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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In this thesis, our focus is on to study complementarity. The concept of complementarity is
a priori rather simple to define and understand. Indeed two factors are complementary if a
marginal increase of one factor increases the marginal productivity of the second factor. This
leads, more than a half century ago, Samuelson (1947) to declare:
“In my opinion the problem of complementarity has received more attention than
its merited by intrinsic importance”
Yet, a quarter century later, Samuelson (1974) came to assert:
“The time is ripe for a fresh, modern look at the concept of complementarity.
The last word has not yet been said on this ancient preoccupation of literary and
mathematical economists. The simplest things are often the most complicated to
understand fully”
A recent theoretical and empirical literature gives a confirmation of this assertion by em-
phasizing the potential importance of interactions and complementarity between different
elements of organizational design (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1994). This stream of research looks at organizations as complex systems, in which re-
sources, activities, processes are highly interdependent characteristics that concur in forming
the organizational system (Rivkin and Sigglekow, 2003; Levinthal, 1997). A major finding of
this literature is that organizational design practices are “clustered”: the adoption of practices
is correlated across firms and some “sets” of practices consistently appear together. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that such clustering might arise if the choice are complements. The
analysis of such complementary effects needs both theoretical and empirical tools.
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First, because practices are discrete by nature new monotone comparative statics methods
are needed that can be conduced without many of the restrictions required by the implicit-
function theorem. One advantage with new approach is that derivatives of relevant functions
need not to be continuous, and objective functions need not to be concave. It has also the
appeal of ease of use relative to the implicit function theorem. But the main advantage is
that it works for discrete (as well as infinitisimally) change in a policy or exogenous variable.
Similarly, taking serioulsy into account the problem of practices adoption strategies between
many players and choice variables make the calculation of a definitive comparative static
result tedious if not impossible. Multiple equilibria are also common in many games, making
it difficult to apply the implicit-function theorem. Monotone comparative methods are also
tractable in this setting. Recent works shows that unambiguous comparative static results can
emerge when a game exhibits increasing monotonic best-reply functions, wich occurs when
all strategic variables are complementary (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1999). That
is, each player’s own choice variables are complementary and all strategic variables across
players are strategic complements. A game with this structure is called a supermodular game
or a game with strategic complementarities.
Second, new empirical models are needed to test for complementarity. Indeed, most of the
recent studies have neither recogneized nor accounted for the potential impact of unobserved
variation in the costs and benefits of the organizational practices (Arora and Gambardella,
1990; Ichniowski et al., 1997). Following Athey and Stern (1998) our thesis uses the pro-
ductivity and adoption approaches to test for complementarity. We more precisely focus
on the separable identification of the complementarity parameter and the parameter of joint
distribution of unobservables.
In what follows, we first give some motivations for modeling and testing for complementarity
(1.1), before presenting the main objectives (1.2) and empirical context of our thesis (1.3).
Finally, we present the outline of our thesis dissertation (1.4).
1.1 The need to model and test for complementarity
The first formal formulation of the complementarity framework in the field of management
and organization is due to Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) who studied the shifts to mod-
ern manufacturing. The declared purposes of their work were to give substance to previously
elusive notions such as “fit” or “systems effects” and complementarity between practices,
provide some basis for interpreting claims such as the need for strategy and structure to fit
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one another by clarifying some ambiguities and enrich our understanding concerning direc-
tions of causation.
The definition of complementarity adopted by the majority of contributions in this field (and
also that will be adopted in the present study) is that of Edgeworth complements: two strate-
gies/activities are complements if doing (more of) anyone of them increases the value to doing
(more of) the others (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). The idea is that of positive mixed-partial
derivatives of a payoff function, in which the marginal returns to one variable are increasing
in the levels of the other variable. From this point of view, returns of each variable (strat-
egy/activity) are related to that of its complements, and then a variation in the level of one
variable is more profitable if the whole system is changed. For an empirical view, whether
a combination of strategic choices together can deliver an output greater than the adoption
of choices in isolation gives an idea to study the synergistic effects of business strategies on
production. More precisely, complementarity can be defined as marginal benefit of acquiring
one business strategy increases with the acquisition of relevant strategy. Inversely, substi-
tutability can be defined as marginal benefits of acquiring one strategy decreases with the
acquisition of related strategy (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994).
In their contribution, Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) use the lattice theory, together with
the supermodularity concept, to provide a mathematical framework able to represent this kind
of complementary interactions (positive and negative) among variables with a tractable model
(despite the high number of variables to consider). This approach avoids some of the main
restrictions typical of economic models (payoff function’s continuity and differentiability and
domain’s convexity) (Moretti and Tamma, 2010).
After this seminal work, two main streams of research emerged: that of theoretical contribu-
tions and that of empirical studies. On the theoretical side several contributions have been
developed, mainly focusing on well-defined areas of research, dealing with specific economic
and managerial instances (Vives, 1990; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). Schaefer (1999)
represents the optimal partitioning of product design. Another interesting example of appli-
cation of the complementarity framework is that of Mayer et al. (2004) who designed a model
based on the concepts of complements and substitutes, which examines the idea present in
procurement management that sees supply inspections and supplier plant inspections as sub-
stitutes. The work of Csorba (2006) applies the complementarity concept to develop a gen-
eral model to describe and solve the screening problem faced by a monopolist seller of a
network commodity. A burgeoning literature tries to test for complementarity using exper-
imental economics. Strategy and organization scholars simulated complementarities among
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organizational characteristics to study their effect on performance, innovation, complexity
and competitive advantages (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999; Ghemawat and
Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin, 2000; Porter and Sigglekow, 2001;
Sigglekow and Levinthal, 2002; Sigglekow, 2002).
The method widely used to test for complementarity is empirical studies. Two approaches
are developed in these empirical researches (Athey and Stern, 1998). The first one test for
complementarity effects on the firm performance (Whittington et al., 1999; MacDuffie and
Krafcik, 1992; Parthasarthy and Sethi, 1993; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Ichniowski and Shaw,
1999; Massini and Pettigrew, 2003). Using mainly OLS models, this approach show that two
business strategies or activities are said to interact if the coefficient of the dummy catching
the presence of both activities is positive and significant. Similarly, two strategies (activities)
can be defined as substitutes if the interaction term is negative. Then we can think of substi-
tutability as a complementarity of negative intensity. The second approach is related to the
adoption rate, namely oriented to analyze complementarities identifying the adoption rate of
some organizational characteristics (new technologies, practices, innovative strategies, etc.)
by a significant group of firms (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Colombo and Mosconi, 1995;
Abernathy et al., 1995; Whittington et al., 1999; Laursen and Mahnke, 2001; Bresnahan et
al., 2002). A first study dedicated to inter-organizational complementarity linkages is due to
Arora and Gambardella (1990), who studied external linkages between small and medium
size biotechnology firms and universities. They demonstrated through an empirical study for
a large sample US, European, and Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical producers, that the
strategies of external linkage of the large firms with other parties are complementary to one
another. Complementarity here is interpreted as a catalyst for inter-organizational relation-
ships directed to a profound innovation process. Another example is the study of Biesebroeck
(2007) about different car and light truck models produced in North America. He suggested
that producing this increased variety of vehicles is associated with a productivity penalty. He
showed that manufacturers can adopt complementary activities to reduce this penalty. Flexi-
ble technology to assemble models derived from different “platforms” on the same assembly
line, and bringing previously outsourced activities in-house are two identified components
that could minimize the penalty. Mothe et al., (2011) and Mohnen and Röller (2003) study
synergistic effects of organizational innovation practices on firm performance.
Most of these studies rarely discussed in detail the issue of unobserved heterogeneity that can
cause misleading results (Athey and Stern, 1998). There are different components of unob-
served heterogeneity which can deteriorate the results. Some of which can be classified as:
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(i) choice set considered by individuals can vary across the members of the population, this
unobserved choice set process must be explicitly treated in modeling; (ii) some attributes are
not directly observable in surveys, but which may be used by decision-makers while choosing
an alternative from a choice set. Such attributes are usually individual’s perceptions of alter-
natives and their attributes. For example, in business mode choice context, such attributes
include “environmental effects”, “managers experience”, etc.
1.2 Thesis objectives and contributions
The primary objective for this work is to test for complementarity by separating the aspect of
unobserved heterogeneity. This implies to develop and test models that also account for the
incoherence problem of models usually used in the adoption approach.
The main contributions of this thesis is methodological as well as empirical with an em-
phasis on capturing complementarity using the two approaches (productivity and adoption
approaches) defined by Athey and Stern (1998). When data available to us contained a per-
formance measure, we were able to test complementarity by productivity approach. To work
with this, we have practiced ordinary least square (OLS) regression as a methodology testing
for complementarity. We unfold the use of dummy variables in the OLS regression to measure
the synergistic effect of practices or activities on payoff. When we have no measure of per-
formance, we have recourse to the indirect approach by regressing discrete adoption choices
on observable characteristics of smallholder farmers. Contrary to classical methods in liter-
ature, we use a new way to test complementarity that carries out unobserved heterogeneity
separately by estimating a multinomial probit model. We apply the discrete choice model for
decision protocol complementarity in a business strategy mode choice context with data from
French small agricultural cooperatives (2005) and smallholder farmers from Pakistan (2010).
For the survey data on smallholder farmers, we test the existence of complementarity between
cropping and livestock activities performed by smallholders by using both approaches.
1.3 Empirical Context
To test for complementarity we use two databases. The first one the quality signaling strate-
gies by small French cooperatives. The second is on the farming systems choices by small-
holder farmers in the Punjab Pakistan province.
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Innovation and quality signals. Innovation is getting ever more importance in the cooper-
ative business environment today as product lifestyles become shorter and technology trans-
formation rate become faster (Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997; Tidd et al., 2005). Due to this,
innovation active firms are found to be more productive than less or no innovation active firms
(Anastassopoulos and Rama, 2003; Breschi et al., 2000). The produce-and-sell perception
of the commodity agribusiness is being replaced by the strategy of first determining what at-
tributes consumer wants in their food products then creating or manufacturing products with
those attributes. With the continuous shifting to the global economy, the international agro-
food market for value-added products is growing in terms of business innovation (Dorsey and
Boland, 2009).
These innovations constitute different portfolio of agro-food products. Major innovations
emanate with the quality of product as consumers are directly addressed and firms have to
pay attention to consumer satisfaction. The idea of branding and quality labeling is based
on the health and safety matters at one hand, and the recognition of the organization at the
other hand. Insurgence of these quality signals were highlighted during the bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy crisis or mad cow disease, Escherichia coli (E. Coli) in Germany in
2011, and meat adulteration scandal in 2013. To account for this backlash, food safety mea-
sure were taken in the form of traceability of agro-food products. Traceability mechanism
for food security is based on the effect of information about production safety procedure in
manufacturing systems (Gellynk et al., 2006; Cheng and Simmons, 1994).
Sustainability of these innovations is also an issue that is concerned with the economic value
to the firm (Alfranca et al., 2004). The reasons of failure of great business entities with
disruptive changes in technology, strategy and market structure are due to not considering
the economic effects of these innovations (Christensen, 1997). A successful business entity
achieves the correct balance between innovation and its value creation. Firms that focus pri-
marily on creativity often end up with a loose organizational structure that carries along a
high chance of coming up with innovative product ideas. On the other hand, firms that pri-
marily focus on value creation or value addition often get a more hierarchical organizational
structure which means innovative product ideas rarely break the surface because of the rigid
structure (Brown and Duguid, 2000).
Within the context of both health matters and economic value of branding and quality labeling
adoption in agribusiness, a recent thread of literature has emerged concerning implementation
of these quality signals into agro-food products, willingness to pay, and their costs and bene-
fits (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2003; Crespi and Marette, 2003; Lence et al., 2007; Bottega et al.,
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2009; Giraud-Heraud et al., 2013; Boumra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 2010). A question is
yet to be addressed in the literature that how different combination of insignia for agro-food
products affect the business entities in terms of payoff.
Crop and livestock mixed Farming. Understanding crop-livestock systems is enormously
challenging that is an open assignment for researchers. For example, mixed farming sys-
tems consist of distinctive but tightly interdependent components or sub-systems which are
highly heterogeneous across regions depending on agro-climatic and demographic condi-
tions (McIntire et al., 2002; Williams et al., 1999). Furthermore, these systems have been
dynamically evolving. Across the developing regions, agro-pastoralists have to face tremen-
dous socio-economic and environmental challenges i.e. population growth and increasing
importance of cash economy, though rates of such changes differ across regions/sub-regions
(Delgado et al., 1999; Steinfeld et al., 2006). What makes the evolution of mixed systems
unpredictable is that smallholder farmers may pursue multiple objectives (e.g. food secu-
rity and income maximization) with multiple system components (e.g. plants and animals).
Crop-livestock integration, defined as a process by which farmers intensify their activities
by integrating components of crop and livestock activities, is expected to be an economically
feasible and environmentally sound pathway for poor agro-pastoralists (Powell and Williams,
1994). Otherwise, there should be competition for resources (e.g. land and labor) between
components with destabilizing effects on resource sustainability. If productivity is to increase
because of increasing demand and increasing land pressure, then there are real research needs
to enhance the complementarities between crop and livestock production (Thornton and Her-
rero, 2001). The potential for integrated crop and livestock is perceived to be high while
further population growth is expected in the next few decades. Hence the need to study the
drivers of interactions contribute for complementarity (Mortimore, 1991; Kristjanson and
Thornton, 2004).
This interdependence of crops and livestock in these systems can be viewed within the con-
text of the economies of scale of joint adoption. Cropping and livestock relationship is of
interest and worth noting: use of livestock manure in sustaining soil productivity (fertility)
for continuous land use; livestock; animals may also be used as a source of farm power (an-
imal traction). Moreover, particularly small ruminants, stand out as an important source of
cash economy at the beginning of the growing season for the purchase of crop inputs. And
livestock can be used as a food security in times of crop failure and a form of savings for
emergency and important occasions.
Crop-livestock farming systems constitute the dominant land use system in developing coun-
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tries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. In developing regions, crop-
livestock farming systems are of growing importance, not only because existing systems are
expanding, but also because formerly specialized cropping and livestock systems are diver-
sifying into mixed farming (Mortimore, 1991; Thornton et al., 2002; Steinfeld et al., 2006).
Considering their significance on livelihoods of the poor, proper understanding of the mixed
crop-livestock systems is critically important in order to devise appropriate policy recom-
mendations and institutional reforms for poverty alleviation, food security and sustainable
resource management (McIntire et al., 1992; Pell, 1999; Thornton and Herrero, 2001; Krist-
janson and Thornton, 2004; Herrero et al., 2007). Moreover, the productivity is also an
important concern with these farming systems. A number of factors affect the productivity
of specialized or mixed farming systems which are to be investigated. Since these farming
systems belong to the poor population of rural areas where most of them are smallholder
farmers, it is important of all for them to maximize income from these production systems.
1.4 Outline of thesis
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents why it is important to study the
model and test of complementarity between existing business strategies. The objective of this
chapter is to raise several questions about different methodologies adopted by researchers to
test for possible complementarity. In response to existed extant approaches and its inability
to cope up with the several statistical aspects of modeling, our motivation of reconsidering
the model to test about complementarity is a strive to those issues that can deprive a firm from
maximum payoffs by using different business strategies. In the empirical context, we intro-
duce some database that have been used in the thesis to test the complementarity empirically.
In addition to the extant literature, we developed different approaches to test for complemen-
tarity following formal procedure of monotone comparative statics and theory of supermod-
ularity (Chapter 2). The three chapters that follow provide empirical responses related to
our questions. Thus, the third chapter of this thesis provides evidence regarding the micro
economic determinants of the adoption of branding and quality labeling strategic choices of
French small agricultural cooperatives (Chapter 3). The fourth chapter comprises of empirical
evidence to use the developed methodology for testing complementarity (adoption approach).
French small agricultural cooperatives data (2005) were used in this chapter (Chapter 4). The
fifth chapter addresses the issue of complementarity between cropping and livestock but in
a different manner than discussed in the preceding chapter. In this case, we have used pro-
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ductivity approach in addition to adoption approach to testing complementarity (Chapter 5).
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes our study.
Chapter 2 is a preliminary chapter that presents an interpretative survey of the existing liter-
ature on adoption of different business strategies in terms of complementarity. It also high-
lights the technical and business organizational literature and the application of such literature
to test for complementarity. The main focus is to set the theoretical basis for testing comple-
mentarity between two business strategies/activities. The adoption of branding and labeling
strategies for agro-food products compliance with an internal logic of production manage-
ment, but also introduces an implementation that is accompanied by complementarity or-
ganizational practices both internally and externally to the firm. Adoption of both insignia
clarifies the consumers perception about brand name who think of that as quality of the prod-
uct. In the first section, we have highlighted the literature about organizational designs along
with the scope of complementarity. The aim of this section is to state the organizational set-
tings in the form of technology, human resources, incentives, coalition with other research
institutions, etc. and their adoption for profit maximization problems. In the second sec-
tion, we have provided with the monotone comparative statics which is the basis for testing
complementarity along with its logic and examples. In the next section, lattice theory and su-
permodular game theory have been discussed. Lattice theory deals with adoption of different
business strategies in an ordered manner. Supermodular functions evaluates the payoffs of us-
ing different business strategies when these are adopted together or not. In the last section, we
have devised two methods to test for possible complementarity between two business strate-
gies. Adoption approach allow us to test for complementarity when explicit performance
measure of different strategies is not available. We discuss in detail the econometric issues of
prevailed model to test for complementarity and its inability to draw conclusions that leads
to increase payoffs in real. To account for these issues, we have devised our own methodol-
ogy and its coherence to test the complementarity by separating unobserved heterogeneity.
In productivity approach we regress performance measure on different characteristics of the
business.
Chapter 3 of this thesis has the objective of analyzing the cooperative level determinants for
the adoption of brand and label insignia by applying a framework of discrete choice models
as business strategies adoption are discrete in nature (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). To be-
gin with, we study the hypothesis that a cooperatives adoption behavior depends on factors
related to its internal characteristics, its vertical relationships or the characteristics of its exter-
nal environment. The idea is to provide a general hypothesis for brand and label adoption that
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can be tested on French small agricultural cooperatives based on small cooperatives survey
(Enquête petites coopératives, SSP, 2005). The survey was carried by the French National
Institute of Statistics (Service central des enquêtes et études statistiques (SCEES)). The other
objective of this chapter is regarding the management decisions about branding and labeling
signalization which are expected to be endogenous to their performance outcomes. Endo-
geneity has important implications for the statistical analysis of such decisions which means
that there are some unobserved factors that also affect the parameter of interest. To do this,
we study the hypothesis of endogeneity of turnover that explicitly depends on quality signals.
The first results that matter for the adoption of branding and labeling choices for agro-food
products reveals some major stylized facts. On the one hand, the results confirm the links
classically observed in the literature between the size, the mode of organization, the supply
chain, and signalized product. Moreover, they emphasize the link between the business of the
company or the product chain, and the choice of signalization adopted. Finally, they tend to
reveal an influence of market innovation strategies in signalization of brand and label through
the effect of geographical target market and the role of distribution. We have used dual em-
pirical approach in this chapter in the form of “unordered” and “ordered” discrete business
strategies. Apparently, it seems quite absurd to allow ’order’ for the branding and labeling
strategies, but we have argued its legitimacy and appropriateness for our study. As far as
endogeneity is concerned, results suggest that after unobserved factors possibly influencing
both phenomena are controlled for, turnover significantly support for increasing quality sig-
nals.
Chapter 4 mainly focus on our extensive work of thesis, i.e. testing complementarity. More
precisely, we evaluate empirically our developed approach to test for the existence of com-
plementarity between branding and labeling adoption strategies in French small agro-food
cooperatives. Our main hypothesis is that the joint adoption of brand and label signalization
business strategies for agro-food products results in more payoffs than separate adoption.
This aspect is rarely studied in agribusiness. The overall objective is to test for the possible
complementarity between branding and labeling strategies in a way to decide whether the
payoffs of joint adoption is greater than the sum of payoffs of their adoption separately. We
further deepen this analysis by focusing on different observable factors that take part in af-
fecting the choice of adoption of innovation strategies. This aspect is also rarely presented in
agro-food literature which can be helpful in determining the choice of innovation strategies
for agro-food products, ceteris paribus, and payoffs will rise.
The results show that the joint adoption of branding and labeling strategies is significantly not
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favorable for small cooperatives in terms of payoffs. Unobserved heterogeneity also matters
significantly in explaining simultaneous adoption of both innovative strategies. Apart from
this, some observable factors that are in favor of adoption of both innovative choices are:
number of employees, cooperatives affiliated with some unions, and those dealing in within
the boundaries on European Union. Last factor suggests that consumers in EU are more
concerned about the quality of the agro-food product in addition to the brand name of the
cooperative.
In this chapter, we have used adoption approach as we did not have the performance measure
of using branding and labeling strategies explicitly. But, the turnover that includes in the data
represents total sales earned by actualizing all the available sources with the cooperative. We
discussed in detail the less suitability of bivariate probit model in testing for complementarity
which is based on correlation coefficient due to error terms and plagued with incoherence
problem. Contrary to this, we have presented error structure of adoption of branding and
labeling business strategies and checked its feasibility with multinomial probit model and
found no incoherence problem.
Chapter 5 is the second empirical evidence of our developed approach to test for possible
complementarity between cropping and livestock farming activities for smallholder farmers
in Pakistan. The integration of two farming activities has largely been discussed, specifically
in African literature, but their joint economic value in terms of complementarity or substi-
tutability was rarely studied. Our main objective is that those smallholder farmers whose
livelihood depend on both activities are economically well-off in contrast to those who adopt
specialized farming activity, either cropping or livestock. In other words, we study to test for
possible complementarity between cropping and livestock farming activities among small-
holder farmers in Pakistan in 2010. In addition to test for complementarity, our focus is to
unveil those factors that affect the joint adoption of farming activities. The inclusion of agro-
climatic variables in the form of regional diversity to test their effects on adoption choices
make this study more valuable as literature rarely focused on this issue.
In this chapter, we have profit to use both productivity (direct) as well as adoption (indirect)
approaches as we have had the performance measure of cropping and livestock adoption
explicitly. In productivity approach we have used ordinary least square (OLS) regression
by including some dummy variables representing the presence/absence of farming activities.
These dummies in addition to other observable factors were regressed to account for comple-
mentarity.
The results obtained through the productivity approach are favoring to conclude about com-
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plementarity for the smallholders. Next to it, some other factors that account for increasing
productivity are age, education, herd size, land size, and mix cropping zone etc. Similarly,
the adoption approach ends up with the conclusion of complementarity between cropping
and livestock. However, unobservable characteristics influence the adoption decisions about
complementarity.
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Chapter 2
Theory about Complementarity
Complementarity in business strategies have argued largely on inductive and experiential
grounds in the form of management of strategy, structure, and managerial process. These
components have come within the purview of economic research, and important advances
have been made in understanding these using economic theory. For example, the manufac-
turing firms that adopt strategic management policies about new technologies and methods
appear to differ from traditional firms in their product strategies as well. Many firms broad-
ening product lines, and there is a widespread increased emphasis on quality, both through
frequent product improvements and new product introductions, and through reductions in de-
fects in manufacturing. A common exercise in economics is to understand how a particular
outcome varies qualitatively with a particular parameter, e.g. whether income tax increases
the investment level in equilibrium or how two business strategies affect jointly on the pay-
offs. When one can answer such a question, this is often driven by a supermodularity (or
complementarity) assumption.
Complementarity in econometrics is pervasive ranging from strategy adoption problems and
acquiring technology issues in industrial organizations. At the heart of complementarity is the
notion, due to Edgeworth, in terms of payoffs that the marginal benefit of acquiring one strat-
egy/technology increases with the acquisition of related strategy/technology. This is mathe-
matically captured by supermodular payoff functions (Amir, 2005). In terms of constraints,
two activities are complementary if doing one activity more does not reduce the possible ac-
tivity level for the other activity. This is mathematically captured by lattices (Yildiz, 2007).
In the maximization problem, the objective reflects a complementarity between an endoge-
nous variable and exogenous parameter, in the sense that having more of one increases the
marginal return to having more of the other, then the optimal value of the former will be
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increasing in the later. In case of multiple exogenous variables, then all of them must also be
complements so as to guarantee that their increases are mutually reinforcing.
In the last two decades, the measurement of complementarity has been somewhat contentious
topic of study for economic analysis. In the literature, complementarity has a deep connection
with strategic situations, and the concept of strategic complementarity is at the center stage of
game-theoretic analysis. The modeling of complementarity, including strategic situations has
proved challenging. The likely reason is that the perturbations of payoff and complex strat-
egy spaces are naturally the norm rather than exception (Vives, 2005). It would not rather
wrong to say that development of theoretical and empirical studies in literature that pose the
question of testing complementarity between strategies is going through transitional phase.
Another controversy is the multiple equilibria particularly in case of demand and supply func-
tions equilibrium which are typical in the presence of complementarity and policy analysis is
left orphan. The genuine difficulty arise because most of the time, testing for complementar-
ity relies on measuring correlations among error terms of equations representing the optimal
decision rules of firms. These simplified representation of the optimal decision rules may
also include the effect of misspecification and/or missing variables in addition to individual
unobserved heterogeneity of firms environments and organizational structure (Mohnen and
Rosa, 2002). In this critical situation, the key is how to build coherent models that are useful
for policy analysis. To partake in studying the synergistic economic effects of two strate-
gies on payoffs, we use actual data to evaluate whether complementarities among business
strategies/activities exist while at the same time controlling for unobserved correlation among
strategies/activities that might only be induced by firms’ unobserved heterogeneity.
This chapter develops a comprehensive theory relating to supermodular function on a lattice,
with a focus on the connection between supermodular functions and complementarity. The
theoretical material is a systematic and integrated view that summarizes and refines previ-
ously published research, and introduces new results.
2.1 Organizational Designs and Scope of Complementarity
During the last decade, internal organizational design choices (such as adoption of strategies
or incentive program) of firms were also considered in addition to focus on labor demand,
investment and productivity (Vandenberghe, 2013). Moreover, recent theoretical and empiri-
cal literature emphasizes the potential importance of interactions between different elements
of organizational designs and their effects of productivity. A major finding of this literature
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is that organizational design practices are “clustered”: the adoption of practices is correlated
across firms, and some sets of practices consistently appear across firms. Economic theory
(e.g. monotone comparative statics and supermodularity theory) suggests that such clustering
might arise if the choices are complement (Ludwig et al., 1977).
Firms have the option to use different strategies with a set of constraints (managerial exper-
tise, environmental, etc.) to minimize the costs or to maximize their profits. The need is to
explore those strategies that can, with the objective function and the constraint set depending
on a parameter, have optimal solutions (Topkis, 1978). Lattices and supermodularity theory
are the dynamic tools in economic research to explore the collection of strategies that a firm
can adopt to achieve optimization.
Manufacturing process through technology, strategy and organization in a flexible multiprod-
uct firm generates comprehensible and consistent response to market conditions. To handle
optimization problems in economics, the objective function not necessarily needs to be differ-
entiable nor convex (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). There exists the solution to optimization
problems that replaced the classical theory of productivity and implicit function theorem. The
manufacturing firms that adopt these new methods appear to differ from traditional firms in
their product strategies as well. For example, ford changed its production pattern and adopted
a parallel team approach to design and manufacturing engineering in conjunction with com-
puter aided simulation techniques that cut the development time of new models by one third
(Taylor, 1988). Characteristics of modern manufacturing proved to be time and cost effective
tools that were analyzed by economic models to achieve optimization through synthesizing
those characteristics that respond in terms of complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994).
Obviously, every firm has the capacity to maximize its output through less costs and they
can benefit the use of maximum resources that they have. In spite of all this, they need
external linkages with some organizations that can be resulted in optimizing the objective
of the firms. In the field of biotechnology, large firms enter into different kinds of linkages
with universities and small/medium sized research intensive firms. These external linkages
in the form of research can be tested for complementarity through correlation (Arora and
Gambardella, 1990).
By joining different strategies, some firms come across multiple equilibria. Now the problem
is to measure which solution produce optimum results. Ordered behavior and lattice theory
provide the solutions to optimization problems in case of multiple equilibria. Strategic com-
plementarities based on lattice theory characterizes the optimization problems when there
are multiple solutions of interaction between strategies (Vives, 1990, 2005; Vives and Gale,
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2009). Innovation is a key factor for achieving a better environmental performance of firms,
to the extent that helps increasing the material/energy efficiency of production process and
reducing emission/effluents associated to outputs (Mazzanti et al., 2008). Input complemen-
tarity between structural characteristics of a firm elucidates the innovation oriented industrial
relations.
Well designed projects are the key to successful completion. Different characteristics and
policies of the firm play an important part in acquiring the innovation. However, there are
some obstacles that cause an interruption or barriers to innovation for the firms. Inability
of characteristics and policy implications takes the project towards failure or to postpone
it. Obstacles that can reduce the innovation process can be excessive perceived economic
risk, innovation costs too high, lack of appropriate source of finance, resistance of change
in the firm, lack of skilled personnel, and lack of information on technologies and markets
(Galia and Legros, 2004). In addition to test complementarities between innovative products
and firm management strategies, some firm structure or incentives can also be discussed in
the arena of complementarity. For example, organizational team, incentives, training and
knowledge management can also be tested to measure and increase the performance of a firm
(Galia and Legros, 2005).
In the last two decades, external technology sources have been used for manufacturing firms
with the intensity to cope up with new market challenges and to enhance their payoffs. Some
researchers studied the effectiveness of these external technology acquisition on the payoffs
of the firms. These external sources are tangible as well as intangible that can acquire through
licensing agreements (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2007; Freitas et al., 2008; Hou and Mohnen,
2013).
The adoption of R&D from different sources also affect productivity. These sources in con-
nection with competitors, clients, suppliers, universities, and research institutes provides their
synergistic affects in terms of complementarity or substitutability. The ideal situation occurs
when all the partners joining with R&D respond in boosting up productivity. But, due to
some constraints like firm size or specific strategy combinations can restrict their productiv-
ity (Belderbos et al., 2006).
Regulated gambling is a multi-billion dollar industry in the United States with greater than
100 percent increases in revenue over the past decade. Along with this rise in gambling
popularity and gaming options comes an increased risk of addiction and the associated social
costs. Use of alcohol during gambling is a norm rather than exception in US. Male population
separated from their families and from different ethnicity cause complementarity between
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gambling and alcohol (French et al., 2008).
A business value can be measured in terms of using information technology (IT) e-commerce
strategies. A US based empirical study on 114 companies in retail industry was established
to test complementarity between IT and e-commerce concluded with synergistic effect be-
tween front-end e-commerce and back-end IT infrastructure contributes positively to firm
performance in terms of sales per employee, inventory turnover, and cost reduction (Zhu,
2004).
These studies are accounted for testing complementarity either in business strategies or tech-
nology. However, most of these studies are “incomplete” due to not accounted for potential
impact of unobserved heterogeneity (variation) in the costs and benefits of organizational
design practices. Moreover, these studies rarely came across the problems of incoherence an-
alyzing the choices discussed by Miravete and Pernias (2010). Our analysis highlights how
particular forms of unobserved heterogeneity bias the test statistic in specific directions. Two
alternative assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity are possible: the unobserved returns
among practiced strategies are affiliated or these are independent. The presence of positive
correlation between the unobserved returns to the two different practices yields positive cor-
relation between strategies. On the other hand, complementarity between strategies creates a
force towards understanding interaction effects.
Our second aim to formulate the model is to analyze the properties of a structural estimate
of parameters, that is, to verify whether these estimates really describe the objectives? And
the assumptions on which correlation have been drawn are really coherent. There are several
advantages to using such a structural approach in the context of heterogeneity and incoher-
ence problems. First, by accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, it is possible to obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters of organizational design as well as covariance between
unobserved returns to different organizational designs practices. Second, our model nests all
prior models we are aware of, and so direct comparison can be made between the implicit
assumptions associated with previous approaches. Third, by specifying and internally con-
sistent simultaneous equations system, we can impose the cross equation restrictions of the
interaction effects.
Firms are not only multi-input, multi-output production units, but also transform resources in
nonlinear ways. Techniques for analysis must be flexible enough to represent the complexity
of production processes. We propose that an appropriate research strategy must fulfill a
requirement for multidimensional mapping i.e. apart from testing complementarity, it also
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the same time. On the line of the methodological
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discussion made above, it appears that the quantitative tools available from the productivity
and efficiency literature offer great opportunities for carrying out explorative analysis on
the multidimensional profile of firms. Furthermore, some initial developments of interactive
software promise to deliver, within a few years, friendly tools to manage simulated and real
multidimensional scenario building on these aspects. These developments are very important
for addressing a critical issue in the literature.
2.2 Monotone Comparative Statics
Monotone comparative statics is particularly concerned with scenarios where optimal deci-
sions vary monotonically with different characteristics of the firm. These characteristics may
contain policy change, exogenous factor, or parameter. For a collection of optimization prob-
lems where the objective function and the constraint set depend on these characteristics, com-
parative statics is concerned with the dependence of optimal solutions on these characteristics
and monotone comparative statics is concerned with optimal solutions varying monotonically
with these characteristics. In a non-cooperative game where every player takes decision inde-
pendently, the characteristics may affect the payoff function of various players, the collection
of strategies, and the set of players participating in the game. Monotone comparative statics
technique in economics can be determined as a corner stone of economic analysis which en-
ables predictions and understanding of economic effects by comparing equilibria before and
after a change in demand/supply, (eco-industrial) policy, exogenous factor, or parameter. This
technique is used for different business strategies in economics concerning analyzing changes
in equilibrium due to change in different factor(s) in the optimization problems. It identifies
that which or how the factor(s) move due to some interventions in the market. Recent work
shows that unambiguous comparative statics results can emerge when a game exhibit increas-
ing monotone functions, which occurs when all strategic variables are complementary. That
is, each player’s own choice variables are complementary and all strategic variables across
players are strategic complements. A game with this structure is called supermodular game
or game with strategic complementarities.
To illustrate the advantage of modern approach, we highlight the conceptual views of com-
parative statics. A number of research papers have focused on monotone methods for com-
parative statics that are crucial for studying complementarity. These includes Topkis (1978,
1998), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Shannon (1995) and
Athey (1996).
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This analytic theory has very close concern with the game theory in business, we will use
the term ’player’ for the agent who make a discrete choice from a set of feasible choices
X . These choices could be multidimensional, that is, a vector of N component choice vari-
ables set x = (x1, . . . ,xN). The choice set X can represent utilization of different strategies
in business {= 1} or not {= 0}. For every discrete choice x ∈ {0,1}, it is assumed that the
player receives a payoff pi(x;θ) = pi(x1 (θ) , . . . ,xN (θ)) which is also called objective func-
tion, utility function, profit function of the firm and in general each firm wants to maximize
it by solving
max
x∈X
pi(x;θ)
We study the qualitative properties of the optimum (or optimal set) that a player chooses; and
how the optimal choices x∗ vary with θ = (θ1, . . . , θM), a vector of exogenous parameters
which is not under control of the player. Study of determining such qualitative relationships
is the core of economic theory and is of particular interest, however, are the situations when
these qualitative relationships are monotone, that is, choice moves monotonically upwards
or downwards to an increase in parameter. Sometimes, the mechanism behind the up and
down of economic variable is easy when the choice variable and parameter are real numbers
or integers. Contrary to this, it becomes merely enigmatic when the relation between choice
variables and exogenous parameter gets more complex like changes in technology or institu-
tions. However, the ideal situation is very rare to have enough information about objective
functions and choice sets to be able to do this. It is a more reasonable expectation that qual-
itative conditions are available about the structure of these problems. However, if one may
not know the magnitude of the marginal returns to changing a choice variable, one may know
that these returns will be greater or smaller if a parameter is higher or lower. And the tools
for comparative statics tells us that this is the only sort of information one needs.
It is rather a good idea to build intuition about what drive comparative statics result, we start to
consider situations in which there is one choice variable. In notation, player chooses a single
variable x ∈ {0,1} from X . Also, for simplicity suppose that the player is maximizing the
objective function (under certain constraints) (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) that is composed
of a benefit minus cost:
pi(x;θ) = maxx∈x∗(θ) B(x;θ)−C (x)
Benefits and costs or anyone of these could be influenced by other parameters. In general,
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profit or payoff function is comprised of revenues minus cost. But, here we have used benefits
in place of revenues because of generality of the term. When the marginal benefit to an
activity is increased and there is no change in marginal cost, or marginal cost increases but
less than marginal benefit, more of that activity will be undertaken by an optimising player.
In above case, the benefit to increase x is (for x′ ≥ x):
B
(
x′;θ
)−B(x;θ) =4B(θ)
is an increasing function. A necessary and sufficient condition for the family B(·;θ) to obey
increasing differences is that
∂2B(x;θ)
∂x∂θ
≥ 0
This implies that an increase in θ increases the marginal benefits of the action of a player.
Note that marginal cost (C (x′)−C (x)) do not change as θ changes. So if for any higher θ
(i.e. θ′ ≥ θ), ∆B(θ) has a higher value, then x∗ (θ) will be monotone non-decreasing. In this
case, raising the parameter directly raises the marginal net return to doing x. Hence, after
parameter change, doing more of x will result in higher payoffs. For example, a firm wants to
increase its payoffs by choosing only one choice variable i.e. quality labeling on its products.
By introducing this choice strategy, firm will have to pay a little more in the form of costs
but they may be able to get more benefit due to this strategic intervention on its products in
the form of quality certification. If firms marginal benefits or marginal returns get increased,
we say that firm is getting more by the intervention of one choice variable on its products.
Hence, after the parameter change, the optimum x∗ (θ) is achieved. It turns out the some
form of complementarity between choices and exogenous variables lies at the heart of any
monotone comparative statics conclusion.
The above theorem provides a sufficient condition for monotone comparative statics whereas
its extension has proved to be stronger result that non-decreasing differences is the least
restrictive assumption we can place to generate monotone comparative statics.
Example 11 To illustrate the comparative statics approach, we investigate the comparative
statics of a monopoly firm whose goal is to maximize profit with respect to output. Let the
firm’s inverse demand be p = a− bq where q is output, p is price, and parameters a and b
1We have taken this example from “The Neglect of Monotone Comparative Statics Methods”, Trembley and
Trembley (2010)
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are positive. The firms total cost function (TC) is linear and depends on a regulatory policy
(R), such that TC = cq+R and c > 0. In this example, the government poses a per unit
subsidy to encourage monopoly production: R = −sq, s > 0. Thus, the firms profit equals
pi= (a−bq− c+ s)q. To ensure that profits are non-negative in equilibrium, a > c− s. Our
goal is to determine how a change in s will affect the firms profit maximizing output. In this
simple model, comparative static analysis can be derived directly from the solution to the
monopoly problem. The firms first- and second-order conditions are:
∂pi
∂q
= a− c+ s−2bq = 0
∂2pi
∂q2
=−2bq < 0
From the first order condition, the firms profit maximizing output (q∗) is:
q∗ =
a− c+ s
2b
Thus for a marginal change in s, ∂q
∗
∂s =
1
2b > 0. For a discrete increase in s from s
1 to s2, the
change in q∗ is s
2−s1
2b > 0. With explicit function, both the sign and magnitude of change can
be obtained.
This is the case when only one output is possible. Monotone methods get more complicated
when the player choose two2 variables. With a single choice variable, checking for increasing
marginal returns on increasing differences is essentially all that is required to do monotone
comparative static analysis. For two choice variables, the analysis by monotone method
gets more complicated due to interaction effects. In this case, the monotonicity theorems3
also require that both choice variables be complementary. For two choice variables with the
objective function pi(x1,x2,α), complementarity of choice variables means that ∂
2pi
∂x1∂x2
≥ 0.
When this condition holds, the objective function is said to be supermodular. Thus, the
application of monotone comparative static analysis in case of two choice variables require
that one must check for both supermodularity and increasing marginal returns. To avoid the
complication of analyzing monotone comparative statics in case of two choice variables, we
use lattice theory which better explains the discrete choice variables adoption by the player.
2We restrict upto two choice variables because of limitation of our study.
3Strict and weak monotonicity theorems.
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Concepts related to supermodular functions on a lattice develops a formal step in the eco-
nomics literature of complementarity. Following section includes general concepts relevant
for the present study on supermodularity and complementarity. The theory in this section is
used in the applications that follow in chapters 3 and 4.
2.3 Lattices and Supermodularity
Lattice theory is a branch of mathematics concerning partially ordered sets (Birkhoff, 1984).
This theory was first applied by Topkis (1978) and then Milgrom and Roerts (1990, 1995)
to profit maximization problems. The laid down structure of lattice theory allows for the
use of discrete variables in the optimization process, which is not possible with conventional
mathematical tools. It is very important that it permits clear comparative statics results for
observed changes in discrete choice variables and internal structure of firms as optimizing
responses to environmental changes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). This is underlying theory
for complementarity analysis. To start with this, we need to know first the preliminaries and
definitions about lattice theory.
Definition1 Let ≥ be a binary relation on a nonempty set X . The pair (X ,≥)is a partially
ordered set consists of a nonempty set X endowed with partial order relation≥, if ≥ is re-
flexive, transitive, and antisymmetric4. A partially ordered set (X ,≥) is said to be completely
ordered if for x ∈ X and y ∈ X , either x≥ y or y≥ x. When there is no ambiguity, we will say
for short that X (rather than (X ,≥)) is a poset, meaning that the partial order relation is un-
derstood. In particular, unless differently specified, R will always be assumed to be endowed
with the usual ≥ order relation. If X is a poset, we say that the elements of the pair (x,y) ∈ X
are comparable if (x≥ y) or (y≥ x) (or both). A partially-ordered set is said to be lattice if
each doubleton subset has greatest lower bound (inf ) or ∧X and smallest upper bound (sup)
or ∨X .
Definition 2 A partially ordered set (X ,≥) is said to be lattice iff for all x,y ∈ X ,
4
• The reflexive property states that for every real number x, x≥ x. For example, the relation≥ on the set of
integers {0,1} is {< 0,0 >, < 0,1 >, < 1,1 >} and it is reflexive because < 1,1 > are in this relation.
• The antisymmetric property states that for all real numbers x and y, if x≥ y and y≥ x, then x = y;
• The transitive property states that for all real numbers x,y and z, if x≥ y and y≥ z, then x≥ z.
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x∨ y = (max{x1, y1} , . . . ,max{xn, yn})
x∧ y = (min{x1, y1} , . . . ,min{xn, yn})
Here, operators ∨ and ∧ are called join (or supremum) and meet (or infimum) respectively,
and S denotes the discrete business strategies or choice variables that a player has to choose.
For our purpose, the nodes of the lattice will represent different business strategies or payoffs
due to the adoption of choice variables. A typical business firm could use none, one or both
of the business strategies and can result in four possible states: (x = 0 = y) if a particular
business uses none of the strategy; (x = 1,y = 0) if it uses first strategy only; (x = 0,y = 1)
if it second strategy only; and (x = 1 = y) if it uses both of the given strategies. If the two
strategies were complementary, then using both simultaneously would be better than using
either one individually and certainly better than using neither. The lattice for this is shown
in Fig. 1.1 where vertical height represents profit. Lattice speaks for different profit levels
achieved by using different combinations of strategies. From this we can see the optimal path
for the business to follow in order to increase profits. In complementarity situation, it would
be best to use both strategies simultaneously.
Figure 2.3.1: Lattice
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2.3.1 Supermodularity - a function on lattice
The step for determining optimal solutions is theory of supermodularity. Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) defined a supermodular function when “the sum of the changes in the payoff function
when several arguments are increased separately is less than the change resulting for increas-
ing all arguments together”. Supermodular function actually exhibits the property of comple-
mentarity as increasing or more inputs raises the return to increasing additional strategies.
Theory of supermodularity is the basis for analyzing structural properties of a collection of
parametrized problems. Concepts related to supermodular functions on a lattice develops a
formal step in the economics literature of complementarity. This theory is based on the use of
two business strategies which are discrete in nature and which states that these strategies are
adopted by a business {= 1} or not {= 0}. Supermodularity theory states that the payoffs of
two business strategies adopted together is greater than the sum of payoffs of their adoption in
isolation, depending on the observable characteristics of the business. For ease to understand,
we discuss this theory with the help of lattice. In what follows we present briefly basic
elements of the lattice theory.
Given any lattice (X ,≥), a function f : X → R is said to be supermodular if for all x,y ∈ X ,
f (x∨ y)+ f (x∧ y)≥ f (x)+ f (y)
A function f is said to be submodular if -f is supermodular. When X = X1×X2, ordered coor-
dinate wise, supermodularity captures the idea of complementarity between X1 = (x1,y1) =
(0,1) and X2 = (x2,y2) = (0,1) precisely. Indeed, if we take x = (x2,y1) = (1,0) and
y = (x1,y2) = (0,1), then (x∨ y) = (x2,y2) = (1,1) and (x∧ y) = (x1,y1) = (0,0). Then,
we can write the inequality in the definition of supermodularity as
f (1,1)− f (1,0)≥ f (0,1)− f (0,0)
This implies that the marginal contribution of an input is increasing with the other input,
capturing the usual meaning of complementarity. One can also write the above inequality as
a condition of mixed differences:
[ f (1,1)− f (1,0)]− [ f (0,1)− f (0,0)]≥ 0
This condition reduces to a usual restriction on the cross derivatives for smooth functions on
R2:
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∂2 f
∂x1∂x2
≥ 0
A function is supermodular if for every strategic pair of input the function is supermodular
in those inputs. The sum of two or more supermodular function is supermodular but the
product is not necessarily supermodular (Topkis, 1978). These theorems are important for
the decomposition of complex functions such as profit function where there are numerous
relationships between subsets supply chain, organizational setup, productivity, and internal
costs etc. are involved. These theorems enable the creation of supermodular function to
demonstrate the effect of complementarity on output (Topkis, 1978; Milgrom and Roberts,
1990, 1995; Mohnen and Röller, 2005).
A function is supermodular if for every strategic pair of input the function is supermodular
in those inputs. The sum of two or more supermodular function is supermodular but the
product is not necessarily supermodular (Topkis, 1978). These theorems enable the creation
of supermodular function to demonstrate the effect of complementarity on output (Topkis,
1978; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995; Mohnen and Röller, 2005).
2.4 Complementarity
The standard analytical implementation of the complementarity hypothesis rests upon a car-
dinal view of the concept: a twice differentiable payoff function pi
(
s1,s2;X
)
is introduced as
a function of s1 and s2 endogenously determined practices and a vector X of exogenous fac-
tors. The necessary and sufficient condition for the practices s1 and s2 to be complementary
is to find nonnegative mixed partial derivatives:
∂2pi
(
s1,s2;X
)
∂s1∂s2
≥ 0 ∀θ (2.4.1)
That is, marginal returns on one strategy increases in the level of the other, for any given value
of the other arguments of pi. It may also possible that given two complementary practices s1
and s2, the firm might have no incentive in increasing any of them individually, but still find
an advantage in increasing both of them simultaneously.
We suppose that a firm adopt 2 feasible choices s1 and s2 from a partially ordered set X
feasible choices with the profit maximization principle that the firm has to maximize his own
payoffs:
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maxs1,s2⊂X pi(s
1,s2)
where s1 ∈{0,1} and s2 ∈{0,1} are discrete choices which represents the adoption of choices
{= 1} or not {= 0}. In the context of supermodularity, we simply define that two business
activities would be considered as complementary if (i) adopting one business strategy does
not preclude the adoption of the other; and (ii) the total payoffs through joint action is greater
than their sum, in isolation. More formally, a firm is free to choose any of the discrete
choices or both as
(
s1 = s2 = 1
)
or not
(
s1 = s2 = 0
)
. The ingredients of productivity fac-
tor or performance measures which is assumed by adopting each strategy are the payoffs(
pi
(
s1,s2
))
obtained by practicing respective strategy or the percentage of income generated
by a strategy. Given that we can only identify payoff differences in discrete choice formula-
tion, consider the payoff difference to positioning on both business activities as:
[pi(1,1)−pi(0,0)] = [pi(0,1)−pi(0,0)]+ [pi(1,0)−pi(0,0)]+δ (2.4.2)
where δ shows the effect of complementarity. In the principle of complementarity, δ must be
positive but it can also be negative if there is substitute relationship between business activ-
ities. From above equation, we can easily forsee the connection between complementarity
and supermodularity of payoffs of s1 and s2 adoption. That is, s1 and s2 are complementary
iff :
δ= pi(1,1)−pi(0,1)−pi(1,0)+pi(0,0)≥ 0 (2.4.3)
This implies that higher payoffs are achieved when the two practices are used together com-
pared to a situation when they are used separately. The definition for substitutability is iden-
tical to the definition above except that ’larger’ is replaced by ’smaller’.
2.4.1 Testing for Complementarity
First, we use the direct approach to test for complementarity by estimating the “objective
function”, alternative combinations of s1 and s2 adopted by a firm being included as dummy
explanatory variables. The direct approach focuses directly on the relation between per-
formance and different combination of these activities. Second, we also use the indirect
approach by regressing discrete adoption choices on observable characteristics of the firms.
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Contrary to classical methods in literature, we have devised a new way to test complementar-
ity that carries out unobserved heterogeneity separately by estimating a multinomial probit
model.
2.4.1.1 The Direct (Productivity) Approach
This approach is based directly on the objective function of the business entity which is to
maximize the payoffs by utilizing different combination of business activities. The main
idea is that the joint implementation of activities should prove to be more valuable in terms
of productivity or payoffs than implementing both of them separately. The test of comple-
mentarity is thus performed by regressing a measure of performance on a set of dummy
variables that represent the adoption of different combination of activities (interpreted as
parameters of complementarity), along with observable characteristics on the considered ac-
tivities. Comparing the impacts of alternative combinations of activities stemming from this
estimation allows the detection of complementarity between these activities. One can obtain
certain supportive evidence of complementarity (substitutability) when significant and pos-
itive (negative) coefficients of the dummy variables are observed. Formally, this approach
can be traced back directly to supermodularity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Topkis, 1998)
as shown in subsections 1.3. Note that the related definition of supermodularity provided by
Milgrom and Roberts (1995) only requires a non-negative (rather than a positive) impact of
one practice on the marginal return of another practice. If there are more than two activi-
ties to be tested, the intuition is that whatever the activities are complementary, the objective
function is supermodular.
Applying this approach, Mohnen and Röller (2005) directly estimated the objective function
and investigated whether business decisions are complementary. Lockshin et al. (2008a)
studied the complementarity between product, process and organizational innovations and
their impact on labor productivity. Ichniowski et al. (1997) also used this approach to test
the complementarity between different human resource management practices. However, the
factor of unobserved heterogeneity was ignored which may have substantial influence on the
association between activities even though complementarity may not exist at all which is
the famous endogenous problem. Consequently, direct approach might deliver bias if there
are unobserved factors in the error term that are correlated with the adoption of business
activities.
The proposed test follow directly from the theoretical development of complementarity/substitutability
and establishes the existence of complementarity/substitutability conditional on having un-
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biased estimates for the explanatory variables. A maintained assumption for this analysis
is to provide unbiased estimates is that the drivers of adoption decisions, s1 and s2, are un-
correlated with the error term. Our aim is to derive the inequality (2.4.3), by regressing
these strategies based on observed characteristics, that can be used in empirical tests to verify
whether the inequality is accepted by the data and, hence, whether adoption of s1 increases
the marginal returns of s2, or vice versa. We estimate the following equation through ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression:
pii
(
s1,s2
)
=
(
1− s1i
)(
1− s2i
)
θ00+ s1i
(
1− s2i
)
θ10+
(
1− s1i
)
s2i θ01+ s
1
i s
2
i θ11+Xiβ+ εi
(2.4.4)
That is, alternative combinations of different business practices being included as explanatory
variables. The performance approach focuses directly on the relation between performance
and different practices adopted by firms. This is in order to compare the impact of alternative
combinations of adoption choices on the performance of the business. Subscript i refers to the
firm i; θ11 are the coefficients of productivity on the adoption choice of both activities jointly,
the same criteria can be applied to θ10, θ01 and θ00. The objective function is supermodular
and s1 and s2 are complements only if θ11− θ01 ≥ θ10− θ00. In order to investigate the
partial returns from s1 and s2, we choose a simplified alternative form to express the objective
function. For example, equation (2.4.4) can be rewritten as
pii
(
s1,s2
)
= θ0+ s1i ·θ1+ s2i ·θ2+ s12i ·δ+βXi+ εi (2.4.5)
where
θ0 = θ00
θ1 = θ01−θ00
θ2 = θ10−θ00
δ= [θ11−θ01]− [θ10−θ00]
θ1 captures the non-exclusive partial effects of s1; θ2 is the non-exclusive returns of s2; δ tells
the returns of adopting both activities s1 and s2 together and represents exactly the comple-
mentarity coefficient we are trying to test; θ0 is constant. Hence, the condition for the above
production function in a supermodular form can be simplified as (2.4.3):
δ= [θ11−θ01]− [θ10−θ00]≥ 0 (2.4.6)
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One important point need to be highlighted here is that the objective function in (2.4.4) is
the same as expressed in (2.4.5) but with some transformation, the complementarity can now
be reflected by testing inequality (2.4.6). Considering this simplicity, we will adopt above
equation in our empirical analysis. Further, it is also worth to note here that equation (2.4.5)
clearly shows that the marginal returns to either s1 or s2 will not be constant anymore if
synergistic effect is present (δ 6= 0).
Athey and Stern (1998) argued that OLS results can be biased due to unobserved heterogene-
ity in the choice of s1 and/or s2. In other words, OLS regression can be estimated the effect
of complementarity whilst there is no any complementarity in real, or vice versa. We do not
have any measure with OLS to correct for this unobserved heterogeneity. To do this, we use
adoption approach.
2.4.1.2 The Indirect (Adoption) Approach
Since complementarity creates a force in favor of increasing payoffs due to joint adoption
of two business activities, if alternative activities are complementary, then we would expect
rationally behaving individual firms to exploit this opportunity, investing in these activities
at the same time and in the same direction. However, Athey and Stern (1998) noted that
we may not be able to test directly for complementarity if we do not have measure of the
performance of different activities. In order to take this problem into account, we discuss
the prevailed methodology that has been used in literature to test complementarity. This di-
chotomous approach is not feasible for testing complementarity due to incoherence problem.
We first discuss theoretically this incoherence problem and at the second stage, we produce
our developed methodology and its feasibility to test for complementarity without having
incoherence problem.
Bivariate probit model (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Arora, 1996) is used to test for the
existence of complementarity between two business activities when the performance mea-
sure is not available. The model is based on the notion that the individual business derives
payoff by choosing a pair of business strategies or activities, and that is postulated to pick
those strategies/activities which maximizes the payoffs. More specifically, bivariate probit
regresses the non exclusive business activities (cropping and livestock) on the assumed ex-
ogenous control variables (Xi), but takes the correlation between them into account explicitly,
as in the following model:
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s1
∗
i = β
1Xi+ ε1i , s
1∗
i

= 1 if s1
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
s2
∗
i = β
2Xi+ ε2i , s
2∗
i

= 1 if s2
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
where the stochastic errors ε1 and ε2 are independent of Xi but not necessarily independent
of each other. That is, E
(
ε1
)
= E
(
ε2
)
= 0, Var
(
ε1
)
=Var
(
ε2
)
= 1, Corr
(
ε1,ε2
)
= ρ.
At the first stage, each of the n firms choose whether to adopt each of the two activities. The
choice set of each firm consists of the four possible combinations of adoption/non-adoption
of the individual activities, denoted k = {(0,0) ,(0,1) ,(1,0) ,(1,1)} representing the choices
respectively to adopt neither activity, adopt s1 only, adopt s2 only, and adopt both activities.
After the adoption decisions are made, all firms observe some payoffs as:
pi j
∗
i
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
=
(
θ1
∗
+ ε1
∗) · s1i +(θ2∗+ ε2∗) · s2i +δ · s1i · s2i (2.4.7)
where the adoption choice is represented by the two dichotomous variables s1 and s2. To
catch the complementarity effect, a pairwise interaction term (δ) is introduced.
(
θ1,θ2
)
rep-
resent the observable characteristics whereas
(
ε1,ε2
)
are unobservable returns to the econo-
metricians. A firm adopt any activity if profitability exceeds some threshold, say, s1
∗
i =
pi
(
1,s2i
)−pi(0,s2i ). From the latent5 profit function (2.4.7), we get
s1
∗
i = θ
1+ ε1+δs2i (2.4.8)
Next, we define the adoption indicators as a function of whether a firm earn positive profits
if it adopts both business activites:
s ji =

1 if s j
∗
i > 0
0 if s j
∗
i ≤ 0
( j = 1,2) (2.4.9)
5This profit function contains not directly observed characteristics but are rather inferred from original vari-
ables.
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The main interest is in the structural treatment of error terms because testing of comple-
mentarity is based on positive error correlation inducde by unobserved heterogeneity. By
substituting (2.4.8) into (2.4.9), we get
s1i =

1 if ε1i >−θ1−δs2i
0 if ε1i ≤−θ1−δs2i
and similarly s2i =

1 if ε2i >−θ2−δs1i
0 if ε2i ≤−θ2−δs1i
Then, we define
Si (1,1) =
{(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
: pi
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (1,1)
}
as the set of unobserved characteristics that induce
firm i to adopt both activities simultaneously. A firm adopt
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (1,1) under the profit
maximization principle as pi(1,1)> pi(1,0) ,pi(1,1)> pi(0,1) and pi(1,1)> pi(0,0). That is,
we define the set Si (1,1) of the combination of errors
(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
leading to the joint strategy
adoption
Si (1,1) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ}
Similarly, we define the following set Si (1,0) of the combination of errors leading to the
adoption of s1 only
Si (1,0) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i ≤−θ2
∗−δ}
symmetrically, the adoption profile of s2 only is
Si (0,1) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i ≤−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ}
finally the set Si (0,0) leading to the adoption of none of the considered activities is
Si (0,0) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i ≤−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i ≤−θ2
∗−δ}
By drawing these four regions in the Fig. 1.4.1 (for the case of complementarity (δ> 0))
depicts overlapping for the subsets of Si (1,1) and Si (0,0). This overlapping intermingles the
choies of adoption of both business activities and none of these at an area E∗. This ambiguity
leads to the problem of incoherence. This suggest that bivariate probit approach is not the
feasible choice to test the notion of complementarity due to unobserved heterogenity across
the k alternate choices.
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Figure 2.4.1: Adoption of strategies
Multinomial Probit Approach
To solve this incoherence problem, we start with more general pattern of correlation. We
suppose that k indicates the exclusive decision of the firm i to adopt business activities. The
discrete dependent variable k now takes values as k = {0,1,2,3} representing the choices
respectively to adopt neither activity, adopt s1 only, adopt s2 only, and adopt both activities.
The payoffs to firm i from choosing j ∈ k is:
pi ji = β
jXi+ ε
j
i (2.4.10)
where Xi is the vector of observed explanatory variables describing firm i and other charac-
teristics important for the determination of choice. The parameter vector β j are unknown
and these are the object of inference. The vector of stochastic errors ε ji =
(
ε0i ,ε
1
i ,ε2i ,ε3i
)′
represents the unobserved returns of the choices. It is assumed to be distributed as multivari-
ate normal, identically and independently distributed across the n firms, with zero mean and
covariance matrix ∑= σ ji > 0, ∀ j (positive definite).
Arranging the parameters in (2.4.10) as β = (β′0,β
′
1,β
′
2,β
′
3) the log-likelihood function to be
maximized is:
L
(
β,∑
)
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
3
∑
j=0
y ji lnP
j
i
(
β,∑
)
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where the profit indicator pi ji is latent but we observe the choice y
j
i = 1 if a firm i chooses the
alternative j and y ji = 0 otherwise. While P
j
i = Pr
(
pi ji > pi
l
i, l 6= j
)
represents the probability
that the firm i make the choice j under the profit maximization principle. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to get a unique maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters (β,∑) in the
above model, as they are not identified. The first source of the identification problem is that
the observed choices are only informative on the differences of the profits and not on the
profits themselves. Then taking differences with respect to the profits associated with j = 0,
i.e. we take the first alternative as the reference state used to normalize location of the latent
variable.
The payoff function pi ji in (2.4.10) is specified differently for the joint adoption option than
for the others. Specifically, the payoff of joint adoption is:
pi3
∗
i = pi
1∗
i +pi
2∗
i +δ
where δ captures the effect of complementarity between two business activities. The treat-
ment for joint adoption payoff takes into account its econometric interpretation. However,
this specification is convenient given our aim to estimate the effects of observable character-
istics of the firms on the complementarity between s1 and s2. This approach was proposed
by Gentzkow (2007) and Arora et al. (2010). For identification, we have taken differenced
payoffs in (2.4.2) because payoff of adopting neither activity is normalized to zero, as is
necessary given that only the payoff differences determines the observation’s choice. Next,
pi3
∗
i =
(
β1
∗
+β2
∗)
Xi+
(
ε1
∗
i + ε
2∗
i
)
+δ
states that firm i choose both activities to earn an average payoff pi3∗i , with the assumption
that payoff of joint adoption is greatest of all other strategies i.e. pi3∗i > pi
0∗
i , pi
3∗
i > pi
1∗
i and
pi3∗i > pi
2∗
i . Let us define θ j
∗
= β j∗Xi, with θ j
∗
=
(
θ1∗,θ2∗
)′
. Rewriting these conditions lead
to the following constraints on the errors:
ε1
∗
i >−θ1
∗−δ
ε2
∗
i >−θ2
∗−δ
ε1
∗
i + ε
2∗
i >−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ
(2.4.11)
The structural model that was assumed by Miravete and Pernias (2010) to study complemen-
tarity, is:
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pi j
∗
i
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
=
(
θ1
∗
+ ε1
∗) · s1i +(θ2∗+ ε2∗) · s2i +δ · s1i · s2i
As previously,
(
θ1,θ2
)
represents the observable characteristics along with
(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
as unob-
servable returns. Identification of these error terms would be resulted in variances σ21 and σ
2
2,
and a correlation parameter ρ. A positive value of ρ would indicate that firms that tend to be
more profitable in adopting s1 also tend to be more profitable in adopting s2, or vice versa,
even if no profit complementarity exists between the two. Such positive correlation would
also capture unobserved heterogeneity among firms in the preference for business activities.
Negative correlation, on the other hand, may imply unobserved gains from specialization
in one of the activities. The correlation actually presents an identification problem in that
correlation between ε1i and ε2i has a similar effect on the payoffs as the complementarity
term. Rewriting conditions of assuming maximization principle that are due to joint adop-
tion of business activities, we get the same (1.4.11) set of constraints of multinomial probit
(MNP) on the unobserved returns. This suggest that the above structural model can be esti-
mated by MNP. With a MNP, we are able to separate the complementarity effect from that
of unobserved heterogeneity, since we can estimate both δ and ρ. We employ the system of
constraints (1.4.11), by defining the set S3 of the combination of errors
(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
leading to the
joint adoption ( j = 3)
S3 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ,ε1∗i + ε2
∗
i >−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ} ;
Similarly, we define the following set S1 of the combinations of errors leading to the adoption
of cropping only ( j = 1)
S1 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗
,ε2∗i <−θ2
∗−δ,ε1∗i − ε2
∗
i > θ2
∗−θ1∗};
symmetrically, the set S2 of the adoption of livestock only profile ( j = 2)
S2 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i <−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗
,ε2∗i − ε1
∗
i > θ1
∗−θ2∗};
finally, the set S0 leading to the adoption of none of the aforementioned livelihood activities
( j = 0)
S0 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i <−θ1
∗
,ε2∗i <−θ2
∗
,ε1∗i + ε2
∗
i <−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ}.
The purpose of restudying above constraints is to testify our model against the problem of
incoherence due to bivariat probit. We show graphically that there is no overlapping between
these different sets in either situation of supermodularity (δ> 0) or submodularity (δ< 0).
Therefore, we can estimate parameters of the model along with the correlation between dif-
ferent adoption choices. That is, it is possible to separate the complementarity between busi-
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ness activities from the unobserved heterogeneity, and thus recover the structural-parameter
estimate of complementarity by using multinomial probit (MNP).
Figure 2.4.2: Profile of adoption of business activities
2.5 Identification
Identification of Multinomial Probit (MNP) model rests on underlying assumptions about the
nature of individual decision-making. Statistical methods commonly used to identify models
of multinomial choices often impose restrictive assumptions about these choices that render
inferences suspect. The first problem is to normalize the location of the latent variable. That
is, profits are taken as differenced from others and not the profit itself6. We take profits from
other sources as the reference for normalization, i.e.pi∗i (0,0) = 0. In this way, profits can
explain by how much better or worse a firm would do by adopting either or both activities
than would do by adopting other activities than cropping and/or livestock.
The second problem of identification is exclusion restriction. That is, restrictions that certain
exogenous variables in the model do not affect the stochastic profits pik∗i of certain alternatives
(Keane, 1992). To follow this mechanism data must contain some variables that affect the
profit levels of any one activity but not the other.
The third problem is to identify the MNP using estimation techniques. The difficulty with
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is well known i.e. evaluating integral of multivari-
ate normal densities through MLE is nigh impossible to estimate. When a model consists of
higher dimensional alternatives, its identification can be extremely computationally burden-
6For details, see Train 2009 for an extensive discussion.
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some. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) makes the MNP problem much more tractable.
The advantage of MCMC over MLE is that for a three or more choice problem it is not
difficult to obtain precise estimates of unobserved heterogeneity.
There are other class of multinomial choice models like HEV (Heteroscedastic Extreme
Value) but they do not identify the source of unobserved heterogeneity among the profit
levels of alternatives and that can also affect complementarity (Gentzkow, 2007). In other
words, these models rely on the assumptions of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
and estimate error correlation as zero (ρ= 0). Whereas the MNP model can estimate both(
θ1,θ2,δ12
)
which catches complementarity, and (ρ′s) the correlation coefficients between
the errors (Gentzkow, 2007).
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Chapter 3
Small French Cooperatives quality
signaling through Labels and Brands
3.1 Introduction
Despite the general trend of growth in the size of agricultural and agro-industrial coopera-
tives, small cooperatives, defined as a cooperative with 10 or less full time employees1, con-
tinue to play a significant role in farming activities in France. Indeed, even if the 1 500 small
cooperatives represent less than 1% of the processing and marketing activity of agro-food
products, they make a total turnover of 3.6 billion euros and are the first intermediary of over
100 000 small farmers. Therefore, they are closely engaged in their production and strategic
choices to market access. Since the major factor of survival of these small French farmers
is their access to markets, and more particularly to “niche markets” where quality signals
may generate some value (Blogowski et al., 2005; Aubert and Perrier-Cornet, 2010), quality
signal strategies developed by those small cooperatives are a key factor of rural development
in France.
Many quality signals can be used, mainly brands (private signals) and common labels, to
foster the development of quality products in the market (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2003; Crespi
and Marette, 2003; Lence et al., 2007; Bottega et al., 2009). Previous research has typically
focused on either brand or common label efficiency independently, while in many instances
1Recall that agricultural cooperative societies form a legal category of society that distinguishes civil and
commercial companies. Their operations based on solidarity farmers producers to ensure their supply, process-
ing, marketing, and sale of their products. These cooperatives are exempted from corporation tax provided to
operate in accordance with the legal provisions that govern them.
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both signals coexist. Agricultural products pairing brand names and certified labels, such
as indications of origin, are indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese, Scottish whiskeys
and most of the french wines). This chapter aims to understand the different drivers of the
quality signal choices made by the small French cooperatives, with a particular focus on the
coexistence of both signals2. To do this, we use a database from the national survey con-
ducted in 2005 by the ministry of agriculture on the exhaustive sample of 1 500 small French
agricultural cooperatives. The four possible quality signal strategies that the cooperative may
choose are the following: (i) no quality signal; (ii) common label only (AOC, IGP, AB, ...);
(iii) brand only; (iv) mix signal, i.e. both signals (label and brand) are adopted.
To analyze the drivers of these different quality signals, multinomial logit estimations are
carried out in our database. The most striking result is the effect of the marketing variables
and mainly the export markets. If exporting has a significant and positive effect on adopting
a quality signaling, there is a clear differential effects between the specific exporting markets.
Exporting outside the EU borders mainly impacts the brand only signal, while exporting
inside the EU borders affects the label choice and the mix signal. This result supports the
idea that the label only strategy is not relevant outside the domestic market, and outside
the EU borders the brand only signal seems to be the more adequate strategy. The second
significant result is the impact of the products. For example, branding alone are much more
common for fruit and vegetables, as well as for meat, while for beverages products (mainly
wine) are mostly common in mix signal (label and brand). Regarding the marketing channel,
the most significant variable is the supermarket that impacts mainly the brand strategy (either
in a mix signal or in a brand only strategy).
Our results provide also some specific results on the potential complementarity between both
signals, i.e. label and brands, by analyzing the drivers of the mix signal. First, among the
organizational and governance variables the number of employees (EMP) as well as being
member of a union of cooperatives (UNION) and having a subsidiary (SUBSID) have a
significant and positive impact. It also appears that this strategy is commonly present in the
beverage, as well as in meat and fruits & vegetables, but with less magnitude.
After checking for the robustness of our estimation results in the multinomial logit, we also
analyze the possibility of an ordinal ranking among the different quality signals. That is,
moving from a no signal strategy then to a common label, a mix signal (label and brand)
and then finally to a brand only strategy, may generate a higher profit for the cooperative.
2Our database is also original because, in contrast to the previous literature on labels and brands, we analyze
the strategic choices done by producers, here the cooperatives of producers, and not by consumers.
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We first estimate a simple ordered logit model, whose results show a clear evidence of an
ordered choice and bring a confirmation of the different drivers found in the previous multi-
nomial logit model. This simple ordered model makes however the restrictive assumption
that the coefficients of the exogenous variables are the same across the quality signal alterna-
tives (parallel regression assumption). To overcome this shortcoming, we have recourse to a
generalized ordered model and a sequential logit model. The estimation mainly show some
contrasting results, i.e. if the organizational structure and the governance variables are able
to explain the adoption of a quality signal (whatever the signal), they have less impact on the
choice of a brand (either in a mix signal or a brand only strategy). The increasing impact
on brand adoption concerns mainly products such as beverages and meat, and the marketing
variables such as exporting outside the EU borders and having recourse to a supermarket
marketing channel. That is, it seems that with the move toward a mix signal and a brand only
signal the organizational variables becomes less relevant, whereas the impact of marketing
drivers seem to increase. The results of the sequential model show clearly that the adoption
decision of a quality signal does not follow a sequential process. That is choosing a brand
does not necessarily imply that we chose a common label in a first step and a mix signal in a
second step. Finally, to deal with the possible endogeneity problem of the turnover variable,
we estimate a specific simultaneous equations model where one of the (ordered) dependent
variable (quality signal) depends on the second dependent variable (turnover). The results of
this bivariate ordered probit model show first that our turnover variable is indeed endogenous
and significant and clearly have positive effect on the probability of choosing a higher quality
signal. Moreover, we find also the same result than in the generalized ordered model, i.e.
the organizational variables have less impact in the choice of a higher quality signal. Our
bivariate ordered probit model seems to suggest that this result is due to the fact that the or-
ganizational variables have no direct impact on the quality signal choice, but that they have
an indirect effect through the increase of the turnover variable.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In section 3.2 we present and discuss the
related literature on quality signaling. Section 3.3 presents our database and the test variables.
Section 3.4 presents an ordered choice model and its results. In section 3.5, we consider that
the dependent variable may be ordered and estimate ordered and sequential models of choice.
We also treat for the endogeneity problem by having recourse to an ordered bivariate probit
model. Section 3.6 provides some concluding remarks.
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3.2 Related Literature
Quality signaling is widespread in the food and agricultural products, because these prod-
ucts are subject to market failures identified by Stigler (1961) and Akerlof (1970). Since
these pioneering contributions, the market failures stemming from information asymmetries
have been the object of considerable research. Nelson (1970, 1974) and Darby and Karni
(1973) extended Stigler’s (1961) economics of information theory by considering how dif-
ferent types of quality or attributes of goods (search, experience, credence)3 interact with
consumer confusion and thus generates more or less severe market failure. This problem of
asymmetric information is due to the fact that the producer knows the good attributes that
consumers can only determine through search or experience, or cannot determine at all. In
the food markets, this problem of asymmetric information impacts negatively on the market:
the quality of total supply drops and higher quality goods are driven out of the market, due to
adverse selection effect.
In response to the unfair competition from producers who sell lower quality goods at the
same price, the producer maintaining the quality of its goods adopts signaling strategies to
create a reputation of “high quality producer”. In his dynamic models of reputation, Shapiro
(1982, 1983) show that in one-shot purchase situations, quality can be better signaled if there
exists: (i) reliable quality certification; (ii) informed buyers, such as readership of reviews
or consumer reports, that may exert a positive externality on uninformed buyers (Mahenc,
2004). In a repeated purchase setting, when consumers can learn which good provides the
desired attribute they buy it, producers can establish a reputation for quality via brands (Klein
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Landes and Posner, 1987, 2003; Grossman and Shapiro,
1988b). Consumers tend indeed to use the quality of products offered by the same brand
in the past as an indicator of future levels of quality. Reputation, through brands, embodies
expected quality in that individuals extrapolate past behavior to make inferences about quality
future behavior. This value judgment develops over time creating an intangible asset. The
value of this asset is given by capitalization of future price premia (Belleti, 1999). Even when
there is competing brands of the same good, a trademark system can still be more efficient
than generic advertising. Crespi and Marette (2002) and Marette and Crespi (2007) show
3Search attributes are ones that can be verified prior to purchase through direct inspection or readily available
sources. Experience attributes are ones that can be verified only after use of the product (Ford et al., 1990).
Credence attributes are ones that are difficult to verify even after use (Darby and Karni, 1973). Products may
have one, two, or all three of those types of attributes. For example, in the case of mouthwash, a search attribute
would be color, an experience attribute would be taste, and a credence attribute would be plaque reduction.
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that high-quality producers do not benefit from generic promotion when the benefits from
generic advertising firm increased demand are outweighed by the cost firm lower product
differentiation.
If a credible brand system can be an efficient mechanism to signal quality, its cost can be
prohibitive for small individual firms and/or small cooperatives in agriculture and food pro-
duction. This is one of the justifications for specific types of government intervention such as
the development of food standards and grades (Gardner, 2003; Lapan and Moschini, 2007).
Alternatively, producers, firms and cooperatives can also bundle together to achieve the crit-
ical mass required for label certification through a common label. Allowing small producers
to collude may indeed improve general welfare by enabling these producers to cover the
fixed costs of quality development and certification (Marette et al., 1999; Marette and Crespi,
2003; Zago and Pick, 2004; Lence et al., 2007; Langinier and Babcock, 2008; Mérel, 2009).
In many countries in Europe, this common labeling was mainly done with geographically
based labels, or geographical indications (GI) such as PGI (Protected Geographical Indica-
tions) and PDO (Protected Designation of Origin)4, where quality attributes are presumed to
be linked to the specific geographic origin of the produced goods. This is generally referred to
as quality-origin nexus or terroir5. The collective nature of these common labels as a quality
signal means that use of the sign is not limited to a single producer but to all producers within
the designation which adhere to code of practice. Product reputation is thus the result of the
actions of different agents active in the same area of production and is projected through tra-
dition over a period of time (Marty, 1998). It could be said that GIs are the result of a process
whereby collective reputation is institutionalized in order to solve certain problems that arise
from information asymmetry and free riding on reputation (Belleti, 1999).
There is a some evidence that common labeling, as an institutionalization of a collective
reputation, enable to generate price premium for producers (Thiedig and Sylvander, 2000;
Loureiro and McCluskey, 2000). For instance, Loreiro and McCluskey (2000) analyzed the
consumer’s willingness to pay for GI labels and show that when collective reputation is good,
a GI is a powerful tool to promote quality and obtain a price premium6. Landon and Smith
4In the case of PGI it suffices that one stage of the production process is carried out in the defined area, while
in the case of a PDO, all stages of production must take place in this area.
5Terroir, a French term for “taste of place”, refers to a casual relationship between agronomic conditions,
craftsmanship and a product’s distinct quality (Giovannucci et al., 2009).
6Bonnet and Simioni (2001) show in contrast that consumers do not place significant value on the PDO
labeled French Camembert and that brand appears to be more relevant in the consumer’s evaluation of alternative
Products. Gergaud and Livat (2010) find also no significant value on the PDO labeled Bordeaux wine.
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(1997, 1998) deepen this analysis and provide an empirical study of the extent to which
consumers use both individual and collective reputation current quality indicators when pur-
chasing Bordeaux wine. Two main results emerge. First, there is a huge effect of reputation
on price premium. Indeed, the results indicate that the price of Bordeaux wine depends sig-
nificantly on both expected and current quality, but that marginal impact of expected quality
(long-term reputation) on price is approximately 20 times higher than that of current qual-
ity. This implies that it take a considerable time for a firm to establish a reputation for high
quality that would result in a significant price premium. Second, a collective strategy of repu-
tation building, e.g. through GIs, can be more efficient since there can be decreasing marginal
cost with reputation building, and positive effect on marginal return. The results suggest that
collective reputation indicators play a significant role in price determination, mainly through
their impact on expected quality.
But GIs may not necessarily prevent free riding in collective reputation. Winfree and Mc-
Cluskey (2005) show that with positive collective reputation and no traceability there is an
incentive to producers to free ride, i.e. extract rents by producing a lower quality level. And
the sustainable level of collective reputation decreases as the number of firms in the produc-
tion area increases. Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud (1999) and Desquilbet and Monier-Dilhan
(2008) also show that a GI can decrease the quality level. Loureiro and McCluskey (2000)
show that while the GI label is a powerful tool to promote high quality goods, its use on
products that are not of high quality is not an efficient marketing strategy and they suggest
that it could impact negatively on the collective reputation. Thus, as shown by Landon and
Smith (1997, 1998), it can be efficient to use both collective and individual reputation, by
having recourse simultaneously to labels and brands, to solve this problem.
The question that can then be addressed is related to the problem of concurrent use or comple-
mentarity between labels (GIs) and brands (trademarks). There is a burgeoning theoretical
literature dealing with this issue. Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban (2010) investigate
whether producers with a quality advantage should collectively choose a GI certification or
a private label. Moschini and Menapace (2012) extend the model of Shapiro (1983) to re-
flect both collective (GIs) and firm-specific (trademarks) reputation in a competitive market.
Their main result is that GIs and trademarks turn out to be complementary signals of quality.
Indeed, if GIs reveal information regarding the origin of product, it can also reduce costs of
building reputation by constraining moral hazard behavior. Therefore, GI certification may
improve welfare compared with a situation where only private trademarks would be avail-
able for firms. Castinagri et al. (2012), following Tirole (1996) and Winfree and McCluskey
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(2005), go one step further and analyze the conditions under which both labels (cooperative
reputation) and brands (private reputation) may coexist.
3.3 Data and Description
Our data come from the national survey conducted in 2005 by the ministry of agriculture on
the 1 500 small French agricultural cooperatives7. This periodical survey aims to study the
economic conditions of small agricultural cooperatives processing and marketing excluded
from the SCEES8 annual business survey. From the exhaustive sample of 1500 cooperatives
we build a database of 993 individuals after cleaning out missing values, since not the whole
cooperatives answered every question.
Although they are small, the size of the cooperatives in our database vary at large since only
10% of these cooperatives realized more than 30% of total sales. Those small cooperatives
are also very marked territorially because of the location of their members. That is, more
than half are in fact exclusively regional customers, even more than 75% of these make more
than 50% of their turnover in the region. Moreover, most of small cooperatives tend to trade
with essentially the same type of customers (only 14% do not achieve more than half of their
turnover with the same customer). Among the typical customers, other cooperatives occupy
a privileged place, indicating the importance of the cooperatives network (Fillipi et Triboulet,
2010). If the majority of small cooperatives develop their activities at the regional level, they
realize on average 20% of sales at the national level. 7% of the cooperatives declared exports
of their products to other countries and earned 6% of total sales. Exports are mainly oriented
to European Union markets and in a lesser extent to out of EU markets. Note that those
cooperatives who export are generally the largest small cooperatives, with a median turnover
double than those turned exclusively to the domestic market.
3.3.1 Dependent Variables: labels and brands
In the agro-food industry, firms used to adopt two main signals: quality labels and brands.
In our database, the different signaling profiles are distributed as follows: (i) 30% of small
cooperatives use no signal (NSIG); (ii) 48% of them uses only labels (LABEL); (iii) 5% uses
only brands (BRAND); (iv) 18% of the cooperatives use a “mix signal” strategy by adopting
7Enquête sur les petites coopératives agricoles et forestières, 2005.
8Service centrale des enquêtes et des études statistiques (Central office for statistical surveys and studies).
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both signals (LABRAND).
Figure 3.3.1: Distribution of quality signs
First, since the official signs (labels) are widespread in the French agro-food sector, it is not
surprising to note that two third of small cooperatives adopt labels. As shown by table 3.1,
among the different labels enforced by the French state regulation, there is a large predom-
inance of signs indicating the geographical origin of products (AOC and PGI). Those signs
are especially developed for wine and cheese, and more generally 79% of dairy products and
64% of alcoholic beverages are sold by small cooperatives with a label indicating the geo-
graphical origin of the product. Other labels hold a significant position with a relatively high
organic farming (AB)9. The cooperatives may also adopt different labels. Indeed, labels are
non-exclusive since different labels can be used to point out different dimensions of quality
(The “label rouge” can be chosen to signal organoleptic quality of the product, and the label
“AB” to signal its “environmental-friendly” dimension). However, in our database, very few
cooperatives among those that use the label strategy adopt more than one label (see table 3.2).
Table 3.1: Dominance of labels
AOC AB PGI CPP Label Others
60% 12% 8% 4% 3% 13%
9Label Rouge certify that processed and unprocessed food or non-food agricultural products have specific
characteristics establishing a level of quality, resulting in particular from their particular conditions of produc-
tion or manufacture and conform to specifications which distinguish them from similar products and foodstuffs
normally sold.
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Second, branding is much less common since it concerns less than a quarter of small coop-
eratives (22%). A notable fact is that brands are primarily associated with a label (18% of
the whole sample and 75% of the cooperatives that choose the brand signal), while very few
choose to hold only a brand (5% of the whole sample and 25% of those choosing a brand).
Small businesses do not always have the ability to develop their own financial trademarks
and many produce on behalf of major brands. This is partly explained by specific institu-
tional features: the wide dissemination of official quality labels. This type of quality labels
has the advantage for small cooperatives to collectivize the costs of establishment and im-
plementation of the signal, which allows them to not only assume the economic burden but
management of a brand as well.
Table 3.2: Labels owned
no label 35%
at least one label 65% Number of labels owned
1 85%
2 12%
3 2%
4 1%
3.3.2 Independent Variables
Different variables may explain the choice of quality signals. First, the turn-over realized
by the cooperative. The continuous variable TURN indicates the log of turnover (millions
euros) realized in 2005 by the cooperative. However, to perform their turnover, cooperative
structures suffer from lower levels of labor force than capitalist structures. Indeed, a coopera-
tive is defined to be small if it has less than ten employees. We build a variable indicating the
number of employees (EMP). On average, the cooperatives in our database have less than 4
full-time equivalent employees. But we observe a large variability since some cooperatives
have no employees, while others are at the threshold of 10 employees. Due to this limited
workforce, farmers, as members of the cooperative, do a large number of jobs mainly in sea-
sonal periods of intense activity for the cooperative. The continuous variable MEM indicates
the total number of members in log (Table (3.3)).
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The other solution to get workforce, equity and new competencies is to join a union of co-
operative (Filippi et al. 2006). The membership to a union of cooperatives is indicated by
the dummy variable, UNION. In our database, nearly 40% of the small cooperatives join
an union. These unions take the form of new cooperatives as an umbrella for the associ-
ated cooperatives. The consolidation of equity can then carry the heavy equipment that the
cooperative base alone cannot achieve. To expand its scope and develop a certain critical
size, the cooperative may also hold shares in the capital of other (private) firms. When the
holdings reach 50% or more, the firm becomes subsidiary owned by the cooperative. We
build a dummy variable SUBSID indicating when the cooperative has a subsidiary firm. This
organizational model is often seen as a mechanism for the cooperative to market directly its
products by creating a marketing firm that sell the products under its own brand (Hendrik-
sen and Bijman, 2002). However, this strategy only refers to 15% of the small cooperatives,
mainly those which have the highest turnover.
The second set of variables that may explain the choice of quality signal is related to the
nature of the activity and the products of the cooperative, as well as the market structure
and the different marketing channels used. There is a clear cut distinction in our database
between cooperatives that are just intermediary of exchange (wholesale industries) and co-
operatives that industrially processes the products collected from their members. The first
category represents 63% of the whole sample and the second 37%. The two categories are
very different in their structures. Within the agro-food industry, the wine making activity
(60% of the cooperatives) and the dairy industry (25% of the cooperatives) are predominant.
As noted previously, these are the two activities where the labels are over-represented. To
take into account the effect of the agro-food industry on the signaling strategy, we create a
dummy variable AF that indicates if the small cooperative processes the farmer’s products.
In the wholesale trade, there is no dominant activity and the first three sectors are milk, eggs
and oil (25%), grain and animal feed (20%) and fruit and vegetables (17%); sectors where
labels are less represented. To analyze more precisely the effect of the different types of
product, we build five dummy variables representing the five main sectors of production: (i)
Beverage, mainly wine (BEV), (ii) cereals and animal feed (CER), (iii) fruit and vegetables
(FVEG); (iv) meat (MEAT); (v) milk, eggs and oil (MILKOIL).
Small cooperatives are also marked territorially because of the location of their members.
This local anchor is often found in the type of market and marketing channel mainly used
by small cooperatives. Regarding the type of market, more than half of the cooperatives
have regional customers exclusively and three quarters of them make more than 50% of their
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turnover in the region. We have a dummy variable, (LT50INREG), which equals one when
the cooperative makes less than 50% of its turnover in the region. Export market represents
3% of total sales on average and essentially turned towards the European Union. But, given
their size a significant proportion exported beyond the borders of Europe (5%). Note that the
cooperatives that export with a median turnover of around double than the cooperative turned
exclusively to the domestic market. We build two continuous variables for the exporting
cooperatives: (i) percentage of total sales from export in Europe (EXINEU); (ii) percentage
of total sales from export outside EU (EXOUTEU). 44% of total sales are being exported
with the brand and public label. 8.5% of total sales that is exported in EU are without any
public label or brand, and 12% of total sales that export outside EU use brand and label
signals.
As for the marketing channel, we notice that most small cooperatives tend to trade with essen-
tially the same type of client (86%). We build a variable that equals one when the cooperative
makes less than 50% of its turnover with the same client (LT50SC). We control for the differ-
ent kind of channels, according to the cooperative sells its product to Supermarket (SUPER),
retailers (RET), wholesalers (WS), or hotels and restaurants (OTHER_HOT).
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Table 3.3: Description of variables
Variable Definition Mean S. D. Min. Max.
Size and organizational structure
MEM Logarithmic value of no. of adherents 3.83 1.26 0.00 8.07
EMP Number of employees (from 0 to 10) 3.53 3.64 0.00 10.00
UNION = 1 if coop is affiliated with an Union 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
SUBSID = 1 if coop is subsidizing 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
TURN Logarithmic value of turnover ( millions C) 13.7 1.86 0.00 17.26
Activity
WSI = 1 if coop is a Wholesale industry 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
AF = 1 if coop is an Agro-food industry 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Products
MILKOIL = 1 if coop produces milk & oil (reference) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
BEV = 1 if coop produces beverages 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
CER = 1 if coop produces cereals 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
FVEG = 1 if coop produces fruits & vegetables 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
MEAT = 1 if coop produces meat 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
OTHERS =1 if coop produces other products 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Export Markets
EXINEU % of Turnover by exports within EU 0.35 0.89 -0.47 4.60
EXOUTEU % of Turnover by exports outside EU 0.06 0.39 0.39 4.60
Variable Definition Mean S. D. Min. Max.
Local Market
LT50INREG = 1 if less than 50% turnover in the same region 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Marketing Channels
- cooperative network = 1 if dealing with a coop network (ref) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
- SUPER = 1 if dealing with supermarket 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
- RET = 1 if dealing with a retailer 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
-WS =1 if dealing with a wholesaler 0.18 0.18 0.00 1.00
- OTHERS_HOT = 1 if dealing with hotels & restaurants 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
LT50SC = 1 if less than 50% of turnover with the same customer 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics
All NSIG LABEL LABRAND BRAND
UNION 40% 30% 46% 40% 48%
SUBSID 14% 11% 14% 22% 14%
TURN (median) 1.28 0.75 1.40 1.74 1.60
MEM (median) 52 60 36 75 112
EMP (median) 3 1 3 5 5
AF 69% 51% 77% 77% 80%
WSI 31% 49% 23% 23% 20%
FVEG 7.5% 8% 6.5% 7.5% 12%
MEAT 28.5% 23% 42% 6% 8%
MILKOIL 5% 5% 4.5% 7% 6%
OTHERS 5% 13% 1% 2% 4%
EXINEU 20% 8.5% 16% 44% 26%
EXOUTEU 5% 2% 3.5% 12% 10%
LT50INREG 21.5% 19% 16% 35% 42%
cooperative network 30% 32.5% 33% 17% 26%
SUPER 5% 3% 4% 8.5% 16%
RET 10% 15% 7% 8.5% 10%
WS 18% 12.5% 19% 24.5% 24%
OTHERS_HOT 23% 28.5% 22% 19% 14%
LT50SC 14% 8.5% 15% 22.5% 10%
Number of observations 993 (100%) 293 (29.5%) 475 (48%) 175 (18%) 50 (5%)
3.4 Unordered Choices
In this section we try to find the drivers of the different quality signal strategies. For this we
use the multinomial unordered choice model. We first present the methodology for estimating
this type of model (3.4.1) and the results of the estimations (3.4.2). Then we discuss the
robustness of our estimates (3.4.3).
3.4.1 The Empirical Model
Considering the four quality signal alternatives, let us denote: (i) m = 1, if the cooperative
chooses no signal; (ii) m = 2, if the cooperative chooses a common label only; (iii) m = 3, if
the cooperative chooses both signals (label and brand); (iv) m = 4, chooses brand only.
Choosing the alternative m of a quality signal can be seen as the realization of a latent (un-
observed) variable u∗m. Suppose that the utility derived from this choice depends linearly on
a set of exogenous variables x and an error term ε. The distribution law of the error term
defines the model for estimating the probability of occurrence of the alternative considered
(probit or logit). The probability of choosing the alternative m is:
Pr(y = m) = Pr(u∗m > u
∗
j), ∀ j 6= m with u∗m = xβ+ ε (3.4.1)
In the classical case of a choice model with two categories, the estimated probability of oc-
currence of the alternative considered is a binary probit or logit model. If several alternatives
are possible, without predefined order, the probability of each alternative should be jointly
estimated with an alternative, taken as a reference. The econometric model required is then a
multinomial logit or probit according to the the law of distribution on error terms (Maddala,
1985).
Among the four alternatives, the multinomial model estimates the probabilities of three alter-
natives and one alternative taken as reference. Therefore we can estimate the probabilities of
alternatives 1, 3 and 4 using alternative 2 as a reference. That is,
Pm = Pr(y = m) =
exp(xβm|2 )
P2
for m = 1,3,4 (3.4.2)
where
P2 =
1
1+∑ j=4j=3
j 6=2
exp(xβ j|2 )
(3.4.3)
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with ∑m=4m=1 Pm = 1,x a vector of k exogenous variables common to the four alternatives and
βm|2 the vector of estimated coefficients for the alternative m, with m = 1,3,4, when the
alternative 2 is the reference (i.e. βm|2 = 0).
Since the estimated coefficients β of logistic models are not directly interpretable, it is useful
to present the results directly in the form of odds; or more precisely, in the form of odds
ratio (OR). These allow to observe directly how a marginal effect of the explanatory variable
changes the odds ratio considered, by exponentiating the estimated coefficients. As part of
binary logistic model, the interpretation of OR is relatively easy because the ratio is equal to
the probability of the event on the probability of the opposite event. That is, the odds can be
written as follows
Odds =
P1
(1−P1) =
Pr(y = 1 |x)
1−Pr(y = 1 |x) = exp(xβ)
and the odd ratios
OR(xk |x) = Pr(y = 1 |xk+1,x)/1−Pr(y = 1 |xk+1,x)Pr(y = 1 |xk,x)/1−Pr(y = 1 |xk,x = exp(βk)
In a multinomial logit model, the analysis is more complex since several events are consid-
ered. Therefore, the odds ratios for each alternative relative to the reference category are not
an odd, which is a likelihood ratio of an event on its opposite event. The conditional odds
ratios (denoted COR), also referred to as relative risk ratio, is preferred in this case. In a
conditional odds ratio, each likelihood ratio is relative to the probability taken as reference
(here alternative 2).
Conditional Oddsm (X) =
Pm
P2
=
Pr(y = m |x)
1−Pr(y = 2 |x) = exp(xβm|2 ) for m = 1,3,4
or
CORm|2 (xk |x) =
Pr(y = m |xk+1,x)/Pr(y = 2 |xk +1,x)
Pr(y = m |xk,x)/Pr(y = 2 |xk,x = exp(βk,m|2 ) for m = 1,3,4
The COR can thus assess whether an explanatory variable increases or decreases the proba-
bility of choosing one alternative relative to the alternative taken as reference. For example,
in the above equation an increase of one unit of the variable xk rises by βk the probability of
occurrence of the alternative m, if we take the alternative 2 as the reference.
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3.4.2 Results and Interpretations
The results of the multinomial logit model that we estimated are directly presented in the
form of exponentiated coefficients (see Table 4) 10. The interpretation of these results reveals
some major stylized facts about the quality signal strategies by small French agricultural
cooperatives. Our results exhibit two kinds of drivers of the quality signal strategies: (i) the
organizational and governance structure variables; (ii) the products and market types.
Organizational and governance effects. Our results exhibit an organizational effect since
there is a positive correlation between the size of the cooperative and the probability of choos-
ing a signal. Indeed, as the number of members increases, the likelihood of developing a mix
signal or a brand only strategy also increases. In other words, the smallest among the co-
operatives would be significantly less likely to develop a brand. Similarly, compared to the
probability of holding a signal in isolation (common label alone, or brand alone), a higher
number of employees increases the probability of choosing a «mix signal» (both signals, la-
bel and brand) and to decrease the probability of choosing no signal. As seen previously, the
management of a mix signal or a brand is relatively more expensive than a common label or
no signaling. Thus, it requires a larger size (Strong et al., 2007). There is also a governance
effect since belonging to a network of cooperatives increases the probability of choosing a
signal. Indeed, the fact that the cooperative belongs to a Union of cooperatives (UNION), or
has a subsidiary firm (SUBSID), reduces by 50% the probability of choosing no signal.
Products and market effects. In the food industry (FI), choosing a single signal (label
only or brand only) is more common than in the wholesale trade. Beyond the effect, the
type of marketed products has also some impact on the signaling strategy. In dairy products
and fats (MILKOIL), it seems that labels are more commonly adopted, whereas this strategy
is less developed in Fruit and Vegetables (FEV) or in beverages (BEV), where brands are
more commonly used. The table 4 below details the effect of the different products on the
probability of choosing a specific quality signal.
Signaling strategy depends also on the type of markets (Lockshin, 2004; Chan Choi and
Coughlan, 2006; Hayes et al., 2007). First, it seems that there is an effect of the local mar-
10Let us recall that the interpretation of these coefficients is not uniform. It depends on the shape of the
explanatory variable (Long 1997). How to interpret these effects depending on whether the explanatory variable
is a continuous variable, a dichotomous variable or a polytomous variable with more than two modalities.
Indeed, from the estimated coefficients, it is possible to calculate the percentage increase (or decrease) the
probability of an alternative over another. Beyond the calculation of these marginal effects, it is interesting to
analyze the relative influence of variables on these alternatives.
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Table 3.5: Productions and probability of adopting signals
Products
Alternatives
BEV CER FVG MEAT
LABEL Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
LABRAND +11 n.s +4 (∗) +5
BRAND +4 n.s +11(∗∗) n.s
NOSIG +2 +13 +3 n.s
Reading: (*) Compared to the milk and fat, cooperatives in the fruit and vegetables have a chance
to own a brand 11 times greater than that of holding an official label alone. (**) The superimposition
of a brand to an official label is also more common in this sector than the mere holding of an official
label, but to a lesser extent than for the single brand strategy: the probability of reporting quality by
both the brand and the official label is four times greater than that of holding an official label.
ket on the signaling strategy. We find that regional market oriented cooperatives are more
likely to choose common labels, while those oriented towards the national market are more
focused on the brand choice, all things being equal. This can be explained by the territorial
anchorage of the smallest among the cooperatives (Filippi and Triboulet, 2006), while those
that have access to the national market are also those that have higher turnover, and thus are
able to manage more costly quality signals (mix signal and brand) than the common label.
Signaling strategies seem also to differ according to the export market. They choose a mix
signal strategy for export in EU (EXINEU) and a brand only strategy for export outside the
EU (EXOUTEU). Indeed, the probability of choosing a brand rather than a label increases
with the share of sales devoted to exports outside the European Union. This can be explained
by the difficulty for a common label system to protect its co-owners against fraud outside
the EU borders, and the fact that the tradmark system is more able to protect the property
rights on the brand than the common labeling system. The other shortcoming is the problem
of free-riding that often emerges from common labeling (Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud,
1999; Winfree and McCluskey, 2005; Desquilbet and Monier-Dilhan, 2008; Loureiro and
McCluskey, 2000). This may explain why cooperatives exporting in the EU use a mix signal
(LABRAND) within the European borders. Indeed, we observe that the export in the Euro-
pean Union instead favors the strategy of a mix signal in relation to a strategy based on a
single signal (brand or label). This is also the case in the wine sector where a brand name
is often added to the common label indicating the origin of the product (a castel name, e.g
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Chateau Latour in the “AOC Pouillac”; or a family name, e.g. Taittinger in the “AOC Cham-
pagne”). Finally, the marketing channels used by the cooperative (its cooperative network,
supermarkets, small retailers, wholesalers, hostels and others) have an impact on the proba-
bility of chosing a quality signal. For the no-signal strategy, there is no significant effect of
the different channels compared to the reference, i.e. the cooperative network. For the two
other signals, choosing supermarket (SUPER) increases the probability of holding a brand
only or a mix signal. These probabilities are multiplied respectively by 4 and 3, compared to
the probability of choosing the reference (common labeling).
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Table 3.6: Multinomial logit estimation
Variable Name & Category LABRAND BRAND NSIG
COR 3/2 COR 4/2 COR 1/2
Size and organizational structure
MEM 1.23 (1.95)* 2.02 (4.25)*** 1.41 (4.24)***
EMP 1.07 (2.43)** 1.05 (1.06) 0.91 (-2.60)***
TURN 0.92 (-0.81) 0.77 (-2.18)** 0.69 (-5.69)***
UNION 0.61 (-2.30)** 0.70 (-1.00) 0.48 (-3.72)***
SUBSID 1.45 (1.42) 0.68 (-0.82) 0.58 (-1.89)*
Sectors
WSI Ref. Ref. Ref.
AF 0.41 (-2.37)** 1.51 (0.61) 0.44 (-3.11)***
Products
MILKOIL Ref. Ref. Ref.
BEV 10.91 (6.17)*** 3.67 (2.16)** 2.23 (3.38)***
CER 3.09 (1.55) 3.65 (0.99) 12.78 (5.46)***
FVEG 4.20 (2.80)*** 11.10 (2.91)*** 2.60 (2.64)***
MEAT 5.20 (3.15)*** 4.09 (1.55) 1.57 (1.06)
OTHERS 4.32 (1.92)* 8.31 (1.89)* 8.48 (4.25)***
Export Markets
EXINEU 1.25 (2.18)** 1.13 (0.70) 0.76 (-2.06)**
EXOUTEU 1.32 (1.00) 2.14 (2.36)** 1.67 (2.04)**
Variable Name & Category LABRAND BRAND NSIG
COR 3/2 COR 4/2 COR 1/2
Local Market
LT50INREG 1.32 (1.18) 2.29 (2.29)** 1.56 (1.76)*
Marketing Channels
cooperative network Ref. Ref. Ref.
SUPER 2.60 (2.18)** 3.79 (2.40)** 0.82 (-0.40)
RET 2.04 (1.68)* 1.06 (0.10) 0.88 (-0.38)
WS 1.89 (2.06)** 1.07 (0.15) 0.73 (-1.12)
OTHERS_HOT 1.43 (1.13) 0.59 (-0.98) 1.25 (0.92)
LT50SC 1.92 (2.02)** 0.48 (-1.23) 0.41 (-2.65)***
Constant -2.61 (-1.91)** -3.18 (-1.65)* 3.83 (4.20)***
LL -914.5
χ2 493.3***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% ; t statistic in paranthesis
3.4.3 Robustness of the Estimates
The multinomial logit is a very convenient model for estimating discrete choices, but it has
some limitations. An important restriction is the assumption of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA), that the odds ratios between the alternatives are independent. The Hausman
& McFadden (1984) and the Small & Hsiao (1985) tests are the most usual statistical tests
used in the literature to verify the validity of such assumption. In table 3.7, we first report
the results of the Hausman & McFadden test. We run three tests: the first two correspond
to excluding one of the two non-base categories. The third test (Label only) is computed by
re-estimating the model using the largest remaining category as the base category. For the
two separate adoption choices of ’brand only’ and ’label only’, we are unable to estimate
the p-values probably due to the negative estimates of chi2. Hausman & McFadden (1984,
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p. 1226) note this possibility and conclude that a negative result is evidence that IIA has
not been violated. In spite of that we are inconclusive about acceptance or rejection of null
hypothesis.
Table 3.7: Hausman-McFadden test of independence
Omitted χ2 df p > χ2 evidence
Brand only -4.323 20 —- —-
None 2.237 20 1.00 for H0
Label only -3.655 20 —- —-
The second test is the Small & Hsiao one. To perform this test, the sample is divided randomly
into two sub samples of about equal sizes. Then the unrestricted multinomial logit model is
estimated on both sub samples (the results for which are shown in second column of Table
3.8). Then a restricted sample is created from the second sub sample by eliminating all cases
with a chosen value of the dependent variable (the results are presented in third column of
Table 3.8). In contrast to the Haussman & McFadden test, the results of the Small & Hsiao
test results are conclusive: all the alternative choices are independent of each other.
Table 3.8: Small and Hsiao test of independence
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) χ2 df p > χ2 evidence
Brand only -206.602 -193.982 25.239 20 0.192 for H0
None -73.501 -61.257 24.487 20 0.222 for H0
Label only -57.798 -46.700 22.195 20 0.330 for H0
However, recent literature on the subject shows that both tests do not always generate the right
decision. So Long and Freese (2006), who observed that these tests can lead to conflicting
results, do not encourage their use. Similarly Cheng and Long (2006) show, from a series
of Monte Carlo simulations, that the tests reject the hypothesis of IIA when the alternatives
seem distinct and rather do not reject it while alternatives seem a priori close substitutes. It
appears preferable to return to first precepts of McFadden (1973) for which verification of
this assumption come directly to the user in the choice of alternatives jointly estimated.
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Following this advice, our estimates in table 3.6 seem to suggest that the different alternatives
(quality signals) are independent. First, because as shown, the common label is more often
used in local markets while brands are mainly used for export market, especially outside EU
borders. Moreover, the «mix signal» strategy is mainly adopted to solve the «free riding
problem» encountered by the common label system. As indicated previously, this strategy
is frequently encountered in the wine sector. Since the AOC can only ensure a minimum
quality, the high quality producers need to use another strategy to signal the higher quality of
their wine (Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud, 2003). Therefore, by targeting a higher market
segment, the mix signal strategy can be seen as a close substitute for common label signal.
The Wald test on the alternatives in the multinomial logit seems also to confirm this result,
since the drivers for the different alternatives are clearly different (see table 3.9). Only the
drivers for the brand alone signal (alternative 4) are not so far from the «mix signal» strategy
(alternative 3). To take this into account, we think that it will be interesting to consider
another class of models, i.e. ordered models.
Table 3.9: Wald test
Alternatives combination i/j tested χ2 p > χ2
3/4 25.193 0.154
3/1 139.750 0.000
3/2 101.710 0.000
4/1 64.059 0.000
4/2 52.886 0.000
1/2 162.751 0.000
3.5 Ordered and Sequential Choices
In the previous section we made implicitly the assumption that the different signals are un-
ordered. However, it seems that moving from no-signal strategy to the label and/or brand
strategy may generate higher net value for the cooperative. That is, the dependent variable
may be ordered, with the following order of the quality signals. In the first step, the cooper-
ative may choose no signal in the market, neither label nor brand. Second, the cooperative
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may get a higher profit by choosing to signal its products with a common label. With a
signal, the cooperative may indeed extract a higher value from the consumers or its cus-
tomers while the cost of being a co-owner of a label is rather limited since the fixed costs
of quality development and certification of the common label is shared among the members
of “the club” (Langinier and Babcock, 2008; Mérel, 2009). However, as shown by Winfree
and McCluskey (2005), common labeling may not necessarily prevent free riding in collec-
tive reputation, which may harm the high quality producers. Therefore, the cooperative may
move to a “mix signal”, where a private signal (brand) is added to the common label. By
using a brand, it can signal its high quality producer status and thus may increase its profit by
reducing the negative impact on collective reputation generated by free riders. The coopera-
tive may also move directly to a brand only strategy. This strategy can be more costly since
the cooperative has to bear solely the management cost of its brand, but larger cooperative
have some economies of scale and have access to high worthy export markets, which may
increase dramatically its profit.
If we consider that the quality signal choice is ordered, then using a multinomial model as
previously may introduce bias in our results since it ignores the ordinal character of the de-
pendent variable. That is why we have recourse to ordered models, and in this section we
propose to test several of these models (Maddala, 1985; Long, 1997; Long and Freese 2006;
Green and Hensher, 2008). In what follows, we first estimate a simple ordered logit model
and discuss its results. However, this model depends on a restrictive assumption, the pro-
portional odds assumption, where the coefficients of the exogenous variables have to be the
same regardless of the alternative considered. Since this assumption is rejected by the two
tests conducted, we have recourse to two models that do not impose such restrictive assump-
tion, i.e. the generalized ordered model (3.5.2) and the sequential model (3.5.3). Moreover,
to deal with the endogeneity problem of the turnover variable, we estimate a simultaneous
equations model. To do so, we have recourse to a bivariate ordered probit model (3.5.4).
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3.5.1 Simple Ordered Logit Model
Since an ordered model with m alternatives can be written in terms of m−1 thresholds, then,
among the four signals, a cooperative i chooses a signal si if:
si =

1 if s∗i < α1
2 if α1 ≤ s∗i < α2
3 if α2 ≤ s∗i < α3
4 if s∗i ≥ α3
with s∗i = xiβ+ εi
where s∗i is an unobservable latent variable. This model estimates each probability as a linear
function of exogenous variables x and the thresholds α j
Pr(s = j |x) = Pr(α j−1 ≤ s∗i < α j |x) = F(α j−xβ)−F(α j−1−xβ) ∀ j = 1,4 (3.5.1)
where F is the distribution function of the logistic part of an ordered logit model.
The estimated coefficients cannot be directly compared to the multinomial model. Indeed,
in this latter the effect of an exogenous variable is interpreted by comparing each alternative
separately, whereas in the ordered model the alternatives are grouped or ordered. That is with
four alternatives, we compare: (i) “alternative 1 against the group (2, 3 and 4)” ; (ii) “ (1, 2)
against (3 and 4)”; (iii) “(1, 2, 3, 4) against 4”. More precisely, we can interpret the results
of these comparisons between groups of alternatives as the choice to move, respectively: (i)
from a no quality signal strategy to a signal strategy (that can be either a common label only,
a mix signal, a brand only); (ii) to a brand strategy, which consists in a mix signal (label and
brand) or a brand only; (iii) to a brand strategy only. Note that the constant is supposed to
be zero, in order to highlight the effects of the different thresholds separating the different
choices.
As previously, for ease of interpretation the coefficients are presented in terms of odds ratio.
As was discussed in the previous section, the OR refers to a likelihood ratio that exponentiate
coefficients to assess the effect of an incremental change in the exogeneous variable.
Odds≤s|>s (x) =Ω≤s|>s (x) =
Pr(y≤ s |x)
1−Pr(y > s |x) = exp(αs−xβ) for s = 1, . . . ,4 (3.5.2)
and the odd ratios
OR≤s|>s (xk |x) =
Ω≤s|>s (xk +1,x)
Ω≤s|>s (xk,x)
=
Pr(y≤ s |xk +1,x)/Pr(y > s |xk +1,x)
Pr(y≤ s |xk,x)/Pr(y > s |xk,x = exp(−βk)
(3.5.3)
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Thus, in the model 2.5.3 the odds ratio of the alternative 1 against the other three alternatives
is given by:
Ω1|2,3,4 (x) =
Pr(m≤ 1 |x)
Pr(m > 1 |x) = exp(α1−xβ)
The effect of unit variation of the variable xk is:
OR1|2,3,4 (x) =
Ω1|2,3,4 (xk +1,x)
Ω1|2,3,4 (xk,x)
= exp(−βk)
Similarly, the odds ratio of alternatives 1 and 2 against alternatives 3 are:
Ω1,2|3,4 (x) =
Pr(s≤ 2 |x)
Pr(s > 2 |x) = exp(α2−xβ)
OR1,2|3,4 (x) =
Ω1,2|3,4 (xk +1,x)
Ω1,2|3,4 (xk,x)
= exp(−βk)
The same formula is applied to derive the OR of the alternatives 1,2,3 against the alternative
4. We notice that whatever the comparison of strategies considered, the OR is constant since
only one vector of parameters β is estimated. Indeed, a unit increase in the exogenous variable
leads to the probability of choosing a strategy relative to other strategies11 by a factor equal
to exp(−βk).
Our estimation results of the simple ordered model (see table 3.11, model 1) clearly shows
that there is some order among the different quality signals. Indeed, the whole cutoff points
are significant and positive and their value is increasing. In contrast, the drivers of the decision
to move toward a more intensive quality signals seem to be very similar to those found in the
previous non-ordered model. First, the organizational and the governance variables have the
same effect. Indeed, the turnover, the number of employees on one side and being a member
of a union of cooperatives or holding a subsidiary on the other side, have a positive and
significant coefficient. That is, the larger the cooperative size, the higher the intensity of the
quality signal. Regarding the products and market effects, the drivers of the quality signal
intensity are the same than for the brand only strategy in the previous non-ordered model (see
table 3.6). In terms of products, compared to milk and oil products, selling beverages and
cereals increases the probability of having a higher quality signal. In terms of market, a larger
share of export outside the EU borders as well as choosing a supermarket marketing channel
and a small number of partners (LT50SC) increases the probability of a change toward a more
intensive quality signal.
11Or the choice of strategies (1, 2) against strategies (3,4), or the strategies (1,2, 3) against strategy 4.
77
The proportional odds assumption. If our results give a confirmation of a significant ordi-
nal relationship, they do not highlight differential effects choice in the progression of quality
signal. Indeed, in the ordinal model, there is an implicit assumption known as both the paral-
lel regression assumption and, for the ordinal logit model, the proportional odds assumption.
This assumption simply says that the coefficients β are identical across each regression. From
(3.5.1) which gives the standard predicted probability
Pr(y = s |x) = F(αs−xβ)−F(αs−1−xβ) for s = 1, ...,J
we can derive the estimate from the J−1 binary regressions
Pr(y≤ s) = F(αs−xβ) for s = 1, ...,J−1
The proportional odds assumption implies that β1 = β2 = ... = βJ−1. To the degree that the
assumption holds, the coefficients β̂1 = β̂2 = ...= β̂J−1 should be close.
To perform this comparison, we can use two tests. First, the log likelihood ratio test that com-
pares the log likelihood from the ordinal logit model with that obtained from pooling there
(i.e. J− 1) binary models fitted with the logit model. Our results show that the assumption
can be rejected at the 1% level. However, this LR procedure tests that the coefficients for
all variables are simultaneously equal. That is, it cannot discriminate between coefficients
that are identical across the binary equations and those that differ for other variables. The
Wald test proposed by Brant (1990) overcome the shortcoming since it tests the assumption
for each variable. However, our results in table 3.10 for model 1 (see tables 3.11) show again
that the assumption can be rejected at the 1% level12. Since this proportional odds regres-
sions assumption seems to be rejected, alternative models that do not impose this constraint
should be considered. The first one is the generalized ordered logit and the second is the
continuation ratio model, also called sequential logit model.
Table 3.10: Test of parallel regressions
LR-Test Brant Test
χ2 P-value χ2 P-value
Model 1 198.37 0.000 210.26 0.000
12This allows to detect which ones contribute most to the violation of the assumption of parallel regressions.
The whole test Brant show that it is mainly the sector dummies that contribute the most, followed by the
organizational structure variables and the part of export outside the European Union.
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3.5.2 Generalized Ordered Logit
The generalized ordered logit model, discussed by Clogg and Shihadeh (1994) and Fahrmeir
and Tutz (1994), allows β to differ for each of the J−1 comparisons. That is,
Ω≤s|>s (x) =
Pr(y≤ s |x)
Pr(y > s |x) = exp(αs−xβs) for s = 1 to J−1
In our regressions, the predicted probabilities are computed as
Pr(y = 1 |x) = exp(α1−xβ1)
1+ exp(α1−xβ1)
Pr(y = j |x) = exp(α j−xβ j)
1+ exp(α j−xβ j)
− exp(α j−1−xβ j−1)
1+ exp(α1−xβ j−1)
Pr(y = 4 |x) = 1− exp(α3−xβ3)
1+ exp(α3−xβ3)
Once predicted probabilities are computed, all the approaches used to interpret the OR results
can be applied. That is, the three columns of coefficients reported in Table 3.11 (model 2)
match well with the following OR:
OR>1|≤1 (xk |x) =
Ω>1|≤1 (xk +1,x)
Ω>1|≤1 (xk,x)
=
Pr(y > 1 |xk +1,x)/Pr(y≤ 1 |xk +1,x)
Pr(y > 1 |xk,x)/Pr(y≤ 1 |xk,x = exp(β1,k)
OR>2|≤2 (xk |x) =
Ω>2|≤2 (xk +1,x)
Ω>2|≤2 (xk,x)
=
Pr(y > 2 |xk +1,x)/Pr(y≤ 2 |xk +1,x)
Pr(y > 2 |xk,x)/Pr(y≤ 2 |xk,x = exp(β2,k)
OR>3|≤3 (xk |x) =
Ω>3|≤3 (xk +1,x)
Ω>3|≤3 (xk,x)
=
Pr(y > 3 |xk +1,x)/Pr(y≤ 3 |xk +1,x)
Pr(y > 3 |xk,x)/Pr(y≤ 3 |xk,x = exp(β3,k)
The results of the generalized ordered logit estimation are given by table 3.11 (model 2). The
interest of this empirical model is to highlight the differential effects of moving from one
strategy to another as explained above.
We first focus on the drivers of the strategy that consists to moving from a no-signal quality
strategy (alternative 1) to a quality signal, whatever this signal either label, brand or both
(alternatives 2, 3 and 4). Our results show that the organizational and governance variables
have the same effect than in the simple ordered model, except for the variables members of the
cooperative which have now a significant and positive effect and in contrast the fact of owning
a subsidiary has no more effect. The market variables are also quite similar since a larger
share of export outside the EU borders as well as having a higher number of partners and
mainly transacting with wholesalers, compared to the cooperative network channel, continue
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to have a positive effect on the probability of choosing a signal. There are however two
differences. First, the supermarket marketing channel is no more significant, which suggests
that this channel is likely to be more specific to a particular signal, i.e. brand, as noted earlier.
Similarly, compared to milk & oil products, cooperatives marketing cereals products and fruit
& vegetables are more prone to adopt a signal. In contrast, selling beverages has no more a
significant impact, which suggests as previously that such products are more associated to a
specific signal strategy.
The second strategy consists in moving from a no-brand signal (alternatives 1 and 2) to a
signal that includes a brand (alternative 3, i.e. label and brand, and alternative 4, i.e. brand
only). The drivers of this strategy are now quite different. First, among the organizational and
governance variables, only number of members and employees have now a significant and
positive effect on moving to a strategy that includes a brand. Among the product variables,
selling beverages and meat also impacts positively the choice of such strategy, confirming the
previous results on the effects of such variables on brand signal. There are some other changes
in the significant marketing channel variables since, besides the previous variables that had
effect on the signaling strategy, we note that the supermarket channel is now significant when
we analyze the strategy of moving to a brand signaling.
The third strategy consists in moving to a brand only strategy (alternative 4 against others
alternatives, i.e. 1, 2, 3). The drivers are more contrasted than in the second strategy. Now, in
the organizational and governance variables only the number of members have a significant
and positive effect on the change toward a brand only signal. Similarly, in the marketing
channel variables only selling to a supermarket have a positive effect. Only the impact of
the product variables remains the same. These results suggest that the adoption decision
of a brand only strategy depends less on organizational structure of the cooperative than on
marketing variables, that is, both specific products (e.g. beverages and meat) and marketing
channels (e.g. supermarkets).
3.5.3 The Sequential Logit Model
The continuation ratio model was initially proposed by Feinberg (1980). Although there are
versions of this model based on binary models (e.g. probit), here we consider the logit ver-
sion, also called the sequential logit model. This model was designed for ordinal outcomes in
which the categories represent three progression of events or stages in some process through
which an individual can advance. For example, as noted earlier, a cooperative with a mix
signal (label and brand), had a no signal strategy at the first stage, then a label strategy at the
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second stage.
If Pr(y = s |x) is the probability of being in stage s given x and Pr(y > s |x) is the probability
of being in a stage later than s, the continuation ratio model for the odds is
Pr(y = s |x)
Pr(y > s |x) = exp(αs−xβ) for s = 1,2,3
where the βs are constrained to be equal across outcome categories, where the constant term
differs by stage. Accordingly, exp(βk) can be interpreted as the effect of a unit increase in
xk on the odds of being in s with being in a higher category given that an individual is in
category s or higher, holding all other variables constant.
The results of this sequential logit estimation are given by table 3.11 (model 3). The first point
to note is that the cutoff points between the different stages are not significant. This suggests
that there is no clear evidence of sequentiality in the adoption process of quality signals. That
is, if the cooperative chooses a brand only strategy this does not imply that it has chosen
a label signal in a first stage and a mix signal in a second stage. The drivers of a higher
quality signal are more or less similar to those found in the simple ordered model. First,
in the organizational and governance variables the number of employees and the turnover
continue to a significant and positive impact. However, the governance variables (SUBSID
and UNION) are no more significant. In contrast, regarding the products sold, more products
(MEAT and OTHERS) have a significant impact as in the generalized model. Similarly,
regarding the marketing channels, we get the same significant variables than in the simple
ordered model. That is, the larger the share of export outside the EU borders, the higher the
probability that the adoption process of quality signals follows sequential stages. Moreover,
regarding the marketing channels, choosing a supermarket or a wholesaler channel as well as
having a higher number of partners are significant drivers of the staged quality signals choice.
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Table 3.11: Simple, generalized and sequential ordered logit models estimations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Name Simple Ordered Generalized Ordered Logit Sequential Ordered
& Category Logit Logit
OR OR{2,3,4|1} OR{3,4|1,2} OR{4|1,2,3} OR
Organizational structure
MEM 0.91 (-1.44) 0.78 (0.20)*** 1.23 (2.15)** 1.54 (2.76)*** 1.004 (0.08)
EMP 1.08 (3.96)*** 1.13 (3.49)*** 1.08 (2.94)*** 1.02 (0.60) 1.06 (3.41)***
TURN 1.30 (5.30)*** 1.37 (5.76)*** 1.002 (0.03) 0.90 (-0.73) 1.21 (4.65)***
UNION 1.21 (1.37)** 1.75 (3.08)*** 0.92 (-0.47) 0.91 (-0.27) 1.13 (1.04)
SUBSID 1.47 (2.15)** 1.99 (2.50) 1.36 (1.31) 0.82 (-0.46) 1.23 (1.33)
Sectors
WSI Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
AF 1.52 (2.13)** 1.84 (2.51)** 1.02 (0.07) 5.16 (2.29)** 1.40 (1.94)
Products
MILKOIL Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
BEV 1.60 (2.66)*** 0.70 (-1.53) 6.75 (6.11)*** 3.96 (2.33)** 1.49 (2.6)***
CER 0.16 (4.83)*** 0.09 (-5.89)*** 1.04 (0.06) 6.83 (1.39) 0.22 (-4.7)***
FVEG 1.08 (0.28) 0.52 (-1.95)* 6.13 (4.07)*** 16.53 (3.15)*** 1.29 (1.06)
MEAT 1.66 (1.56) 0.91 (-0.23) 6.37 (3.91)*** 11.72 (2.77)*** 1.57 (1.66)*
OTHERS 0.27 (-3.22) 0.15 (-4.32) 1.97 (1.13) 5.14 (1.48) 0.38 (-2.89)**
Export Markets
EXINEU 0.95 (-0.30) 0.76 (-1.38) 1.08 (0.7) 1.40 (2.14)** 0.38 (-0.06)
EXOUTEU 1.30 (3.36)*** 1.32 (2.46)** 1.39 (3.45)*** 1.05 (0.29) 0.99 (3.50)***
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Name Simple Ordered Generalized Ordered Logit Sequential Ordered
& Category Logit Logit
OR OR{2,3,4|1} OR{3,4|1,2} OR{4|1,2,3} OR
Local Market
LT50INREG 1.02 (0.14) 0.73 (-1.34) 1.26 (1.14) 1.55 (1.24) 1.12 (0.82)
Marketing Channels
cooperative network Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
SUPER 2.35 (2.71)*** 1.83 (1.39) 2.78 (2.83)*** 3.83 (2.47)** 2.14 (2.92)***
RET 1.43 (1.39) 1.40 (1.13) 1.78 (1.68)* 1.08 (0.13) 1.31 (1.24)
WS 1.64 (2.51)** 1.69 (2.02)** 1.82 (2.26)** 1.19 (0.35) 1.45 (2.21)**
OTHERS_HOT 0.97 (-0.18) 0.88 (-0.57) 1.16 (0.53) 0.54 (-1.04) 0.90 (-0.67)
LT50SC 1.79 (2.75)*** 3.11 (3.50)*** 1.82 (2.07)** 0.44 (-1.33) 1.39 (1.83)*
Cut Points
Cut point 1 3.36 (4.83)*** 2.55 (0.59)
Cut point 2 5.97 (8.35)*** 4.69 (0.61)
Cut point 3 7.86 (10.78)*** 5.60 (0.64)
Constant -3.30 (-4.26)*** -4.43 (-5.1)*** -6.23 (-2.94)***
N 993 993 1918
L1 -1014.8 -918.8
Chi2 292.7*** 448.6*** 253.90***
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.21 0.11
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
3.5.4 Bivariate Ordered Probit Model
In our previous univariate models, we made the implicit assumption that the turnover variable
was exogenous. However, the cooperative a priori makes a joint decision, i.e. it chooses its
turnover level as well as its quality signal strategy. Therefore, the turnover variable may
be seen as more endogenous than exogenous. Since the different results of our estimates
have shown a significant effect of this variable on the quality signal choice, this potential
endogeneity problem can become cumbersome since it may biases our estimates.
To take into account the joint nature of the decision making on quality signal and turnover and
to deal with the problem of endogeneity, i.e. the fact that one dependent variable (turnover) is
endogenous for the other dependent variable (quality signal), Green and Hensher (2008) pro-
posed a bivariate ordered probit model where one of the dependent variables is endogenous
for the other. The underlying model consists of a simultaneous model of two equations relat-
ing the latent strategies of quality signaling (S) and Turnover (T ) to individual characteristics
of the cooperatives xi
t∗i = x
′
1iβ1+ ε1i (3.5.4)
s∗i = γTi+x
′
2iβ2+ ε2i (3.5.5)
where t∗i and s∗i are two latent variables that can be broadly defined as measures of profitability
associated with the two simultaneous decisions, i.e. the turnover level and the quality signal;
x1i and x2i are vectors of exogenous variables that may have some common components, β1
and β2 are the vectors that include the coefficients to be estimated, ε1i and ε2i are error terms
for corresponding equations and these error terms are assumed to have a bivariate standard
normal distribution with correlation ρ; γi is a scalar representing the effect that the turnover
(T i) of a cooperative i has on the quality signal (Si) chosen by the latter.
Estimation of this simultaneous equations model (3.5.4-3.5.5) can be performed with discrete
variables as dependent variables instead of t∗i and s∗i , and corresponding to ordered changes
in turnover and quality signal. These variables can be defined as follows. The dependent
variable quality signal Si is defined as previously, that is:
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Si =

1-no signal if s∗i < α1
2-label only if α1 ≤ s∗i < α2
3- label and brand if α2 ≤ s∗i < α3
4- brand only if s∗i ≥ α3
For the dependent variable turnover, we create a polytomic variable Ti corresponding to 4
classes:
Ti =

1-less than 5 if t∗i < δ1
2- between 6 and 10 if δ1 ≤ t∗i < δ2
3- between 11 and 15.42 if δ2 ≤ t∗i < δ3
4- more than 15.42 if t∗i ≥ δ3
where the α j and δ j values represent the unknown cutoff parameters to be estimated with β1
and β2. The cutoffs satisfy the condition that α1 < α2 < α3 and δ1 < δ2 < δ3 . We have taken
the cutoff value for ln(Turnover) as 15.42 which corresponds to the cooperative turnover at
5 million euros. The reason to choose this particular value is that it is the threshold above
which the small cooperatives are considered to be wholesalers. Parameters in the system
(3.5.4-3.5.5) are identified only if exclusion restrictions are imposed, namely, at least one
variable x′1i in should be excluded from x
′
2i. An interesting candidate in the determination
of change in turnover that is not correlated with quality signal change is others products
(OTHERS). Indeed, while these kind of products seem to have an impact on turnover, while
having no clear coherence in terms of quality signal since they are miscellaneous.
Following Kaminski and Thomas (2011), we estimate the above bivariate ordered probit
model using the Full-Information Maximum Likelihood. We use two specifications. In
the first specification, the system is estimated as seemingly unrelated regressions where all
explanatory variables are assumed exogenous and a correlation coefficient between random
terms in both equations is estimated (FIML I). In the second specification the system is jointly
estimated by explicitly accounting for the endogeneity of the other ordered variable on the
right hand side of equation (3.5.5) (FIML II). To address the endogeneity problem, we com-
pute a Wald test under the null assumption of exogeneity of the dependent variable turnover
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(γ= 0) in the second equation of the system, using this second specification.
The bivariate ordered probit regression results are presented in tables 3.12. Let us first turn to
specification tests on the model, addressing the issue of endogeneity and correlation across
equations. Our results confirm also the endogeneity effect, since the coefficient γ is posi-
tive and significant in the second equation of the system. To address the endogeneity issue,
we compute the Wald test statistic under the null assumption of exogeneity of the change
in turnover variable in the bivariate-ordered equations (FIML I). The exogeneity test statis-
tic allow us to reject the null assumption of exogeneity of the change in turnover. Hence,
our prediction of an endogenous change in turnover is supported by the data, meaning that
the turnover level effectively impacts the quality signal. As can be seen in Tables 3.12,
correlation among residuals of the two equations of the system is negative and significant
(ρ = −0.45), which gives support to the bivariate specification and to the simultaneous na-
ture of data-generating processes. Moreover, cut-off values also indicate the preference of
ordered discrete specification to the binary discrete choice as more than two cut-off values
are significant in each case. We therefore concentrate on the estimates of the bivariate or-
dered probit specification with the turnover level as an endogenous variable in the quality
signal strategy.
Let us now analyze the main drivers of both dependent variables of the system, i.e. turnover
and quality signal intensity. Regarding the turnover variable, the mains drivers are the orga-
nizational and governance variables. Indeed, the number of members and employees, as well
belonging to a union of cooperative increases the probability of getting a higher turnover. In
contrast, the variables of products and marketing channels seem to decrease the probability
of having a higher turnover. Indeed, compared to milk & oil products selling beverages or
others products, transacting with a retailer and having different partners (LT50SC) are signif-
icant drivers of a lower probability of getting higher turnover. Regarding the quality signal
intensity dependent variable, its main drivers have the opposite effect than in the turnover
case. The organizational and governance variables are non-significant or have a negative ef-
fect, e.g. the number of members. In contrast, the products and market variables increases
the probability of getting a higher quality signal. Compared to milk and oil products, sell-
ing beverages, exporting outside the borders of EU, transacting with a retailer and a larger
number of partners increases the probability of getting a higher quality signal.
This contrasted result can be explained by the indirect and positive effect of the turnover
variable on the quality signal dependent variable. Indeed, it seems that the positive effect of
the organizational and governance variables on quality signal intensity found in univariate
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ordered models (see table 3.11) is only indirect. Indeed, it is only because these variables
increases the turnover that they also raises the probability of adopting a quality signal more
intensive, since the turnover has a positive effect on this dependent variable. The direct effect
of these variables is then at best non significant and at worst negative. This implies that the
only direct drivers of choosing a more intensive quality signal strategy are variables related
to the nature of the products or the market structure.
Table 3.12: Bivariate Ordered Probit estimates
Variable Name FIML I FIML II FIML I FIML II
Turnover Quality Signal
Organizational Structure
MEM 0.17 (0.04)*** 0.17 (0.05)*** 0.02 (0.03) -0.09 (0.05)*
EMP 0.10 (0.02)*** 0.10 (0.02)* 0.006 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.02)
UNION 0.24 (0.12)** 0.24 (0.12)** 0.14 (0.08)* -0.02 (0.11)
SUBSID 0.08 (0.16)*** 0.08 (0.16) 0.21 (0.10)** 0.14 (0.13)
Sector
WSI Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
AF -1.34 (0.19)*** -1.35 (0.19)*** 0.14 (0.11) 0.97 (0.19)***
Products
MILKOIL Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
BEV -0.31 (0.15)** -0.31 (0.15)** 0.14 (0.09) 0.32 (0.12)***
CER -0.25 (0.25) -0.25 (0.25) -1.09 (0.20)*** -0.83 (0.23)***
FVEG -0.13 (0.23) -0.13 (0.23) 0.002 (0.16) 0.08 (0.19)
MEAT 0.11 (0.24) 0.11 (0.24) 0.23 (0.18) 0.13 (0.22)
OTHERS -1.23 (0.27)*** -1.23 (0.27)*** -0.85 (0.21) /////
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Variable Name FIML I FIML II FIML I FIML II
Turnover Quality Signal
Export Markets
EXINEU 0.17 (0.14) 0.17 (0.14) 0.01 (0.09) -0.10 (0.12)
EXOUTEU -0.03 (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) 0.17 (0.04)*** 0.17 (0.05)***
Local Market
LT50INREG -0.16 (0.15) -0.16 (0.15) 0.01 (0.09) 0.11 (0.12)
Marketing Channels
cooperative network Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
SUPER 0.30 (0.28) 0.30 (0.28) 0.51 (0.17)*** 0.28 (0.24)
RET -1.07 (0.19)*** -1.07 (0.19)*** -0.02 (0.14) 0.65 (0.23)***
WS 0.05 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18) 0.25(0.11)** 0.19 (0.15)
OTHERS_HOT -0.07 (0.16) -0.07 (0.16) -0.06 (0.10) -0.01 (0.13)
LT50SC -0.55 (0.18)** -0.55 (0.18)** 0.18 (0.12) 0.51 (0.16)***
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Variable Name FIML I FIML II
γ ///// 0.62 (0.14)***
Cut Points
α1 -3.37 (0.30)*** -3.37 (0.30)***
α2 -2.20 (0.26)*** -2.20 (0.26)***
α3 1.90 (0.25)*** 1.90 (0.25)***
δ1 0.01 (0.16) 0.01 (0.14)
δ2 1.50 (0.16)*** 1.36 (0.21)***
δ3 2.49 (0.18)*** 2.26 (0.28)***
Wald χ2 167.25*** 167.25***
ρ 0.19 (0.06)** -0.45 (0.16)**
Log likelihood -1372.54 -1372.54
N 993 993
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter aims to understand the different drivers of the quality signal choices made by
the small French cooperatives, with a particular focus on the coexistence of both signals. To
do this, we use a database from the national survey conducted in 2005 by the ministry of
agriculture on the exhaustive sample of 1 500 small French agricultural cooperatives. The
four possible quality signal strategies that the cooperative may choose are the following: (i)
no quality signal; (ii) common label only (AOC, IGP, AB, ...); (iii) brand only; (iv) mix signal,
i.e. both signals (label and brand) are adopted.
To analyze the drivers of these different quality signals, multinomial logit estimations are
carried out on our database. The most striking result is the effect of the marketing variables
and mainly the export markets. If exporting has a significant and positive effect on adopting
a quality signaling, there is a clear differential effects between the specific exporting markets.
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Exporting outside the EU borders mainly impacts the brand only signal, while exporting
inside the EU borders affects the label choice and the mix signal. This result supports the
idea that the label only strategy is not relevant outside the domestic market, and outside
the EU borders the brand only signal seems to be the more adequate strategy. The second
significant result is the impact of the products and the marketing channel variables on both
the mix signal and the brand only strategy.
Our results provide also some specific results on the coexistence of the two signals, i.e. labels
and brands, by analyzing the drivers of the mixed signal. First, among the organizational and
governance variables the number of employees (EMP) as well as being member of a union
of cooperatives (UNION) and having a subsidiary (SUBSID) have a significant and positive
impact. It also appears that this strategy is commonly present in the beverage, as well as in
meat and fruits & vegetables, but with less magnitude.
After checking for the robustness of our estimation results in the multinomial logit, we also
analyze the possibility of an ordinal ranking among the different quality signals. That is,
moving from a no signal strategy then to a common label, a mix signal (label and brand)
and then finally to a brand only strategy, may generate a higher profit for the cooperative.
We first estimate a simple ordered logit model, whose results show a clear evidence of an
ordered choice and bring a confirmation of the different drivers found in the previous multi-
nomial logit model. This simple ordered model makes however the restrictive assumption
that the coefficients of the exogenous variables are the same across the quality signal alterna-
tives (parallel regression assumption). To overcome this shortcoming, we have recourse to a
generalized ordered model and a sequential logit model. The estimation mainly show some
contrasting results, i.e. if the organizational structure and the governance variables are able
to explain the adoption of a quality signal (whatever the signal), they have less impact on the
choice of a brand (either in a mix signal or a brand only strategy). The increasing impact
on brand adoption concerns mainly products such as beverages and meat, and the marketing
variables such as exporting outside the EU borders and having recourse to a supermarket
marketing channel. That is, it seems that with the move toward a mix signal and a brand only
signal the organizational variables becomes less relevant, whereas the impact of marketing
drivers seem to increase. The results of the sequential model show clearly that the adoption
decision of a quality signal does not follow a sequential process. That is choosing a brand
does not necessarily imply that we chose a common label in a first step and a mix signal in a
second step. Finally, to deal with the possible endogeneity problem of the turnover variable,
we estimate a specific simultaneous equations model where one of the (ordered) dependent
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variable (quality signal) depends on the second dependent variable (turnover). The results
of this bivariate ordered probit model show first that our turnover variable is indeed endoge-
nous and significant and clearly positive effect on the probability of choosing a higher quality
signal. Moreover, we find also the same result than in the generalized ordered model, i.e.
the organizational variables have less impact in the choice of a higher quality signal. Our
bivariate ordered probit model seems to suggest that this result is due to the fact that the or-
ganizational variables have no direct impact on the quality signal choice, but that they have
an indirect effect through the increase of the turnover variable.
This chapter mainly focuses on the drivers of the different quality signals. Regarding the
coexistence of the signals (mixed signals) issue, the results of our estimates are contrasted.
Indeed, if there are some specific drivers for the mixed signal strategy (label and brand are
jointly chosen) which can suggest a complementarity effect between both signals, label and
brand strategies seem to target different markets: the domestic or the EU market for the label
only strategy and the outside EU borders market for the brand only signal. Our results are
mixed because we did not define a clear-cut test for complementarity. Test convincingly for
the complementarity effect implies having recourse to specific econometric models of com-
plementarity (Arora, 1996; Cassiman and Veuglers, 2006; Gentzkow, 2007). Implementing
these models is the next step in our agenda of research.
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Chapter 4
Is there some Complementarity between
Labels and Brands? Evidence from
French Small Cooperatives
4.1 Introduction
Consumers demand for quality food has been increasingly drawing attention throughout the
world particularly in industrialized countries (Braham, 2003; Vanhonacker et al., 2010; Hu
et al., 2011). Many quality signals can be used, both private and common, to foster the de-
velopment in the market of such quality food, mainly brands and common labels (Auriol and
Schilizzi, 2003; Crespi and Marette, 2003; Lence et al., 2007; Bottega et al., 2009). Previ-
ous research has typically focused on either brand or common label efficiency independently,
while in many instances both signals coexist. Agricultural products pairing brand names and
certified labels, such as indications of origin, are indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese,
Scottish whiskeys and most of the french wines). The objective of this chapter is to explain
this coexistence by empirically analyzing the complementarity/substitutability that may exist
between labels and brands. To do so, we develop an empirical model of complementarity that
we test on a database of the quality signaling strategies from 993 French small cooperatives.
Quality signaling is widespread in the food and agricultural products, because these prod-
ucts are subject to market failures identified by Stigler (1961) and Akerlof (1970). Since
these pioneering contributions, the market failures stemming from information asymmetries
have been the object of considerable research. Nelson (1970, 1974) and Darby and Karni
(1973) extended Stigler’s (1961) economics of information theory by considering how dif-
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ferent types of quality or attributes of goods (search, experience, credence)1 interact with
consumer confusion and thus generates more or less severe market failure. This problem of
asymmetric information is due to the fact that the producer knows the good attributes that
consumers can only determine through search or experience, or cannot determine at all. In
the food markets, this problem of asymmetric information impacts negatively on the market:
the quality of total supply drops and higher quality goods are driven out of the market, due to
adverse selection effect.
In response to the unfair competition from producers who sell lower quality goods at the
same price, the producer maintaining the quality of its goods adopts signaling strategies to
create a reputation of “high quality producer”. In his dynamic models of reputation, Shapiro
(1982, 1983) show that in one-shot purchase situations, quality can be better signaled if there
exists: (i) reliable quality certification; (ii) informed buyers, such as readership of reviews
or consumer reports, that may exert a positive externality on uninformed buyers (Mahenc,
2004). In a repeated purchase setting, when consumers can learn which good provides the
desired attribute they buy it, producers can establish a reputation for quality via brands (Klein
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Landes and Posner, 1987, 2003; Grossman and Shapiro,
1988b). Consumers tend indeed to use the quality of products offered by the same brand
in the past as an indicator of future levels of quality. Reputation, through brands, embodies
expected quality in that individuals extrapolate past behavior to make inferences about quality
future behavior. This value judgment develops over time creating an intangible asset. The
value of this asset is given by capitalization of future price premia (Belleti, 1999). Even when
there is competing brands of the same good, a trademark system can still be more efficient
than generic advertising. Crespi and Marette (2002) and Marette and Crespi (2007) show
that high-quality producers do not benefit from generic promotion when the benefits from
generic advertising firm increased demand are outweighed by the cost firm lower product
differentiation.
If a credible brand system can be an efficient mechanism to signal quality, its cost can be
prohibitive for small individual firms and/or small cooperatives in agriculture and food pro-
duction. This is one of the justifications for specific types of government intervention such as
the development of food standards and grades (Gardner, 2003; Lapan and Moschini, 2007).
1Search attributes are ones that can be verified prior to purchase through direct inspection or readily available
sources. Experience attributes are ones that can be verified only after use of the product (Ford et al., 1990).
Credence attributes are ones that are difficult to verify even after use (Darby and Karni, 1973). Products may
have one, two, or all three of those types of attributes. For example, in the case of mouthwash, a search attribute
would be color, an experience attribute would be taste, and a credence attribute would be plaque reduction.
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Alternatively, producers, firms and cooperatives can also bundle together to achieve the crit-
ical mass required for label certification through a common label. Allowing small producers
to collude may indeed improve general welfare by enabling these producers to cover the
fixed costs of quality development and certification (Marette et al., 1999; Marette and Crespi,
2003; Zago and Pick, 2004; Lence et al., 2007; Langinier and Babcock, 2008; Mérel, 2009).
In many European countries, this common labeling was mainly done with geographically
based labels, or geographical indications (GI) such as PGI (Protected Geographical Indica-
tions) and PDO (Protected Designation of Origin)2, where quality attributes are presumed to
be linked to the specific geographic origin of the good produced. This is generally referred to
as quality-origin nexus or terroir3. The collective nature of these common labels as a quality
signal means that use of the sign is not limited to a single producer but to all producers within
the designation which adhere to code of practice. Product reputation is thus the result of the
actions of different agents active in the same area of production and is projected through tra-
dition over a period of time (Marty, 1998). It could be said that GIs are the result of a process
whereby collective reputation is institutionalized in order to solve certain problems that arise
from information asymmetry and free riding on reputation (Belleti, 1999).
There is some evidence that common labeling, as an institutionalization of a collective reputa-
tion, enable to generate price premium for producers (Thiedig and Sylvander, 2000; Loureiro
and McCluskey, 2000). For instance, Loreiro and McCluskey (2000) analyzed the consumer’s
willingness to pay for GI labels and show that when collective reputation is good, a GI is a
powerful tool to promote quality and obtain a price premium4. Landon and Smith (1997,
1998) deepen this analysis and provide an empirical study of the extent to which consumers
use both individual and collective reputation current quality indicators when purchasing Bor-
deaux wine. Two main results emerge. First, there is a huge effect of reputation on price
premium. Indeed, the results indicate that the price of Bordeaux wine depends significantly
on both expected and current quality, but that marginal impact of expected quality (long-term
reputation) on price is approximately 20 times higher than that of current quality. This im-
plies that it take a considerable time for a firm to establish a reputation for high quality that
2In the case of PGI it suffices that one stage of the production process is carried out in the defined area, while
in the case of a PDO, all stages of production must take place in this area.
3Terroir, a French term for “taste of place”, refers to a casual relationship between agronomic conditions,
craftmanship and a product’s distinct quality (Giovannucci et al., 2009).
4Bonnet and Simioni (2001) show in contrast that consumers do not place significant value on the PDO
labeled French Camembert and that brand appears to be more relevant in the consumer’s evaluation of alternative
Products. Gergaud and Livat (2010) find also no significant value on the PDO labeled Bordeaux wine.
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would result in a significant price premium. Second, a collective strategy of reputation build-
ing, e.g. through GIs, can be more efficient since there can be decreasing marginal cost with
reputation building, and positive effect on marginal return. The results suggest that collec-
tive reputation indicators play a significant role in price determination, mainly through their
impact on expected quality.
But GIs may not necessarily prevent free riding in collective reputation. Winfree and Mc-
Cluskey (2005) show that with positive collective reputation and no traceability there is an
incentive to producers to free ride, i.e. extract rents by producing a lower quality level. And
the sustainable level of collective reputation decreases as the number of firms in the produc-
tion area increases. Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud (1999) and Desquilbet and Monier-Dilhan
(2008) also show that a GI can decrease the quality level. Loureiro and McCluskey (2000)
show that while the GI label is a powerful tool to promote high quality goods, its use on
products that are not of high quality is not an efficient marketing strategy and they suggest
that it could impact negatively on the collective reputation. Thus, as shown by Landon and
Smith (1997, 1998), it can be efficient to use both collective and individual reputation, by
having recourse simultaneously to labels and brands, to solve this problem.
The question that can then be addressed is related to the problem of concurrent use or comple-
mentarity between labels (GIs) and brands (trademarks). There is a burgeoning theoretical
literature dealing with this issue. Bouamara-Mechemache and Chaaban (2010) investigate
whether producers with a quality advantage should collectively choose a GI certification or
a private label. Moschini and Menapace (2012) extend the model of Shapiro (1983) to re-
flect both collective (GIs) and firm-specific (trademarks) reputation in a competitive market.
Their main result is that GIs and trademarks turn out to be complementary signals of quality.
Indeed, if GIs reveal information regarding the origin of product, it can also reduce costs of
building reputation by constraining moral hazard behavior. Therefore, GI certification may
improve welfare compared with a situation where only private trademarks would be avail-
able for firms. Castinagri et al. (2012), following Tirole (1996) and Winfree and McCluskey
(2005), go one step further and analyze the conditions under which both labels (cooperative
reputation) and brands (private reputation) may coexist.
This chapter offers the first attempt to empirically test for this coexistence by estimating the
complementarity effect that may exist between labels and brands. First, we develop empirical
models used to test for complementarity effects between different both signals. Since Arora
(1996), it is usually considered that the complementarity effect between different practices
can be estimated using a bivariate probit. But taking into account the Miravette and Per-
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nias (2010) criticism on the incoherence problem encountered when using such a model, we
show that a multinomial probit model can overcome this problem. With a multinomial probit
model, it is indeed possible to separate what is due to complementarity and what is due to
unobservable heterogeneity.
Second, to estimate both models we use an exhaustive sample of 993 small French coopera-
tives. The cooperatives may choose between 4 strategies of quality signaling: no sign, label
only, brand only, label and brand (mix signal). The question we address is then if the mix
signal is due to a complementarity effect, i.e. the simultaneous choice of two signals (label
and brand) is due to the net gain generated by this combination of signals, or to unobservable
heterogeneity between cooperatives. Note that in contrast to the previous literature on labels
and brands, our focus is on the strategic choices done by producers, here the cooperatives of
producers, and not on the choices done by consumers.
Third, our estimation results show that the evidence of a complementary effect depends on
the empirical model used. When we first regress the mix signal variable on the explanatory
variables using a bivariate probit, the results exhibit a complementary effect (the correlation
term between errors is positive). While the signs seem to have been chosen for different
markets (national European market for labels and outside of EU for brands). But as shown by
Miravette and Pernias (2010), the bivariate probit model is incoherent when the endogenous
variables are discrete since it cannot separate what is due to complementarity and what is due
to unobserved heterogeneity. To overcome this shortcoming, we use a multinomial probit that
allows to make such separation. The results are clear cut: we get a significant but negative
interaction between label and brand variables. That is, both signals are more substitute than
complementary.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In section 4.2 we present and discuss the
complementarity effect and the empirical models to test for this effect (a bivariate probit
model, and a multinomial probit model). In section 4.3, we present the database and the
different variables used in the test. In section 4.4, we discuss and comment the results of the
two empirical models and we conclude on the presence of complementarity or substitutability
between labels and brands. Section 4.5 bring some concluding remarks.
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4.2 Testing for Complementarity
4.2.1 Some Theory
In order to test for complementarity of labels and brands we apply an empirical strategy that
is based on the theory of supermodularity. This theory of supermodularity was mathemat-
ically developed by Topkis (1978)5, and first introduced in industrial economics by Vives
(1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) to explain innovation adoption in firms. In
the context of supermodularity, two signals are complementary if: (i) adopting one signal
does not preclude adopting the other; (ii) whenever it is possible to implement each signal
separately, the sum of the profit to do just one or the other is not greater than the profit of
doing both together. Condition (ii) can also be understood as follows: the incremental return
to implementing any one of the signals is greater if the other has already been implemented.
More formally, suppose that there are two quality signals s1 (label) and s2 (brand). Each sig-
nal can be adopted by the cooperative (s1 = s2 = 1) or not (s1 = s2 = 0). The payoff function
pi(s1,s2) is supermodular and s1 and s2 are complements if
pi(1,1)−pi(0,1)≥ pi(1,0)−pi(0,0)
That is adding a signal while the other signal is already adopted has a higher incremental
effect on performance (pi) than adding the signal in isolation.
4.2.2 The Empirical Models
Athey and Stern (1998) show that the problem of testing for complementarity can be tackled
according to two approaches. The first one is the direct approach. It consists in using a pro-
duction function to determine the effects of choosing particular combinations of innovation
strategies on a firm’s innovative performance (Belderbos et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugel-
ers, 2006; Mohnen and Röller, 2005). Using this approach allows for a direct test of the com-
plementarity constraints, by testing multiple inequality constraints simultaneously (Mohnen
and Röller, 2005). Two methods are used to test for these inequality constraints. First, for
each possible combination of strategies, a corresponding dummy variable is included to cap-
ture whether or not the firm is involved in that particular combination of strategies. These
dummy variables are then included in a regression analysis and based on the estimates follow-
ing from the regression analysis, a number of inequality restrictions can be tested. The second
5See Topkis (1998) for an extensive treatment of the concept with economic illustrations.
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method consists in using pairwise interaction terms to assess complementarity (Bresnahan et
al., 2002; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Ichionowski et al., 1997; Carree et al., 2011). Using
interaction terms allows for the estimation of the amount of interaction between two or more
practices, whereas using a production function with dummies only provides an insight in par-
ticular combinations but remains silent on the magnitude of the increasing gains of using the
one while already performing the other.
The direct approach requires however a measure of the innovation performance, which is not
always available. When we do not have such a measure, we must use an indirect approach:
the adoption approach. It tests for a positive correlation between different practices con-
ditional on a vector of exogenous variables X . More precisely, it consists in examining firm
simultaneous decision in a bivariate model and analyze cross-equation correlation in the error
terms, conditioned on firm characteristics (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Testing for cor-
relation to infer complementarity derives from the theoretical approach on complementarity
presented above. Let us show this. Suppose that our previous payoff function pi(.) depends
also on a vector of exogenous variables (X), and assume that pi(s1,s2,X) is supermodular in
(s1,s2)6.
Then the optimal configuration of signals S∗(s1(X),s2(X)) is monotone non-decreasing in
X . Arora (1996) shows that this implies that if a pair of signals (s1,s2) is complementary,
then they will be correlated when there is heterogeneity in X across firms (cross-sectional
study). A bivariate probit regresses the non-exclusive signals s1 and s2 on assumed exogenous
variables (X) but takes the correlation between them explicitly into account. This model can
6A function f : Rk→ R is supermodular if
f (x
∨
y)+ f (x
∧
y)> f (x)+ f (y)
for all x,y ∈ Rk, where x∨y denotes the component-wise maximum and x∧y the componentwise minimum
of x and y. If f is a twice continuously differentiable payoff function defined over actions x and y, then super-
modularity is equivalent to the condition
∂2 f
∂x∂y
> 0
That is, the marginal payoff (∂ f/∂x) of action x is non-decreasing in y .
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be written as follows:
s1
∗
i = β
1Xi+ ε1i , s
1∗
i

= 1 if s1
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
s2
∗
i = β
2Xi+ ε2i , s
2∗
i

= 1 if s2
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
where s j
∗
i , j = 1,2, is a latent variable. The errors are such that
E(ε1) = E(ε2) = 0
V (ε1) = V (ε2) = 1
Cov(ε1,ε2) = ρ
The main intuition of the bivariate probit model is the following: in the presence of comple-
mentarity, a variable that affects only one of the signal directly, say s1, show up significant in
both regressions, since complementarity induces an indirect effect from this variable on the
adoption of s2. That is, the indirect approach gives an indication of complementarity based
on the assumption that the actual choice of the chosen practice(s) maps the firm’s optimal
decision. As explained before, it has the advantage that it can be used if performance effects
of the chosen signals cannot be observed.
This indirect approach encounters however two difficulties. First, unobserved heterogeneity
between different firms could bias the estimation results and leads either to accepting the
hypothesis of complementarity while non complementarity exists, or to rejecting the com-
plementarity hypothesis when activities are in fact complementary. In order to account for
this unobserved heterogeneity, it is recommended to use an exclusion restriction that directly
impacts one of the practices, but not the other. Note that this “reduced-form test” for com-
plementarity (Athey and Stern, 1998) is only useful if there are not more than two practices
to be tested, as far more options a strong indirect effect might outweigh a substitution effect
of the pair of practices. We implement this test as a multinomial logit model for the mutually
exclusive signals: label, brand, both and none.
Second, this reduced-form approach suppose that the innovations strategies are continuous
variables, whereas decisions on innovations are discrete in most common situations (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1990, 1995). The extension to the case of binary variables by using a
bivariate probit (Cassiman and Veuglers, 2006) make the discrete response model incoherent
(Miravette and Pernias, 2010).
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Following Arora et al. (2010) and Gentzkow (2007), we mainly show that a multinomial
probit approach can overcome both difficulties even when the strategies are dichotomous.
That is, we can separate the complementarity between the innovation strategies from the
unobserved heterogeneity, by estimating both the parameter of complementarity and the cor-
relation coefficients in the error terms. This result holds because the MNP model is not
incoherent. Indeed, we show that there is no overlapping between different sets of combina-
tions of error terms, and therefore it is possible to associate any combination of error terms
with a unique combination of innovation strategies without excluding any complementarity
effect.
4.2.3 The Multinomial Probit Approach
4.2.3.1 The Model
We consider a situation where n firms in a market decide to adopt (or not) some innovations.
More precisely, we analyze the decision of a firm i, i = 1, . . . .,n, to adopt two types of inno-
vation7. We denote s1i and s
2
i these innovations, where s
1
i = 1 if the firm i adopts the first type
of innovation and 0 otherwise; similarly, s2i = 1 if the same firm i adopts the second type of
innovation and 0 otherwise. Let the choice j indicate the simultaneous decision of the firm
i to adopt these innovations. Then, the firm can make one of four possible choices: j = 0
when it neither adopts s1i nor s
2
i (s
1
i = 0, s
2
i = 0); j = 1 when it adopts s
1
i but does not adopt
s2i (s
1
i = 1, s
2
i = 0); j = 2 when it does not adopt s
1
i but adopts s
2
i (s
1
i = 0, s
2
i = 1); and j = 3
when it adopts both (s1i = 1, s
2
i = 1).
Each firm i is supposed to make a choice j that maximizes its own profit pii j
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
. The
profit maximization theoretical framework results in the following empirical discrete choice
model for the latent profit indicator the firm i derives from making the choice j:
pii j = β jzi+ εi j (4.2.1)
where the profit associated to each choice has components that are observable and unob-
servable to the econometrician. That is, zi j is the vector of observed explanatory variables
describing individual and alternative specific characteristics which are supposed to be im-
portant for the determination of the choice. The parameter vectors β j are unknown and they
are the object of inference. The vector of stochastic terms εi j =
(
εi0,εi1,εi2,εi3
)′ represents
7Much of the intuition presented here extends to cases of three or more innovations; however, the analysis
becomes far more cumbersome.
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the unobserved returns of the choices. It is assumed to be distributed as a multi-variate nor-
mal, identically and independently across the n firms, with zero mean and covariance matrix
∑= σi j > 0, ∀ j (positive definiteness).
Arranging the parameters in (4.2.1) as β = (β′0,β
′
1,β
′
2,β
′
3) the log-likelihood function to be
maximized is:
L
(
β,∑
)
=
1
n
3
∑
i=0
3
∑
j=0
yi j lnPi j
(
β,∑
)
where the profit indicator pii j is latent but we observe the choice yi j = 1 if the firm i chooses
the alternative j and yi j = 0 otherwise. While Pi j = Pr
(
pii j > piik,k 6= j
)
represents the prob-
ability that the firm i make the choice j if it gets the greatest profit from this alternative.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to get a unique maximum likelihood estimates of the param-
eters (β,∑) in the above model, as they are not identified. The first source of the identification
problem is that the observed choices are only informative on the differences of the profits and
not on the profits themselves. Then taking differences with respect to the profits associated
with j = 0, i.e. we take the first alternative as the reference state used to normalize location
of the latent variable, leads to
pi∗il = piil−pii0 = β∗l zi+ ε∗il
where β∗l = βl−β0 and ε∗il = εil− εi0 for l = 1,2,3. The normalized profits for the different
alternatives are then
pi∗i0 = 0
pi∗i1 = β
∗
1zi+ ε
∗
i1
pi∗i2 = β
∗
2zi+ ε
∗
i2
pi∗i3 = β
∗
3zi+ ε
∗
i3
This implies that the profit to adopting neither innovation is fixed at zero (pi∗i0 = 0). One
should then interpret the profits of the other options as differences from the non-adoption
option. We measure profit complementarity by how much better or worse the firm would do
by adopting both strategies than would two identically firms each specializing by adopting
one strategy. We denote the profit complementarity by δ and define it as:
δ= pi∗i3− (pi∗i1+pi∗i2) (4.2.2)
One should not infer from the use of the term complementarity any restriction that δ be
positive. The case of negative profit complementarity is certainly plausible in many contexts,
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especially if the two innovation types are substitutes. Rewriting (4.2.2) we get
pi∗i3 = (pi
∗
i1+pi
∗
i2)+δ
= (β∗1+β
∗
2)zi+(ε
∗
i1+ ε
∗
i2)+δ
The both strategies innovation profile is chosen, i.e. the choice j = 3 is observed, if we have:
pi∗i3 > pi
∗
i2, pi
∗
i3 > pi
∗
i1, and pi
∗
i3 > pi
∗
i0 . Let us define θ
∗
j = β∗jzi, with θ∗j = (θ∗1,θ
∗
2)
′. Rewriting
these conditions lead to the following constraints on the errors:
ε∗i1 >−δ−θ∗1
ε∗i2 >−δ−θ∗2
ε∗i1+ ε
∗
i2 >−δ− (θ∗1+θ∗2)
(4.2.3)
Now we want to compare these constraints to those generated by the structural model. Fol-
lowing Miravette and Pernias (2010), we define the profit function as follows:
pii
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (θ1+ ε∗1)s
1
i +(θ2+ ε
∗
2)s
2
i +δs
1
i s
2
i
where the innovation choice is represented by the two dichotomous variables s1i and s
2
i . To
catch the complementarity effect, a pairwise interaction term (δ) among the two strategies is
introduced. As previously, (θ1,θ2) represents the observable characteristics of the firm and(
εi1,εi2
)
returns unobservable to the econometrician. If we observe
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (1,1) this is
because the profit function satisfies the following conditions: pii (1,1) > pii (0,1), pii (1,1) >
pii (1,0), and pii (1,1) > pii (0,0). Rewriting these conditions, we get the MNP system of
constraints (4.2.3) on the unobserved returns8.
Since the MNP generates the same set of constraints than the structural model, the structural-
parameter estimate of complementarity can be recovered with this model. The intuition of
this result is the following. Recall that if the firm adopts the two innovations simultaneously,
this can be due to the existence of complementarity or to the existence of these unobservable
returns. With a MNP, we are able to separate the complementarity between the strategies from
the unobserved heterogeneity, since we can estimate both δ, which catches complementarity,
and ρs the correlation coefficients between the errors. Indeed, in contrast to the bivariate
approach (Miravette and Pernias, 2010), the MNP model generates no incoherence problem.
That is, it is possible to associate each combination of the errors (ε∗i1,ε
∗
i2) to one and only one
8The only difference is that the estimated parameter in the MNP are normalized.
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strategy profile without imposing the restrictive condition δ= 0. Otherwise, we can estimate
only the coefficients of correlation between the errors.
To show this, let us rewrite the system of constraints [3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.7] by defining the set
S3 of the combinations of the errors (ε∗i1,ε
∗
i2) leading to the joint strategies adoption ( j = 3)
S3 = {(ε∗i1,ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 >−δ−θ∗1,ε∗i2 >−δ−θ∗2,ε∗i1+ ε∗i2 >−δ− (θ∗1+θ∗2)}
Similarly, we define the following set S1 of the combinations of the errors leading to the
adoption of strategy 1 ( j = 1)
S1 = {(ε∗i1,ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 >−θ∗1,ε∗i2 <−δ−θ∗2,ε∗i2− ε∗i1 > θ∗2−θ∗1}
symmetrically, the set S2 of the innovation profile 2 ( j = 2) is
S2 = {(ε∗i1,ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 <−δ−θ∗1,ε∗i2 >−θ∗2,ε∗i2− ε∗i1 > θ∗1−θ∗2}
finally the set S0 leading to the adoption of neither innovation is
S0 = {(ε∗i1,ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 <−θ∗1,ε∗i2 <−θ∗2,ε∗i2+ ε∗i1 <−δ−θ∗1−θ∗2}
We show graphically that there is no overlapping between these different sets either when
δ < 0 (see Fig.2.1) or when δ > 0 (see Fig.2.2). This implies that a multinomial probit
estimation generates no incoherence problem. Therefore, we can estimate both δ, which
catches complementarity, and ρs the correlation coefficients between the errors. That is,
it is possible to separate the complementarity between the strategies from the unobserved
heterogeneity, and thus recover the structural-parameter estimate of complementarity.
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Figure 2.1: Regions of the diﬀerent strategies when δ < 0
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innovations simultaneously, this can be due to the existence of complementarity or to
the existence of these unobservable returns. With a MNP, we are able to separate the
complementarity between the strategies from the unobserved heterogeneity, since we
can estimate both δ, which catches complementarity, and ρs the correlation coeﬃcients
between the errors. Indeed, in contrast to the bivariate approach (Miravette and Per-
nias, 2010), the MNP model generates no incoherence problem. That is, it is possible
to associate each combination of the errors (ε∗i1, ε
∗
i2) to one and only one strategy profile
without imposing the restrictive condition δ = 0. Otherwise, we can estimate only the
coeﬃcients of correlation between the errors.
To show this, let us rewrite the system of constraints [3, 4, 5b] by defining the set S3 of
the combinations of the errors (ε∗i1, ε
∗
i2) leading to the joint strategies adoption (j = 3)
S3 = {(ε∗i1, ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 > −δ − θ∗1, ε∗i2 > −δ − θ∗2, ε∗i1 + ε∗i2 > −δ − (θ∗1 + θ∗2)}
Similarly, we define the following set S1 of the combinations of the errors leading to the
adoption of strategy 1 (j = 1)
S1 = {(ε∗i1, ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 > −θ∗1, ε∗i2 < −δ − θ∗2, ε∗i2 − ε∗i1 > θ∗2 − θ∗1}
symmetrically, the set S2 of the innovation profile 2 (j = 2) is
S2 = {(ε∗i1, ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 < −δ − θ∗1, ε∗i2 > −θ∗2, ε∗i2 − ε∗i1 > θ∗1 − θ∗2}
finally the set S0 leading to the doption of neither innovation is
S0 = {(ε∗i1, ε∗i2) : ε∗i1 < −θ∗1, ε∗i2 < −θ∗2, ε∗i2 + ε∗i1 < −δ − θ∗1 − θ∗2}
We show graphically that there is no overlapping between these diﬀerent sets either
when δ < 0 (see Fig.1) or when δ > 0 (see Fig.2). This implies that a multinomial
probit estimation generates no incoherence problem. Therefore, we can estimate both δ,
which catches complementarity, and ρs the correlation coeﬃcients between the errors.
That is, it is possible to separate the complementarity between the strategies from
the unobserved heterogeneity, and thus recover the structural-parameter estimate of
complementarity.
Figure 2.2: Regions of the diﬀerent strategies when δ > 0
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4.2.3.2 Discussion
The problem of normalization is not the only difficulty encountered when we try to estimate
a MNP model. A study performed by Keane (1992) shows that even if formal identification
of the MNP models does not require exclusion restriction, the parameter identification of
the models can be extremely tenuous in the absence of such restrictions9. This problem
can be solved when the regressors of the stochastic profits pi∗i j include an alternative-specific
attribute. This means that data must contain some variables - observed for all individuals -
which should enter the profit associated with only one alternative and not the others. Such
alternative-specific variables are usually available in studies concerning transportation choice
(Greene, 2003), where, for example, the price or a quality indicator faced by the individual
in each alternative can be observed. Without such a structure of data, the multinomial probit
can still be identified if: (i) we can find variables that directly impact the choice of one
signal strategy but not the other; (ii) we impose some additional constraints on the variance-
covariance matrix10.
If other class of multinomial models are easier to estimate, they are less suitable to test for
complementarity. This is the case of the standard multinomial model or the HEV (Het-
eroscedastic Extreme Value) model since the key assumption in this class of models is the
“independence” of the extreme value of distribution. This assumption implies that the unob-
served portion of profit for one alternative is supposed to be independent of the unobserved
portion of profit for other alternatives (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption).
In other words, the errors among alternatives are supposed to be uncorrelated and thus the
correlation coefficients are zero (ρ = 0). Therefore, since only δ can be estimated by using
such class of models, it is not possible to separate complementarity from unobserved het-
erogeneity (Augereau et al., 2006)11. Whereas the MNP model can estimate both δ which
catches complementarity, and ρs the correlation coefficients between the errors (Gentzkow,
2007).
Another solution is to examine firm simultaneous decisions in a bivariate model with an
endogenous dummy variable. This model would explicitly test whether the adoption of the
first type of innovation is a function of the use of the second type of innovation, and vice
9Identification of a model is tenuous or fragile when even if formally identified, this model exhibit very small
variation in the objective function from its maximum over a wide range of parameter values (Keane, 1992; p.
193).
10See Train (2009) for an extensive discussion.
11Note that we have the symmetric case in the bivariate probit model, when δ = 0 and only the correlation
coefficients can be estimated due to the incoherence problem.
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versa. However, this kind of model is also plagued by the incoherence problem encountered
in the classic bivariate model (Heckman, 1978; Tamer, 2003).
4.3 Data and Variables
Our data come from the national survey conducted in 2005 by the ministry of agriculture on
the 1,500 small French agricultural cooperatives12. This periodical survey aims to study the
economic conditions of small agricultural cooperatives processing and marketing excluded
from the SCEES13 annual business survey. From the exhaustive sample of 1500 cooperatives
we build a database of 993 individuals after cleaning out missing values, since not the whole
cooperatives answered every question.
A small cooperative14 is defined in this survey as a cooperative that has 10 or less full time
employees. By achieving a total turnover of 3.6 billion euros, these small cooperatives rep-
resent less than 1% of the processing and marketing activity of agro-food products. But they
are the first intermediary of over 100 000 farmers and thus are closely engaged in their pro-
duction and strategic choices to market access. And although they are small cooperatives,
their size vary at large since only 10% of these cooperatives realized more than 30% of total
sales.
Those small cooperatives are also very marked territorially because of the location of their
members. That is, more than half are in fact exclusively regional customers, even more
than 3/4 of these make more than 50% of their turnover in the region. Moreover, most of
small cooperatives tend to trade with essentially the same type of customers (only 14% do
not achieve more than half of their turnover with the same customer). Among the typical
customers, other cooperatives occupy a privileged place, indicating the importance of the co-
operatives network (Fillipi et Triboulet, 2010). If the majority of small cooperatives develop
their activities at the regional level, they realize on average 20% of sales at the national level.
7% of the cooperatives declared exports of their products to other countries and earned 6%
of total sales. Exports are mainly oriented to European Union markets and in a less extend to
out of EU markets. Note that those cooperatives who export are generally the largest small
12Enquête sur les petites coopératives agricoles et forestières, 2005.
13Service centrale des enquêtes et des études statistiques (Central office for statistical surveys and studies).
14Recall that agricultural cooperative societies form a legal category of society that distinguishes civil and
commercial companies. Their operations based on solidarity farmers producers to ensure their supply, process-
ing, marketing, and sale of their products. These cooperatives are exempted from corporation tax provided to
operate in accordance with the legal provisions that govern them.
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cooperatives, with a median turnover double than those turned exclusively to the domestic
market.
4.3.1 Dependent Variables: labels and brands
In the agro-food industry, firms used to choose two main signals: quality labels and brands.
In our database, the different signaling profiles are distributed as follows: (i) 30% of small
cooperatives use no signal (NSIG); (ii) 48% of them uses only labels (LABEL); (iii) 5% uses
only brands (BRAND); (iv) 18% of the cooperatives use a “mix signal” strategy by adopting
both signals (LABRAND).
Figure 4.3.1: Distribution of quality signs
First, since the official signs (labels) are widespread in the French agro-food sector, it is not
surprising to note that two third of small cooperatives adopt labels. As shown by table 1,
among the different labels enforced by the French state regulation, there is a large predom-
inance of signs indicating the geographical origin of products (AOC and PGI). Those signs
are especially developed for wine and cheese, and more generally 79% of dairy products and
64% of alcoholic beverages are sold by small cooperatives with a label indicating the geo-
graphical origin of the product. Other labels hold a significant position with a relatively high
organic farming (AB)15. The cooperatives may also adopt different labels. Indeed, labels are
non-exclusive since different labels can be used to point out different dimensions of quality
(The “label rouge” can be chosen to signal organoleptic quality of the product, and the label
15Label Rouge certify that processed and unprocessed food or non-food agricultural products have specific
characteristics establishing a level of quality, resulting in particular from their particular conditions of produc-
tion or manufacture and conform to specifications which distinguish them from similar products and foodstuffs
normally sold.
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“AB” to signal its “environmental-friendly” dimension). However, in our database, very few
cooperatives among those that use the label strategy adopt more than one label (see table 1).
Table 4.1: Labels owned
no label 35%
at least one label 65% Number of labels owned
1 85%
2 12%
3 2%
4 1%
Second, branding is much less common since it concerns less than a quarter of small coop-
eratives (22%). A notable fact is that brands are primarily associated with a label (18% of
the whole sample and 75% of the cooperatives that choose the brand signal), while very few
choose to hold only a brand (5% of the whole sample and 25% of those choosing a brand).
Small businesses do not always have the ability to develop their own financial trademarks
and many produce on behalf of major brands. This is partly explained by specific institu-
tional features: the wide dissemination of official quality labels. This type of quality labels
has the advantage for small cooperatives to collectivize the costs of establishment and im-
plementation of the signal, which allows them to not only assume the economic burden but
management of a brand as well.
4.3.2 Independent Variables
Different variables may explain the choice of quality signals. First, the turn-over realized by
the cooperative. The continuous variable LN(TURN) indicates the turnover (millions euros)
realized in 2005 by the cooperative. However, to perform their turnover, cooperative struc-
tures suffer from lower levels of labor force than capitalist structures. Indeed, a cooperative
is defined to be small if it has less than ten employees. We build a variable indicating the
number of employees (EMP). On average, the cooperatives in our database have less than 4
full-time equivalent employees. But we observe a large variability since some cooperatives
have no employees, while others are at the threshold of 10 employees. Due to this limited
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workforce, farmers, as members of the cooperative, do a large number of jobs mainly in sea-
sonal periods of intense activity for the cooperative. The continuous variable MEM indicates
the total number of members (Table (4.2)).
The other solution to get workforce, equity and new competencies is to join a union of co-
operative (Filippi et al. 2006). The membership to a union of cooperatives is indicated by
the dummy variable, UNION. In our database, nearly 40% of the small cooperatives join
an union. These unions take the form of new cooperatives as an umbrella for the associ-
ated cooperatives. The consolidation of equity can then carry the heavy equipment that the
cooperative base alone cannot achieve. To expand its scope and develop a certain critical
size, the cooperative may also hold shares in the capital of other (private) firms. When the
holdings reach 50% or more, the firm becomes subsidiary owned by the cooperative. We
build a dummy variable SUBSID indicating when the cooperative has a subsidiary firm. This
organizational model is often seen as a mechanism for the cooperative to market directly its
products by creating a marketing firm that sell the products under its own brand (Hendrikse
and Bijman, 2004). However, this strategy only refers to 15% of the small cooperatives,
mainly those which have the highest turnover.
The second set of variables that may explain the choice of quality signal is related to the
nature of the activity and the products of the cooperative, as well as the market structure
and the different marketing channels used. There is a clear cut distinction in our database
between cooperatives that are just intermediary of exchange (wholesale industries) and co-
operatives that industrially processes the products collected from their members. The first
category represents 63% of the whole sample and the second 37%. The two categories are
very different in their structures. Within the agro-food industry, the wine making activity
(60% of the cooperatives) and the dairy industry (25% of the cooperatives) are predominant.
As noted previously, these are the two activities where the labels are over-represented. To
take into account the effect of the agro-food industry on the signaling strategy, we create a
dummy variable AF that indicates if the small cooperative processes the farmer’s products.
In the wholesale trade, there is no dominant activity and the first three sectors are milk, eggs
& oil (25%), grain & animal feed (20%) and fruit and vegetables (17%); sectors where labels
are less represented. To analyze more precisely the effect of the different types of product, we
build five dummy variables representing the five main sectors of production: (i) Beverages,
mainly wine (BEV), (ii) cereals & feed (CER), (iii) fruit & vegetables (FVEG); (iv) meat
(MEAT); (v) milk, eggs & oil (MILKOIL).
Small cooperatives are also marked territorially because of the location of their members.
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This local anchor is often found in the type of market and marketing channel mainly used
by small cooperatives. Regarding the type of market, more than half of the cooperatives
have regional customers exclusively and three quarters of them make more than 50% of their
turnover in the region. We have a dummy variable, (LT50INREG), which equals one when
the cooperative makes less than 50% of its turnover in the region. Export market represents
3% of total sales on average and essentially turned towards the European Union. But, given
their size a significant proportion exported beyond the borders of Europe (5%). Note that the
cooperatives that export with a median turnover of around double than the cooperative turned
exclusively to the domestic market. We build two continuous variables for the exporting
cooperatives: (i) percentage of total sales from export in Europe (EXINEU); (ii) percentage
of total sales from export outside EU (EXOUTEU). 44% of total sales are being exported
with the brand and public label. 8.5% of total sales that is exported in EU are without any
public label or brand, and 12% of total sales that export outside EU use brand and label
signals.
As for the marketing channel, we notice that most small cooperatives tend to trade with essen-
tially the same type of client (86%). We build a variable that equals one when the cooperative
makes less than 50% of its turnover with the same client (LT50SC). We control for the differ-
ent kind of channels, according to the cooperative sells its product to Supermarket (SUPER),
retailers (RET), wholesalers (WS), or hotels and restaurants (OTHER_HOT).
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Table 4.2: Description of variables
Variable Definition Mean S. D. Min. Max.
Size and organizational structure
MEM Logarithmic value of no. of adherents 3.83 1.26 0.00 8.07
EMP Number of employees (from 0 to 10) 3.53 3.64 0.00 10.00
UNION = 1 if coop is affiliated with an Union 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
SUBSID = 1 if coop is subsidizing 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
TURN Logarithmic value of turnover ( millions C) 13.7 1.86 0.00 17.26
Activity
WSI = 1 if coop is a Wholesale industry 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
AF = 1 if coop is an Agro-food industry 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Products
MILKOIL = 1 if coop produces milk & oil (reference) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
BEV = 1 if coop produces beverages 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
CER = 1 if coop produces cereals 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
FVEG = 1 if coop produces fruits & vegetables 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
MEAT = 1 if coop produces meat 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
OTHERS =1 if coop produces other products 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Export Markets
EXINEU % of Turnover by exports within EU 0.35 0.89 -0.47 4.60
EXOUTEU % of Turnover by exports outside EU 0.06 0.39 0.39 4.60
Variable Definition Mean S. D. Min. Max.
Local Market
LT50INREG = 1 if less than 50% turnover in the same region 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Marketing Channels
- cooperative network = 1 if dealing with a coop network (ref) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
- SUPER = 1 if dealing with supermarket 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
- RET = 1 if dealing with a retailer 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
-WS =1 if dealing with a wholesaler 0.18 0.18 0.00 1.00
- OTHERS_HOT = 1 if dealing with hotels & restaurants 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
LT50SC = 1 if less than 50% of turnover with the same customer 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
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4.4 Results and Interpretations
We regress the endogenous quality signal variables on the independent variables, using the
empirical models presented in section 2. In what follows, we first present the estimation
results of the bivariate probit (4.4.1) as well as those of the multinomial logit (Table 4.4.2).
Then, we will give the results of the multinomial probit estimation and conclude on the evi-
dence of complementary/substitution effect (Table 4.4.3).
4.4.1 The Bivariate Probit
With the estimation of the bivariate probit model, we start with an investigation of the cor-
relation between both quality signals (label and brand) conditional on intra-organizational
and environmental characteristics of the cooperative. Label and brand are defined as non-
exclusive quality signals, i.e. it is possible that the cooperatives may use both.
The results for the bivariate probit estimations, with the two methods of maximum likelihood
(MML) and simulated maximum likelihood (SML), are presented in Table (4.3). The first
important finding is that there is a significant positive relationship between label and brand
signals as indicated by the positive and significant correlation coefficient ρ. This finding
suggests that label and brand signals are likely to occur in combination and hence is a first
indication of complementarity. To explain this possible complementary effect between la-
bels and brands, we need to analyze the different variables that have significant effect on the
adoption of label and brand signals. Concerning the size and organizational structure vari-
ables, the small coops that have a higher number of employees (EMP) and turnover (LnTurn)
and, at the same time are members (Union) of a larger cooperative, choose preferably a label.
In contrast, the small cooperatives that have both higher employees and members (MEM)
choose a brand strategy. This may suggest a strong contrast between: (i) small cooperatives
that have a “cooperative” strategy of growth by developing their relationships and organi-
zational proximities with bigger cooperatives and thus choose a “cooperative” signal like a
label; (ii) cooperatives that have more “individualistic” strategy of growth with more em-
ployees and members and that choose an “individualistic” signal like brand. We observe the
same contrast for the different sectors of activity. If, compared to the reference MILKOIL,
the cooperatives of the other sectors have less recourse to labels, those in the fruits & veg-
etables sector (FVEG) are more prone to adopt a brand. This contrasting result holds also
for export markets and marketing channels. Indeed, if exporting to European markets (EX-
INEU) increases the adoption of both signals, the cooperatives that export outside European
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Union (EXOUTEU) are less prone to choose a label. For marketing channels, compared to
the cooperatives network (reference), transacting with a reduced number of big partners like
supermarket and wholesalers increases the probability of adopting a brand. In contrast, hav-
ing a larger number of small partners (LT50SC, i.e. less than 50% of turn-over with the same
client) increases the probability of adopting a label.
This contrast in drivers that affect the choice of labels and brands may be explained by the
fact that the label and brand signals are not mutually exclusive in the bivariate probit model.
That is, observing the label choice can be the result either of choosing a label strategy or
of choosing the mix signal (label and brand). To analyze the different drivers of all the
combination of signal strategies, we need to estimate a multinomial logit.
4.4.2 The Multinomial Logit
We estimate a multinomial logit model, examining the drivers for the combinations of all
signal strategies (NOSIG, LABEL, BRAND, LABRAND). This can be done if the number
of categories is not too large and there is sufficient variation in each category. We estimate
the following model of quality signal choice:
Pr(Y = j) =
eXiβ
∑4i=1 eXiβ
with j ∈ {LABEL,BRAND,LABRAND,NOSIG} and Xi a vector of characteristics of coop-
erative i. cooperatives choosing no signal (NOSIG) serve as the reference case.
Compared to the bivariate probit model, the multinomial logit model is less restrictive on the
effects that exogenous control variables can have on the different choices, allowing coeffi-
cients to vary across exclusive combinations of quality signals. The bivariate probit restricts
the coefficients to be the same for all LABEL (BRAND) decisions. The multinomial logit
model, therefore reveals drivers of exclusive combinations of the different quality signals.
That is, the alternatives are exclusive now, i.e. each cooperative can only belong to one of
the four groups. This allow us to apply the indirect test for complementarity. Recall that
this test relies on an exclusion restriction that affects the use of one of the quality signal in
isolation as well as the combined use of both signals while not the use of the other signal in
isolation. That is, the marginal return from one signal is increased by the other. But, first we
are interested in the drivers that affect the stand alone signals (LABEL and BRAND).
In the multinomial logit regression results (table (4.4)), the drivers for the stand alone signals
are as contrasted as in the bivariate probit estimation. This may suggest more substitution
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effect than complementary one between signals. For the label only choice, we get exactly
the same significant drivers than in the bivariate probit. For the brand only strategy, the only
differences with the bivariate probit regression is that some variables are no more significant.
This is the case for the MEAT and Beverage variables, and also for the marketing channels
variables. If the supermarket variable still increases the probability of choosing a brand, it is
no more the case of the wholesalers.
Second, to apply the indirect test for complementarity between signals we need some theo-
retical predictions. The literature on supermarkets (Liesbeth et al., 2004) provides us with a
theoretical argument from an instrument variable, with a focus on brand, to test indirectly for
complementarity. Compared to the other marketing channels, quality signals are widespread
and more diverse in supermarkets. On one hand, the suppliers have incentives to develop
their own brand strategy to get a larger share of the price premium paid by consumers. Su-
permarkets may also get some profits from this strategy since a brand signal is a credible
commitment that the suppliers will provide a quality good. This could help to sustain the
supermarket reputation as a third party guarantor of quality (Bigaiser, 1991; Biglaiser and
Friedman, 1994). On the other hand, the development of brands when transacting with su-
permarkets may also have an indirect effect by increasing the return of a labeling strategy.
The suppliers have indeed some incentives to use other signals to escape from the brands
competition with supermarkets that recently developed their own (retailer) brands (Hassan
and Monier-Dilhan, 2006; Berges et al., 2007; Berges and Bouamra, 2012). Another exclu-
sion restriction is used in brand choice. Hayes et al. (2007) show indeed that brand is the
more common signal in the fruit & vegetables sector. The fruit & vegetables market is very
atomized, and thus less prone to the development of labels, with very few cooperatives able to
ensure a collective action on common labeling adoption and diffusion. But this strategy can
also have an indirect effect in the probability of adopting a label signal, since small producers
are more and more prone to adopt common signal with the development of the organic label
(AB) in the fruit and vegetables short supply chains (Torre and Traversac, 2011).
Two further restrictions are used that center around labels. We expect that the label choice
depend on some specific governance of the cooperatives (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). That is,
the more a cooperative is a member of a union of cooperatives (UNION), the more it will
adopt the common labeling first (Fillipi and Triboulet, 2010). This can be explained by the
fact the cooperatives subsidiary usually do not have the full decision rights on its marketing
strategies (Bijman and Hendriksen, 2004). But the higher the “small” cooperative turnover,
the higher its decision rights, and thus its negotiation power, inside the union to develop
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(or maintain) its own brand signal strategy. For such cooperatives, it can indeed be worthy
to increase differentiation by using a mix signal. That is to say, adding a private signal on
common labeling.
The estimation results show that some of our exclusion restrictions for the indirect test work.
The supermarket variable impacts the choice of brand in isolation as well as the joint use of
label and brand (LABRAND), while there is no impact on the choice of label only signal.
Hence, we can conclude that choosing the supermarket as a marketing channel increases the
expected marginal returns from brand in the presence of labels (mix signal). We find no
significant effect of the other exclusion restriction on fruit and vegetables sector. The second
set of exclusion restrictions, that builds on the governance of the cooperatives, also show that
the level of the turnover and the subsidiary ownership by the cooperative are important for
the label signal, and that the marginal gains from this signal are higher if brands are in place.
The results further show that exporting in European countries (EXINEU) and making less
than 50% of its turnover with the same customer also increase the marginal gains. But if
the retailers (RET) and wholesalers (WS) variables significantly affect the probability of the
mix signal (LABRAND), they do not significantly affect stand-alone signals (LABEL and
BRAND).
Therefore, the multinomial logit results suggest two comments. It seems that the drivers for
the label and brand stand alone signals are very contrasted, which may suggest that both sig-
nals are more substitutable than complementary. The indirect test of complementarity show
an opposite result, i.e. that there is some evidence of complementarity. We find indeed some
drivers that affect the use of one of the quality signals in isolation as well as the combined
use of both signals (LABRAND) while not the use of the other signal in isolation. In the
following section, we will estimate a multinomial probit model that will provide clear-cut
result on the presence of a complementarity effect between quality signals.
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Table 4.3: Bivariate probit estimation
Variables MLE SML
BRAND LABEL BRAND LABEL
Constant -2.79 (0.54)*** -1.99 (0.46)*** -2.79 (0.54)*** -1.99 (0.46)***
Size and organizational structure
MEM 0.12 (0.05)** -0.20 (0.04)** 0.12 (0.05)** -0.20 (0.04)**
EMP 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.02)** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.02)**
UNION -0.13 (0.11) 0.29 (0.10)*** -0.14 (0.11) 0.29 (0.10)***
SUBSID 0.20 (0.14) 0.36 (0.14)** 0.21 (0.14) 0.36 (0.14)**
TURN 0.03 (0.04) 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.03 (0.04) 0.21 (0.03)***
Domain of activity
WSI Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
AF -0.11 (0.17) 0.34 (0.14)** -0.13 (0.17) 0.34 (0.14)**
Activity sector
MILKOIL Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
BEV 0.97 (0.16)*** -0.28 (0.13)** 0.98 (0.16)*** -0.28 (0.13)**
CER -0.16 (0.31) -1.35 (0.24)*** -0.17 (0.31) -1.35 (0.24)***
FVEG 0.75 (0.23)*** -0.52 (0.19)*** 0.72 (0.23)*** -0.53 (0.19)***
MEAT 0.78 (0.25)*** -0.13 (0.22) 0.77 (0.25)*** -0.13 (0.22)
OTHERS 0.20 (0.30) -1.08 (0.25)*** 0.19 (0.30) -1.08 (0.25)***
Export markets
EXINEU 0.17 (0.05)*** 0.15 (0.06)** 0.17 (0.05)*** 0.15 (0.06)**
EXOUTEU 0.11 (0.12) -0.28 (0.12)* 0.11 (0.12) -0.28 (0.12)*
Variables MLE SML
BRAND LABEL BRAND LABEL
Local market
LT50INREG 0.16 (0.12) -0.23 (0.12)* 0.15 (0.12) -0.23 (0.12)**
Marketing channels
COOP Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
SUPER 0.62 (0.22)*** -0.07 (0.21) 0.62 (0.22)*** -0.06 (0.22)
RET 0.32 (0.20) 0.11 (0.17) 0.30 (0.20) 0.11 (0.17)
WS 0.33 (0.15)** 0.19 (0.14) 0.33 (0.15)** 0.19 (0.14)
OTHERS_HOT -0.02 (0.15) -0.04 (0.13) -0.02 (0.15) -0.04 (0.13)
LT50SC 0.31 (0.16)* 0.58 (0.17)*** 0.30 (0.16)* 0.58 (0.17)***
ρ 0.22 (0.06)*** 0.19 (0.06)***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.4: Multinomial logit estimation
Variables Both Brand Label
Constant -6.44 (1.35)*** -7.01 (1.85)*** -3.83 (0.91)***
Size and organizational structure
MEM -0.13 (0.11) 0.36 (0.16)** -0.34 (0.08)***
EMP 0.17 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.05)*** 0.09 (0.04)***
UNION 0.25 (0.25)* 0.39 (0.36) 0.74 (0.20)***
SUBSID 0.91 (0.33)*** 0.16 (0.50) 0.54 (0.19)
TURN 0.30 (0.10)*** 0.11 (0.11) 0.38 (0.06)***
Domain of activity
WSI Ref. Ref. Ref.
AF -0.07 (0.39) 1.22 (0.68)* 0.81 (0.26)***
Activity sector
MILKOIL Ref. Ref. Ref.
BEV 1.55 (0.42)*** 0.46 (0.62) -0.84 (0.24)***
CER -1.42 (0.71)** -1.25 (1.28) -2.54 (0.47)***
FVEG 0.48 (0.55) 1.45 (0.84)* -0.95 (0.36)***
MEAT 1.19 (0.58)** 0.95 (0.93) -0.45 (0.42)
OTHERS -0.67 (0.71) -0.02 (1.08) -2.13 (0.50)***
Export markets
EXINEU 0.49 (0.13)*** 0.39 (0.19)** 0.27 (0.13)**
EXOUTEU -0.23 (0.28) 0.25 (0.30) -0.51 (0.25)**
Variables Both Brand Label
Local market
LT50INREG -0.16 (0.28) 0.39 (0.39) -0.44 (0.25)
Marketing channels
COOP Ref. Ref. Ref.
SUPER 1.15 (0.54)** 1.53 (0.63)*** 0.19 (0.49)
RET 0.84 (0.44)* 0.19 (0.64) 0.13 (0.37)
WS 0.94 (0.35)*** 0.38 (0.50) 0.31 (0.28)
OTHERS_HOT 0.14 (0.34) -0.75 (0.55) -0.22 (0.24)
LT50SC 1.55 (0.40)*** 0.15 (0.64) 0.89 (0.34)***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
4.4.3 The Multinomial Probit
As the multinomial logit model, and in contrast to the bivariate probit, the multinomial pro-
bit model is less restrictive on the effects that exogenous control variables can have on the
different choices, allowing coefficients to vary across exclusive combinations of quality sig-
nals. The difference is that for the mix signal (LABRAND), the only explicative variable is
the constant, which catches the complementarity effect. Like the bivariate probit model, and
in contrast to the multinomial logit, it is possible to estimate a coefficient of correlation be-
tween the error terms, which catches the unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, as explained
in section 4.2, with a multinomial probit we are able to separate the complementarity be-
tween the strategies from the unobserved heterogeneity, since we can estimate both: (i) the
parameter δ (the constant term in the regression), which catches complementarity; (ii) the
parameter ρ (the correlation coefficients between the errors), which catches the unobserved
heterogeneity between cooperatives. This separation cannot be done with the previous two
models, bivariate and multinomial logit models.
The results in table (4.5) indicate that there is complementarity between quality signals, since
the intercept coefficient is significant for the mix signal (LABRAND) choice. This comple-
mentarity effect here is a substitutability effect since the sign of the coefficient is negative
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(-3.16). Then, this result show that the positive sign in the coefficient correlation found in the
previous bivariate probit regression does not catch a complementarity effect, but only some
unobserved heterogeneity between cooperatives that explain the mix signal choice. Indeed,
the coefficient of correlation in the multinomial probit (ρ= 0.63) is positive and significant.
The drivers of both stand alone signals (LABEL and BRAND) exhibit this substitutability
effect. Indeed, while exporting inside EU (EXINEU) increases the probability of adopting a
label, exporting out the European Union (EXOUTEU) reduces this probability. This result
magnified by the regional effect and the origin of the product. Indeed, making less than
50% in the region (LT50INREG) reduces the probability of choosing a label. In contrast,
exporting out the EU increases the probability of adopting a brand since the positive sign of
the coefficient turns to be significant in the multinomial probit, which was not the case in the
previous regressions. This mainly shows that brand signal is made for export outside Europe
Union and labels are profitable inside the European Union market. This is coherent with the
idea that labels, mainly GIs and PDOs, have an access to an institutional recognition and
protection from the European Union that make them profitable. Outside the borders of the
EU markets, this protection is less effective and thus the trademark system, and thus brands,
is more efficient.
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Table 4.5: Multinomial probit estimation
Variables Both Brand Label
Constant -3.16 (1.01)*** -5.39 (2.68)*** -2.28 (0.87)***
Size and organizational structure
MEM 0.28 (0.24)** -0.23 (0.07)***
EMP 0.06 (0.0)** 0.03 (0.03)
UNION 0.26 (0.34) 0.54 (0.17)***
SUBSID -0.03 (0.39) 0.36 (0.27)*
TURN 0.06 (0.11) 0.25 (0.07)***
Domain of activity
WSI Ref. Ref.
AF 1.01 (0.82)** 0.61 (0.25)***
Activity sector
MILKOIL Ref. Ref.
BEV 0.54 (0.88) -0.86 (0.28)***
CER /////// -1.71 (0.46)***
FVEG 1.31 (1.36)* -0.85 (0.31)***
MEAT 0.87 (1.19) 0.51 (0.29)*
OTHERS 0.35 (1.18) -1.54 (0.44)***
Export markets
EXINEU 0.18 (0.12) 0.09 (0.09)*
EXOUTEU 0.16 (0.21)* -0.29 (0.18)**
Variables Both Brand Label
Local market
LT50INREG 0.25 (0.27) -0.03 (0.16)**
Marketing channels
COOP Ref. Ref.
SUPER 1.09 (0.67)*** -0.003 (0.32)
RET 0.14 (0.42) 0.03 (0.22)
WS 0.20 (0.32) 0.12 (0.20)
OTHERS_HOT -0.38 (0.31)* -0.15 (0.17)
LT50SC -0.12 (0.50) 0.62 (0.37)**
Error components
ρ (Label, Both) -0.07 (1.01)
ρ (Brand, Both) 0.46 (0.88)
ρ (Label, Brand) 0.63 (0.76)***
σ (Label) 0.98 (1.35)***
σ (Brand) 1.80 (4.54)***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
4.5 Conclusion
Many quality signals have been developed to foster the development of food quality in the
agro-food markets, mainly brands and common labels. Previous research has typically fo-
cused on either brand or common label efficiency independently, while in many instances
both signals coexist. Agricultural products pairing brand names and certified labels, such as
indications of origin, are indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese, Scottish whiskeys and
most of the French wines). The objective of this chapter is to take into account this coexis-
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tence by empirically analyzing the complementarity/substitutability that may exist between
labels and brands. To do so, we develop a multinomial probit model of complementarity
that we test on a database of the quality signaling strategies from 993 French small coopera-
tives. Our main result is that there is a clear interaction effect between brand and label signal
strategies but it is more a substituability effect than a complementary one. The positive corre-
lation that can be observed between both signals is only due to the unobserved heterogeneity
between cooperatives.
Given the lack of previous empirical work on this topic of coexistence of quality signals, the
first results generated by this research provide some interesting suggestions for further theo-
retical work which treats the complementarity between quality signals. But, more empirical
work is needed to improve the predictive power and the significance levels, and check the
robustness of the estimates. Introducing new questions in the survey, and thus new variables
in the database, on contracting and governance mechanisms of the cooperatives may help
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity. A panel data set on the different surveys on
cooperatives signal choices would allow also us to control for unobserved specific effects.
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Chapter 5
Crop-Livestock Complementarity and
Income Maximization: Policy
Implications for Developing Countries
5.1 Introduction
As in many less developed countries, Pakistan is an agriculture based country where either
directly or indirectly more than 60% of the population is dependent on agriculture for their
livelihoods. A large share of agricultural production comes from the smallholder farmers
owning less acreage of agricultural land and having recourse to different farming systems:
cropping system alone, livestock system alone, or a mixed cropping and livestock system.
According to Edwards et al. (1988), the synergistic interactions of the components of this
mix farming system may have a significant and positive economic effect greater than the sum
of their individual effects. The fact that smallholder farmers adopt cropping and livestock si-
multaneously may suggest that these activities are complementary, that is the marginal return
to one activity increases as the intensity of the other increases. In this chapter, our study inter-
est is to test for the possible complementarity effect between cropping and livestock activities
of the smallholder farmers in the province of Punjab in Pakistan.
Most studies on rural household market participation focus either on crop or livestock mar-
kets separately (Lapar et al., 2003; Jaleta and Gardebroek, 2010; Negassa and Jabbar, 2008).
Therefore, in explaining smallholder participation in crop markets, livestock usually enters
the crop market participation equation as a draught power, risk assurance indicator or as alter-
native income source to crop sales, assuming that smallholder decision in livestock markets
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is given. Thus, in mixed crop and livestock farming systems in the Pakistan Punjab, where
diverse types of animals are kept and diverse types of crops are produced, the choice of one
activity is likely to be influenced by the other. Though, several empirical studies have in-
vestigated the integration of crop and livestock activities (Bell et al., 2013; Tarawali et al.,
2011; Udo et al., 2011), we did not find any research testing for this possible complementarity
effect.
To test for complementarity we have recourse to different empirical models of complementar-
ity. The theoretical framework of complementarity is based on the theory of supermodularity
that was first discussed in detail by Topkis (1978). This latter shows that when a function
is supermodular it exhibits a complementarity effect. That is, the payoff of jointly adopted
strategies is higher than the sum of payoffs of these strategies taken separately. In order to test
for this complementarity effect, two approaches are usually used in the literature (Athey and
Stern, 1998). Direct approach (also called production approach) is concerned when a perfor-
mance measure in terms of profit or income generated by the different strategies is available.
In this case, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and regress profit or income on
exogeneous variables and dummies representing the different strategies. A complementarity
test is run on the coefficient associated to these dummies to see if the marginal return to one
activity increases as the intensity of the other increases. If performance measure is not avail-
able in the data, we are obliged to use an indirect approach (also called adoption approach)
which is based on the analysis of correlation conditional on a common set of exogenous
variables.
In both approaches, besides the evidence of a potential complementary effect, we also analyze
the different drivers of the smallholder farmer’s decision to adopt any activity. These drivers
can be: (i) the socio-demographics variables of the family’s head (age, educational status);
(ii) variables characterizing the whole family (family size, type of family system, family
assets such as land ownership and income generated by the different activities); (iii) the dif-
ferent agro-climatic regions in the Punjab Province. Data used in this study were collected
from the different agro-climatic regions in Pakistan Punjab. The initial data were collected
by the enumerators using survey methods and some variables were collected on households
demographic, income and expenditure sources, land resources and livestock inventory, and
economic activities they were involved in. The data set used in this study includes 360 house-
hold observations.
Results from the production approach provide evidence of a complementarity effect from the
mixed farming system. We also obtain interesting insights about contextual variables that
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affect whether or not such activities may explain this complementary effect. We identify
that regional diversity is an important factor in determining economic gains for smallholders
because of differences in socio-economic and environmental context and smallholders pref-
erences about adoption of farming activities. Next to it, some other factors that account for
increasing productivity are education, herd size, and land size. The adoption approach con-
firms the result of complementarity even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. For
this, we use first a bivariate probit to estimate the coefficient of correlation between cropping
and livestock. The positive sign of the correlation coefficient is however plagued by an inco-
herence problem. To resolve this issue of incoherence, we adopt a multinomial probit model
that also allows to estimate separately of what is due to complementarity and what is due to
unobserved heterogeneity. The result confirms the complentarity effect in the mixed farming
system.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the related literature on mixed
farming and adoption of cropping or livestock activities. In section 5.3, we discuss the theory
of complementarity and the two approaches to test for complementarity (direct approach and
indirect approach). Section 5.4 presents the database and the variables. Results are presented
in Section 5.5 adjoining to discussion. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
The importance of mixed farming system in providing crop and livestock products is not new
and for at least two decades, research and development strategies have explored the potential
of such systems to address developing countries food needs and mitigate poverty (Lenné and
Thomas, 2006; Williams et al., 2004; Parthasarathy and Birthal, 2008). The innumerable
benefits of the crop and livestock integration can be agronomic, through the recuperation and
maintenance of the soil productive capacity (Ngambeki et al., 1992), and ecological, through
the reduction of crop pests and consequently less pesticide use as well as erosion control
(Delve et al., 2001). There are also some economic benefits of these systems since they can
better manage risk through diversification and may also provide product quality and food
security (Devendra and Thomas, 2002).
First, Seo (2010) and Dinar et al. (2008) show that farmers in Africa that turn towards mixed
farming system against specialized farming, are more resilient to climatic shocks. However,
to get more involvement with the climate, they need to choose some special types of crops
and some special species of animals as it is not completely unrestricted due to difference of
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climatic zones and precipitation. In spring season, they avoid livestock while summer precip-
itations are the most favourable season to adopt both activities. More generally, since climatic
risk management tools in less developed countries are imperfect or completely missing, the
adjusted measures taken to control the distribution of risk variables are diversification on the
farm (Walker and Ryan, 1990) and risk controling inputs (Just and Pope, 1979). Kurosaki
(1995) has shown the importance of livestock as a consumption smoothing measure for in-
come and price risks. He has also found that the rise in the share of livestock subsector in
agricultural value added in Pakistan should have improved welfare positions of poorer house-
holds in rural areas. Mishra (2007) also highlights the role of livestock in cropping as a risk
management tool and an evidence of rural insurance mechanism through livestock. This in-
surance mechanism plays mainly through revenue diversification (Perry, 1982; Lockwood,
1982). Income from milk and milk products was estimated as 27% of the household income
and the sale of animals on the religious festival “Eid-ul-Azha” is considered as one of the
best returns of livestock.
Second, mixed farming systems can also provide quality products and food security. Gonzàlez-
Garcia et al. (2010) showed that mixed farming production in the Caribbean gives a wide
availability and quality of authentic primary products. Their crop residues, agro industrial
by-products and other non-conventional feeds are useful to be used in integrated feeding sys-
tems. They find that increasing pressure on land is a key factor of the development of mixed
farming, which at the same time could mean positive and economic benefits in the promotion
of a sustainable and environmental friendly agriculture. However, even if this mixed farming
system is more socially efficient than the specialized system, the smallholder farmer adopt
crop and livestock activities jointly if the profit generated is higher than with each activity
taken in isolation (Lemaire et al., 2013). That is, if the mixed farming system generates
complementary effect.
5.3 Testing for Complementarity: theory and empirical mod-
els
In order to test for complementarity, two approaches are usually used in the literature. The
first one is based on testing the contribution of different combinations of practices, along
with observable characteristics, directly on the performance measure (also called productivity
approach). If performance measure is not available, the prevailed indirect approach (also
called adoption approach) is adopted which is based on the analysis of correlation between
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discrete decisions on activity, conditional on a common set of exogenous variables.
This complementarity approach traces back to a mathematical theory of lattices and super-
modularity functions (5.3.1). From this theoretical framwork, we can derive predictions on
the complementarity between strategies chosen by an agent (5.3.2). We test these predictions
using the two empirical approaches, productivity approach and adoption approach, high-
lighted by Athey and Stern (1998) (5.3.3). Identification problems of our empirical models
are discussed briefly in subsection 5.3.4.
5.3.1 Lattice and Supermodularity
5.3.1.1 Lattice
Lattice theory is a branch of mathematics concerning partially ordered sets1 (Birkhoff, 1984).
This theory was first applied by Topkis (1978) and then Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995)
and Topkis (1995) to monotone optimization problems in Economics. In what follows we
present briefly basic elements of the lattice theory.
Definition: A partially ordered set X is said to be lattice iff for all x, y ∈ S
x
∨
y = (max{x1, y1} , . . . , max{xn, yn})
x
∧
y = (min{x1, y1} , . . . , min{xn, yn})
Here, operators
∨
and
∧
are called join (or supremum) and meet (or infimum) respectively.
For our purpose, the nodes of the lattices will represent different farming strategies (see
Figure 5.3.1). As in our case the two livelihood activities are cropping and livestock farming
adopted by smallholder farmers in Pakistan. A typical smallholder could use none, one or
both of these activities resulting four possible states:
(
s1 = s2 = 0
)
if the smallholder farmer
is involved in none of the given farming activities;
(
s1 = 1, s2 = 0
)
if farmer is involved
in cropping but not in livestock;
(
s1 = 0, s2 = 1
)
if farmer is involved in livestock but not
in cropping; and
(
s1 = s2 = 1
)
if the farmer is associated with both of the given livelihood
activities. If the two farming activities were complementary, then using both simultaneously
1A partially ordered set (X ,≥) is said to be completely ordered if for x ∈ X and y ∈ X , either x ≥ y or y ≥ x.
When there is no ambiguity, we will say for short that X (rather than (X ,≥)) is a poset, meaning that the partial
order relation is understood. In particular, unless differently specified, R will always be assumed to be endowed
with the usual ≥ order relation.
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would be better in marginal gains than using either one individually and certainly better than
using neither. The lattice for this is shown in Fig. 5.3.1 where vertical height represents
profit. Lattice speaks for different profit levels achieved by using different combinations of
farming activites. s1 and s2 can also be reversible and can represent either activities. From
this we can see the optimal path for a smallholder to follow in order to increase profits. In
complementarity situation, it would be best to use both activities simultaneously. The step
for determining optimal solutions is given by the theory of supermodularity.
Figure 5.3.1: Lattice
5.3.1.2 Supermodularity - a function on lattice
A function is said to be supermodular when the sum of the changes in the payoff function,
when several arguments are increased separately, is less than the change resulting for increas-
ing all arguments together (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). More formally, given any lattice
(X ,≥), a function f : X → R is said to be supermodular if for all x, y ∈ X ,
f (x
∨
y)+ f
(
x
∧
y
)
≥ f (x)+ f (y)
A function f is said to be submodular if -f is supermodular. Moreover, a function is super-
modular if, for every strategic pair of input the payoff function, is supermodular in those
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inputs; and the sum of two or more supermodular function is supermodular but the product is
not necessarily supermodular (Topkis, 1978).
5.3.2 Complementarity
A smallholder farmer is supposed to make S = (s1,s2) feasible choices, from a partially
ordered set X (S⊂ X), to maximize his supermodular profit function
maxs1,s2∈S⊂X pi(s
1, s2)
where s1 and s2 are discrete choices s1 ∈ {0,1} and s2 ∈ {0,1}, which represent the adoption
of activities
{
s1 = s2 = 1
}
or not
{
s1 = s2 = 0
}
. The function pi
(
s1,s2
)
is supermodular, and
s1 and s2 are complements only if
pi(1,1)−pi(0,1)≥ pi(1,0)−pi(0,0)
that is, adding an activity while the other activity is already being performed has a higher in-
cremental effect on profit than adding the activity in isolation. This condition can be rewritten
as follows
[pi(1,1)−pi(0,1)]− [pi(1,0)−pi(0,0)]≥ 0
If this inequality is always strict, then pi has strictly increasing differences in
(
s1,s2
)
. This
inequality states that there is always increasing differences from not making any choice to
make both choices. The interpretation can also be: returns are higher if smallholder adopts
s1 choice when he already adopted s2 choice, and vice versa.
Two interesting empirical predictions follow from this theory (Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern,
1998).
1. (Correlation): Assume that pi
(
s1,s2,X
)
is supermodular in s1,s2 and X , where X is
vector of exogenous variables. Then S∗ (X) =
(
s1
∗
(X) ,s2
∗
(X)
)
, the optimal choice of
activities is monotone non decreasing in X . In a cross sectional study, s1 (X) and s2 (X)
will be positively correlated.
2. (Excluded Variable): Suppose that an increase in Xk increases only activity s1 di-
rectly. But because of complementarity between activities s1 and s2, Xk will indirectly
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increases activity s2. Therefore, s2
∗
will be non decreasing in Xk in the presence of
complementarity.
The first result states that two complementary activities will be positively correlated. Positive
correlation, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient for complementarity if the conditions
specified above do not hold (Arora, 1996). The main problem is that unobserved hetero-
geneity between different observations could bias the estimation results and lead either to
accepting the hypothesis of complementarity while no complementarity exist at all, or to re-
jecting the hypothesis of complementarity when activities, in fact, are complementary (Athey
and Stern, 1998).
The second empirical prediction allows for a less noisy empirical assessment of complemen-
tarity. Suppose that cropping and livestock are complementary activities and that an exoge-
nous variable (e.g. herdsize) affects only the likelihood of choosing livestock only. Then, as
the second empirical prediction states, in addition to positive direct effect on livestock, the
exogenous variable will also increase the probability of choosing a cropping activity due to
complementarity effect.
5.3.3 Testing for Complementarity
To test for complementarity, we use both approaches. First, we use the direct approach by es-
timating the profit function, where alternative combinations of business livelihood activities
adopted by smallholder farmers being included as dummy explanatory variables. Thus, the
direct approach focuses directly on the relation between performance and different combina-
tions of farming activities. The OLS regression used is unfortunelty biased by unobserved
heterogeneity. To overcome this probleme, we have recourse to the indirect approach by
regressing discrete adoption choices on observable characteristics of smallholder farmers.
Contrary to classical methods in literature, we use a new way to test complementarity that
carries out unobserved heterogeneity separately by estimating a multinomial probit model.
5.3.3.1 The direct approach: performance analysis
This approach is based directly on the objective function of the farmer, who maximizes his
profit by using different combinations of farming activities. The main idea is that the joint im-
plementation of activities should prove to be more valuable in terms of profit than the imple-
mentation of both of them in isolation. The test of complementarity is thus performed by re-
gressing a measure of performance on a set of dummy variables that represent the adoption of
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different combinations of activities, along with observable characteristics on the considered
activities. One can obtain certain supportive evidence of complementarity (substitutability)
when significant and positive (negative) coefficients of the joint activities dummy variables
are observed.
Applying this approach, Mohnen and Röller (2005) directly estimate the objective function
and investigate whether R&D make-buy choices are complementary. Lockshin et al. (2008a)
studied the complementarity between product, process and organizational innovations and
their impact on labour productivity. Ichniowski et al. (1997) also used this approach to test
for complementarity between different human resource management practices. However, the
problem of unobserved heterogeneity was ignored which may have substantial influence on
the association between activities, even though complementarity may not exist at all. Conse-
quently, direct approach might deliver bias if there are unobserved factors in the error term
that are correlated with the adoption of livelihood activities.
In our context, we simply define that crop and livestock activities are complementary if:
(a) a smallholder farmer can choose any one, or both activities at the same time; (b) the
total payoffs through joint action is greater than their sum in isolation. More formally, for
j = 1,2, smallholders are free to choose: (i) one of the two activities
(
s j = 1,s− j = 0
)
, (ii)
both activities
(
s j = 1
)
; (iii) none activity
(
s j = 0
)
. The performance measure is the profit(
pi
(
s1,s2
))
. The test for complementarity between two activities is defined by the following
inequality
pi(1,1)−pi(0,1)≥ pi(1,0)−pi(0,0)
That is, there is evidence of a complementary effect when using together the two activities,
compared to a situation where they are used separately, generates a higher profit. The def-
inition for substitutability is identical to the definition above except that “≥” is replaced by
“≤”.
To test for complementarity, we first estimate the following equation through ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression
piki
(
s1,s2
)
=
(
1− s1i
)(
1− s2i
)
θ00+ s1i
(
1− s2i
)
θ10+
(
1− s1i
)
s2i θ01+ s
1
i s
2
i θ11+Xiβ+ εi
(5.3.1)
where alternative combinations of different farming activities being included as explanatory
variables through dummies. θ11 is the productivity coefficient of adopting both activities, θ01
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the coefficient for cropping, θ01 for livestock and θ00 for none agricultural activity. Xi is the
vector of exogenous variables, βi the vector of coefficients and εi the error terms (unobserved
characteristics) distributed as multivariate normal, identically and independently across the n
farmers, with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ= σi > 0.
The objective function is supermodular and s1 and s2 are complements only if θ11− θ01 ≥
θ10−θ00. In order to investigate the partial returns from cropping and livestock, we rewrite
equation (5.3.1) as follows
piki
(
s1,s2
)
= θ0+ s1i θ
C + s2i θ
L+ s12i θ
CL+Xiβ+ εi (5.3.2)
where θ0 = θ00; θC = θ01− θ00; θL = θ10− θ00; θCL = [θ11−θ01]− [θ10−θ00]. That is,
θ0 is the constant, θC captures the non-exclusive partial returns of cropping, θL is the non-
exclusive partial returns of livestock and θCL the returns of adopting both activities together.
This latter represents exactly the complementarity parameter we are trying to test. Hence, the
condition for the above production function to be supermodular can be simplified as
θCL = [θ11−θ01]− [θ10−θ00]> 0 (5.3.3)
However, Athey and Stern (1998) argued that OLS results can be biased due to unobserved
heterogeneity. That is, OLS regression can exhibit complementarity effect while there is no
complementarity in real or vice versa. To correct for this unobserved heterogeneity, we use
the adoption approach.
5.3.3.2 The indirect approach: adoption analysis
In the adoption approach, we test for complementarity on the basis of a positive correlation
between error terms using a bivariate probit model (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Arora,
1996). The bivariate probit regresses the non-exclusive farming activities (cropping and live-
stock) on the assumed exogenous control variables (Xi), but takes the correlation between
them into account explicitly. Formally, the model is as follows
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s1
∗
i = β
1Xi+ ε1i , s
1∗
i

= 1 if s1
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
s2
∗
i = β
2Xi+ ε2i , s
2∗
i

= 1 if s2
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
where the stochastic errors ε1 and ε2 are independent of Xi but not necessarily independent
of each other. That is, E
(
ε1
)
= E
(
ε2
)
= 0, Var
(
ε1
)
= Var
(
ε2
)
= 1, Corr
(
ε1,ε2
)
= ρ.
But, in this reduced-form approach the strategic choices are discrete ones, while Arora and
Gambardella (1990) assumed continuous variables. Extending their approach to the case of
discrete choices results in incoherence problem, as show by Miravette and Pernias (2010).
To see this, consider the structural model with exclusive activity choices. If smallholder i
chooses to adopt cropping (livestock) activity, four different combinations of these activities
can be found as: (i) adoption of cropping only
(
s1 = 1,s2 = 0
)
; (ii) adoption of livestock
only
(
s1 = 0,s2 = 1
)
; (iii) adoption of both activities
(
s1 = 1 = s2
)
; (iv) adoption of none of
cropping and/or livestock
(
s1 = s2 = 0
)
. The latent profit function of the smallholder is as
follows
pi∗i
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
=
(
θ1
∗
+ ε1
∗)
s1i +
(
θ2
∗
+ ε2
∗)
s2i +δs
1
i s
2
i (5.3.4)
To catch the complementarity effect between the two activities s1 and s2, a pairwise interac-
tion term (δ) is introduced.
(
θ1,θ2
)
represent the observable characteristics whereas
(
ε1,ε2
)
are, as previously, unobservable returns to the econometricians. A smallholder adopt any ac-
tivity s j
∗
i if profitability exceeds some threshold, say, s
j∗
i = pi
(
1,ski
)−pi(0,ski )> 0 for j = 1,2
and j 6= k. From the latent profit function (5.3.4), we get
s1
∗
i = θ
1+ ε1+δs2i (5.3.5)
Next, we define the adoption indicators as a function of whether smallholders earn positive
profits if they adopt one of the farming activity
s ji =

1 if s j
∗
i > 0
0 if s j
∗
i ≤ 0
j = 1,2 (5.3.6)
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By substituting (5.3.5) into (5.3.6), we get
s1i =

1 if ε1i >−θ1−δs2i
0 if ε1i ≤−θ1−δs2i
and similarly
s2i =

1 if ε2i >−θ2−δs1i
0 if ε2i ≤−θ2−δs1i
Then, we define Si (1,1) =
{(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
: pi
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (1,1)
}
as the set of unobserved character-
istics that induce smallholder i to adopt both activities simultaneously. A smallholder adopt(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
= (1,1) if pi(1,1) > pi(1,0) ,pi(1,1) > pi(0,1) and pi(1,1) > pi(0,0). That is, we
define the set Si (1,1) of the combination of errors
(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
leading to the joint strategy
adoption
Si (1,1) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ}
Similarly, we define the following set Si (1,0) of the combination of errors leading to the
adoption of cropping only activity
Si (1,0) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i ≤−θ2
∗−δ}
Symmetrically, the adoption profile of livestock only activity is
Si (0,1) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i ≤−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ}
finally the set Si (0,0) leading to the adoption of none of the farming activities is
Si (0,0) =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i ≤−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i ≤−θ2
∗−δ}
By drawing these four regions in the fig. 5.3.2 (for the case of complementarity (δ> 0))
depicts overlapping for the subsets of Si (1,1) and Si (0,0). This overlapping intermingles the
choices of adoption of both farming activities and none of these at an area E∗. This ambiguity
leads to the problem of incoherence. This suggests that bivariate probit approach is not the
feasible choice to test the notion of complementarity due to unobserved heterogenity across
the alternate choices.
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Figure 5.3.2: Incoherent adoption of strategies
Multinomial Probit Approach
To solve this incoherence problem, we start with more general pattern of correlation. We
suppose that k indicates the exclusive decision of the farmer i to adopt farming activities. The
discrete dependent variable k now takes values as k = {0,1,2,3} representing the choices
respectively to adopt neither activity, adopt cropping only, adopt livestock only, and adopt
both activities. The payoffs to smallholder i from choosing j ∈ k is:
pi ji = β
jXi+ ε
j
i (5.3.7)
where Xi is the vector of observed explanatory variables describing smallholder i and other
characteristics important for the determination of choice. The parameter vector β j are un-
known and these are the object of inference. The vector of stochastic errors ε ji =
(
ε0i ,ε
1
i ,ε2i ,ε3i
)′
represents the unobserved returns of the choices. It is assumed to be distributed as multivari-
ate normal, identically and independently distributed across the n smallholders, with zero
mean and covariance matrix ∑= σ ji > 0, ∀ j (positive definite).
Arranging the parameters in (5.3.7) as β = (β′0,β
′
1,β
′
2,β
′
3) the log-likelihood function to be
maximized is:
L
(
β,∑
)
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
3
∑
j=0
y ji lnP
j
i
(
β,∑
)
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where the profit indicator pi ji is latent but we observe the choice y
j
i = 1 if the smallholder i
chooses the alternative j and y ji = 0 otherwise. While P
j
i = Pr
(
pi ji > pi
l
i, l 6= j
)
represents the
probability that the smallholder i make the choice j under the profit maximization principle.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to get a unique maximum likelihood estimate of the parame-
ters (β,∑) in the above model, as they are not identified. The first source of the identification
problem is that the observed choices are only informative on the differences of the profits and
not on the profits themselves. Then taking differences with respect to the profits associated
with j = 0, i.e. we take the first alternative as the reference state used to normalize location
of the latent variable.
The payoff function pi ji in (5.3.7) is specified differently for the joint adoption option than for
the others. Specifically, the payoff of joint adoption is:
pi3
∗
i = pi
1∗
i +pi
2∗
i +δ
where δ captures the effect of complementarity between farming activities. The treatment for
joint adoption payoff takes into account its econometric interpretation. However, this spec-
ification is convenient given our aim to estimate the effects of observable characteristics of
smallholders on the complementarity between cropping and livestock. This approach was
proposed by Gentzkow (2007) and Arora et al. (2010). For identification, we have taken dif-
ferenced payoffs in (5.3.7) because payoff of adopting neither farming activity is normalized
to zero, as is necessary given that only the payoff differences determines the observation’s
choice.
pi3
∗
i =
(
β1
∗
+β2
∗)
Xi+
(
ε1
∗
i + ε
2∗
i
)
+δ
states that smallholder i choose both activities to earn an average payoff pi3∗i , with the assump-
tion that payoff of joint adoption is greatest of all other strategies i.e. pi3∗i > pi
0∗
i , pi
3∗
i > pi
1∗
i
and pi3∗i > pi
2∗
i . Let us define θ j
∗
= β j∗Xi, with θ j
∗
=
(
θ1∗,θ2∗
)′
. Rewriting these conditions
lead to the following constraints on the errors
ε1
∗
i >−θ1
∗−δ
ε2
∗
i >−θ2
∗−δ
ε1
∗
i + ε
2∗
i >−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ
(5.3.8)
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The structural model that was assumed by Miravete and Pernias (2010) to study complemen-
tarity, is:
pi j
∗
i
(
s1i ,s
2
i
)
=
(
θ1
∗
+ ε1
∗) · s1i +(θ2∗+ ε2∗) · s2i +δ · s1i · s2i
As previously,
(
θ1,θ2
)
represents the observable characteristics along with
(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
as unob-
servable returns. Identification of these error terms would be resulted in variances σ21 and
σ22, and a correlation parameter ρ. A positive value of ρ would indicate that smallholders
that tend to be more profitable in adopting cropping also tend to be more profitable in adopt-
ing livestock, or vice versa, even if no profit complementarity exists between the two. Such
positive correlation would also capture unobserved heterogeneity among smallholders in the
preference for farming activities. Negative correlation, on the other hand, may imply unob-
served gains from specialization in one of the activities. The correlation actually presents an
identification problem in that correlation between ε1i and ε2i has a similar effect on the payoffs
as the complementarity term. Rewriting conditions of assuming maximization principle that
are due to joint adoption of farming activities, we get the same (4.3.11) set of constraints of
multinomial probit (MNP) on the unobserved returns. This suggest that the above structural
model can be estimated by MNP. With a MNP, we are able to separate the complementarity
effect from that of unobserved heterogeneity, since we can estimate both δ and ρ. We em-
ploy the system of constraints (), by defining the set S3 of the combination of errors
(
ε1i ,ε2i
)
leading to the joint adoption ( j = 3)
S3 =
{(
ε1
∗
i ,ε
2∗
i
)
: ε1
∗
i >−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗−δ,ε1∗i + ε2
∗
i >−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ
}
Similarly, we define the following set S1 of the combinations of errors leading to the adoption
of cropping only ( j = 1)
S =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i >−θ1
∗
,ε2∗i <−θ2
∗−δ,ε1∗i − ε2
∗
i > θ2
∗−θ1∗};
symmetrically, the set S2 of the adoption of livestock only profile ( j = 2)
S2 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i <−θ1
∗−δ,ε2∗i >−θ2
∗
,ε2∗i − ε1
∗
i > θ1
∗−θ2∗};
finally, the set S0 leading to the adoption of none of the aforementioned livelihood activities
( j = 0)
S0 =
{(
ε1∗i ,ε2
∗
i
)
: ε1∗i <−θ1
∗
,ε2∗i <−θ2
∗
,ε1∗i + ε2
∗
i <−θ1
∗−θ2∗−δ}.
The purpose of restudying above constraints is to testify our model against the problem of
incoherence due to bivariat probit. We show graphically that there is no overlapping between
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these different sets in either situation of supermodularity or submodularity. Therefore, we
can estimate parameters of the model along with the correlation between different adoption
choices. That is, it is possible to separate complementarity between farming activities from
the unobserved heterogeneity, and thus recover the structural-parameter estimate of comple-
mentarity by using multinomial probit (MNP).
Figure 5.3.3: Adoption of farming activities
5.3.4 Identification
Identification of Multinomial Probit (MNP) model rests on underlying assumptions about the
nature of individual decision-making. Statistical methods commonly used to identify models
of multinomial choices often impose restrictive assumptions about these choices that render
inferences suspect. The first problem is the normalization of the latent variable. We take
profits from other activities than cropping and livestock as the reference for normalization,
i.e. pi∗i (0,0) = 0. In this way, we can see by how much the smallholder farmer would be
better or worse by adopting either one or both activities than adopting others. The second
problem of identification is exclusion restriction. That is, restrictions that certain exogenous
variables in the model do not affect the stochastic profits pi∗i of some alternatives (Keane,
1992). To follow this mechanism data must contain some variables that affect the profit
levels of any one activity but not the other. The third problem is to identify the MNP using
a tractable estimation method. The difficulty with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
is well known, i.e. evaluating integral of multivariate normal densities in a three or more
choices problem through MLE can be computationally burdensome. Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) makes the MNP problem much more tractable since it is less difficult to
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obtain precise estimates.
There are other class of multinomial choice models like HEV (Heteroscedastic Extreme
Value), but these models rely on the assumptions of Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives (IIA) and thus estimate error correlation as zero (ρ= 0). This implies that such models
cannot catch the unobserved heterogeneity, and thus we cannot separate what is due to com-
plementarity and what is the due to unobserved heterogeneity (Gentzkow, 2007). In contrast,
the MNP model can estimate both the parameter δ, which catches complementarity, and the
ρs, which catches the unobserved heterogeneity.
5.4 Data and Variables
The data for this study come from household survey by the ministry of Planning and De-
velopment (P&D), Government of Punjab, Pakistan. The Punjab province is the largest one
by rural population and by its share in agriculture (crop and livestock production). Based
on the varying cropping pattern, irrigation facilities, soil type, underground water table and
rainfall pattern in its different parts, the province is divided into five agro-climatic zones.
These zones are named as rice/wheat Punjab, mixed cropping Punjab, cotton/wheat Punjab,
low-intensity Punjab, and rain-fed (barani) Punjab (Amjad et al., 2008). The rural household
survey was conducted on twelve communities from April to August 2010 in the five previous
agro-climatic zones2. Equal number of surveys were administered from every zone. A total
of 360 surveys were collected. This survey was aimed at estimating the economic conditions
of rural households in these zones. Data collection process comprised of making field visits
in the selected villages. The targeted families were interviewed at their homes, where the
questionnaire was filled in. The objective of the survey was to better know the economic
conditions of households in the different agro-climatic zones.
The main sources of earning of these rural households are farming activities, i.e. cropping
and livestock. In the province, more than half of the households are engaged in both cropping
and livestock. While, a very small number of households are engaged in only cropping or
only livestock. One third of the sample is involved in economic activities other than farming.
In this case, the rural households are involved in Government or military jobs, or they run
their own business.
2The concept of these surveys as such is not new. More than three decades ago the use of village studies was
promoted as an empirically-based alternative to other economic analyses of rural situations (Dasgupta, 1978;
Lipton and Moore, 1972; Scoones, 2009; Erenstein and Thorpe, 2011).
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Figure 5.4.1: Studied districts of Punjab, Pakistan
5.4.1 Dependent Variables
Testing for complementarity using the direct approach implies to define a measure of the
performance. As a proxy of the performance, we use the income (INCOME) variable. This
income variable is the net revenue derived from the different activities: (i) cropping only ac-
tivitiy; (ii) livestock only activity; (iii) mixed farming (crop and livestock) activity; (iv) other
activities. Other activities include the sources of livelihood other than cropping and/or live-
stock, such as military services, government jobs, and private business, foreign remittances
etc. The Income variable is used as the dependent variable in the linear regression model, to
analyze to what extent observable characteristics of smallholder farmers along with activity
dummies help explain the income level.
When we test for complementarity using the adoption approach, we analyze the adoption of
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household activities. On the one hand, households may choose farming activities: cropping
(Crpng) or livestock (Livestk). They can also choose mixed farming by making both ac-
tivities simultaneously (CropLive). Apart from above agricultural farming activities, house-
holds may also choose other activities (Others) such as military services, government jobs,
and private business, foreign remittances etc. In our database, these activities are distributed
as follows: (i) 5% of households were engaged in cropping; (ii) 7% were involved in live-
stock; (iii) 53% were involved in both cropping and livestock; (iv) remaining 35% were doing
their own business or serving Government, military or private sectors. The choice of activities
vary in different agro-climatic zones and households are not free at all to choose any farm-
ing or other activity disregarding agro-climatic effects. Like in Chakwal which is situated in
Potohar plateau, mountainous and rocky region, covered with scrub forest, interspaced with
flat lying plains, they choose to adopt either livestock or other activity because it is a rain fed
zone where agriculture is mostly dependent on the rainfall and the land is unleveled (Nosheen
et al., 2011). In this area, the reliance of households on agriculture farming is minimal. Sim-
ilarly, the cotton/wheat zone still largely depends for employment on the agricultural sector
while this dependency is very low in the rain fed zone, which has good opportunity to seek job
opportunities for its labor force in the armed services and government departments (Amjad
et al., 2008).
5.4.2 Independent Variables
Different exogenous variables may affect the choice of the dependent variable. First, the
socio-demographic variables of the household. The first variable is the age of the household
head. In our sample, his average age (AGE) is 46 years. Most of the farmers, in Punjab, are
illiterate or have poor education, and illiterate or less educated smallholder are more prone
to adopt farming as primary occupation. Average number of schooling years (EDU) is only
3 years and 36% of the surveyed respondents are illiterate. Therefore, illiteracy and poor
education prevail in this sector even if it is evident that literacy is a tool to achieve optimum
level of yield and can be a source to enhance income (Tarawali et al., 2011).
Other exogenous variables are related to the structure of the household. First, in rural areas
of Punjab, a general culture of living under joint family system (FmlySys) is prevailing.
More than half of our respondents are living under this type of familial system. About two
decades ago, joint family system or large family size was considered as more contributive in
terms of farming (joint utilization family labor, cost of production sharing, farm inputs etc.).
But, increased variation within and inter families due to change in educational and social
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status lead members to run their own farming activities privately. This leads to a reduction
of the average family size (FmlySize), which is of 5.37 persons in our sample. Most of the
families are engaged in a single profession as the whole family profession. For example, if the
household head is engaged in cropping activity, the whole family members are there to help
them. Only a small number of households were studied whose members were undertaking
more than one economic activity. But, only the principle activity was considered in the survey
and income earned from principle activity is taken into account. More than one family in the
same residence is considered as one household.
In spite of knowing the fact that agricultural farm machinery have substantial place in per-
forming activities and can result in higher productivity, poverty in this sector deprives a large
number of smallholders to purchase and use these equipments. However, a small part of sur-
veyed households use some machinery (FMachinery) like tractor, planters, threshers, har-
vesters, and livestock feeders etc. They usually do not buy them but rather rent the machines
depending on its availability.
We have used two variables to explain the effect of agricultural land. Land size (LandSize)
owned by the rural households determine their extent of reliance on farming as a source
of livelihood. Land size is the number of hectares possessed by a household. While land
ownership (LandOwn) is a binary variable defining the status of the the farmer, owner of
the land used or just a tenant. 80% of the households in our sample are owner of their land.
In case of tenancy, we know if the land is under a sharecropping contract (CropShare) or a
tenancy contract.
Livestock farming is the function of large and small ruminants. The animals mostly domes-
ticated by the rural people were, buffalo, cattle (cow), goat, and sheep. Each household is
caracterized by its livestock population (HerdSize). A larger herd size, as well as Landsize,
may lead to economies of scale and thus to the choice of one activity, either livestock or
cropping, alone.
The purpose of including the regional diversity variables in our analysis is to see that under a
vast and an apparently homogeneous region (Punjab) how different contextual or sub-regional
(districts) realities influence our dependent variable (along with the other independent vari-
ables). Erenstein and Thorpe (2011) have confirmed in a study in five contiguous states in
Indo-Gangetic Plains (IGP) region of India that the apparent homogeneity of vast irrigated
plains masked the significant diversity in rural assets, livelihood strategies, and livelihood
outcomes. Hence the inclusion of region variables in the analysis is to investigate the pres-
ence (or absence) of regional effects. Table 5.1 provides some differences between these
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zones in terms of fammily size, illteracy, ... Rain-fed zone, mixed-cropping zone, and cot-
ton/wheat zone (among five zones) were selected for our sample to be taken, as the data were
available only from these three zones.
Another regional effect is the distance from the village to the main market in the district
capital in the region. To catch this effect, we build a variable Proximity, which gives for
every village its distance from the district capital.
Table 5.1: Socio-economic characteristics of agro climatic zones in Punjab
Indices Rice/Wheat Mixed Cotton/Wheat Low-intensity Rain-fed
Family Size 7.90 7.80 8.00 8.40 6.90
Dependency Ratio 0.93 0.94 0.99 1.14 0.79
Illiterate (%) 40.40 47.80 54.80 60.80 31.4
Avg. urban pop (%) 32.27 26.88 20.76 15.16 28.60
% of rural employees in
agro-industry (including forestry
and fishing)
45.90 54.40 58.90 58.70 31.80
Source: Amjad et al. 2008
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
INCOME Logarithmic value of income (in Pak Rupees) 360 12.01 0.733 9.548 14.73
AGE Age of head of household
1 if 20-29 years; 2 if 30-39 years; 3 if 40-49
years; 4 if 50-59 years; 5 if 60-69 years; 6 if 70+
years
360 3.272 1.141 1.00 6.00
EDU Education of head of household
1=Illiterate; 2=Primary ; 3=Middle; 4=
Secondary; 5=Higher secondary; 6=Above
higher secondary
360 2.516 1.451 1.00 6.00
FmlySize Size of a household 360 5.366 1.743 1.00 11.00
HerdSize Number of animals kept by a household
1 if 1-10 animals; 2 if 11-20 animals; 3 if 21-30
animals; 4 if 31-40 animals; 5 if 40+ animals
360 1.172 0.498 1.00 5.00
FmlySys equals to 1 if household has joint family; 0
otherwise
360 0.542 0.499 0.00 1.00
LandSize Land owned by a household (in hecatres) 360 2.116 3.199 0.00 25.30
LandOwn equal to 1 if household is the owner; 0 otherwise 360 0.800 0.400 0.00 1.00
Rain-fed Zone equals to 1 is household live in rain-fed zone; 0
otherwise
360 0.333 0.472 0.00 1.00
Mix-crop Zone equals to 1 if household live in mix-crop zone; 0
otherwise
360 0.333 0.472 0.00 1.00
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FMachinery No. of farm machine accessories used by
households
360 0.311 0.946 0.00 6.00
CropShare equals to 1 if household is sharecropper; 0
otherwise
360 0.144 0.352 0.00 1.00
Proximity Distance of village from district capital city
1 if distnace is ≤ 24 km; 2 if ≤ 18 km; 3 if ≤ 12
km; 4 if ≤ 6 km
360 2.5 1.119 1.00 4.00
Crpng equals to 1 household is involved in cropping; 0
otherwise
360 0.586 0.493 0.00 1.00
Livestk equals to 1 if household is involved in livestock;
0 otherwise
360 0.600 0.490 0.00 1.00
CropLive equals to 1 if household is involved in cropping
and livestock; 0 otherwise
360 0.533 0.499 0.00 1.00
Others equals to 1 if household is involved in other
activities than cropping and/or livestock; 0
otherwise
360 0.347 0.477 0.00 1.00
5.5 Results and Interpretations
Our methodology to examine the complementarity versus substitutability relationship be-
tween cropping and livestock activities consists of two steps. First, we directly test for com-
plementarity/substitutablity using the direct approach. Second, we have recourse to the in-
direct approach. We estimate a bivariate probit model to estimate crop only and livestock
only activity in search of complementarity. In a third step, we perform the multinomial logit
analysis in search of the variables that affect the choice between different activities. Finally,
we perform multinomial probit model on the same drivers to conclude for possible comple-
mentarity.
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5.5.1 Direct Approach
First, in search for evidence of complementarity in mixed farming, we analyze how the differ-
ent activities affects the income (performance) that the smallholder farmer gets. Therefore,
we regress income on different observable characteristics and activity dummies that may af-
fect the performance of the adoption process. The results of the OLS regression are given in
Table 5.3. Our results suggest that choosing cropping (Crpng) only activity has no significant
effect on the income, while livestock (Livestk) only strategy decreases the level of income
obtained. In contrast, choosing both activities (CropLive) generate a significant increase in
the level of income obtained. This is a first evidence of a possible complementarity between
crop and livestock activities. To confirm this result, we perform the direct test of complemen-
tarity, i.e. as defined in (5.3.3) we test for the inequality (θ11−θ01) ≥ (θ10−θ00) > 0. The
test run does not reject the hypothesis at 1% level of significance. This is a clear evidence of
a complementarity effect between cropping and livestock activity.
Second, we analyze other drivers, than activity choice, to explain the income level. First,
socio-demographic variables characterizing the farmer have a significant and positive im-
pact on his income. This is the case of age and level of education, since the higher socio-
demographic levels, the higher the farmer’s productivity and ability to manage the activities
of the farm (Feder et al., 1985). Herd size and land size are also showing more effects
likely because of economies of scale. Mixed-crop zone is situated at the hub of agro-food
processing industry region and whereas returns are high as compared to other agro-climatic
zones. So family labour in this mix-crop zone increases the level of income. Farm machinery
though has least significant positive effect towards increasing income levels, but its impor-
tance can never be ignored in farming activities (Boz et al., 2005). However, machinery costs
and technical know-how in handling farm machinery are the main hurdles for smallholders
in increasing the output. Least distance from the main cities also results in increasing in-
come levels. Transportation costs and access to new local markets is easy as compared to
smallholders far away from main cities.
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Table 5.3: Performance regression (dependent variable: Income)
Variables Estimate (S.E.)
Constant 10.540 (0.199)***
AGE 0.065 (0.030)**
EDU 0.075 (0.018)***
FmlySize 0.005 (0.020)
HerdSize 0.248 (0.056)***
FmlySys 0.016 (0.056)
LandSize 0.079 (0.009)***
LandPos 0.052 (0.086)
Cotton/Wheat Zone Ref.
Rain-Fed Zone 0.001 (0.097)
Mix-Crop Zone 0.523 (0.719)***
FMachinery 0.065 (0.038)*
ShareCrop 0.018 (0.077)
Proximity 0.091 (0.025)***
Crpng -0.056 (0.124)
Livestk -0.469 (0.168)***
CropLive 0.791 (0.207)***
N = 360
OLS (Huber-White
sandwich estimator)
Complementarity test
θ11−θ10 ≥ θ01−θ00
F(1, 346) = 10.15***
Model F(15, 344) = 24.18***
R2 0.5120
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
5.5.2 Indirect Approach
5.5.2.1 Bivariate Probit Results
In search of complementerity between cropping and livestock activities through bivariate pro-
bit, activities are defined as non-exclusive, i.e. it is possible that a smallholder is benefitting
from both activities at the same time. Most important result of bivariate probit analysis is
that there is significant positive relationship between crop and livestock as indicated by the
positive and significant correlation coefficient (ρ). This finding may suggest that cropping
and livestock activities are likely to occur in combination and is hence an indication of com-
plementarity. But, as seen previously this is not necessary nor sufficient condition to test for
the existence of complementarity (Athey and Stern, 1998).
To unravel this indication of complementarity, we need to interpret variables that have signifi-
cant effect on the adoption of farming activities. In our analysis, smallholders who owns some
agricultural land (LandOwn), who acquire land on crop sharing basis (CropShare), and lives
near main cities (Proximity) choose preferably cropping. On the other hand, smallhoders
who have a larger herd size (HerdSize), owing some agricultural land (LandOwn) , dwellers
of mix-crop zone (Mix−CropZone), and sharecroppers (CropShare) prefer to choose live-
stock. It indicates a strong agreement of adopting both activities among the smallholder
farmers who are owners of agricultural land and acquire more land on crop sharing basis to
administer their bigger livestock and to maximize the use of family labour. Contrary to this,
regional diversity and joint familial system are less prone to adopt one or the other activity.
Smallholder farmers in mix-crop zone invest in livestock with the fact that (s)he is the sole
earner from the livestock but not from cropping. But, in spite of crop sharing, smallholder
has to take interest in choosing both activities because of two reasons: (i) (s)he can not give
up cropping as land was acquired for cropping purpose; (ii) (s)he has a larger herd size and
(s)he needs more land to perform livestock activities.
Keeping in view the criticism of Scoones (2009) about the neglect of socio-demographic
variables in the study of crop-livestock systems, we included family size (FmlySize) and
family system (FmlySys) as explanatory variables. Higher financial needs of a larger family
and the cost of family labour influence negatively the adoption of cropping and livestock.
When cotton/wheat zone is taken as reference, smallholders in rain-fed zones have negative
effect on the adoption of cropping and livestock but have a contrasted effect on livestock in
mix-crop zone. This may suggest that regional diversity is the main source of some contrasts
in the estimated results that affect the choice of cropping and livestock activities.
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Table 5.4: Bivariate probit estimation of 360 smallholder farmers
Variables Cropping Livestock
Constant 0.274 (0.478) 0.122 (0.532)
AGE 0.106 (0.078) 0.033 (0.075)
EDU -0.021 (0.056) -0.001 (0.056)
FmlySize -0.081 (0.050) -0.147 (0.051)***
HerdSize -0.383 (0.169)** 0.915 (0.261)***
FmlySys -0.478 (0.163)*** -0.500 (0.165)***
LandSize 0.021 (0.026) 0.023 (0.028)
LandPos 1.039 (0.232)*** 0.459 (0.218)**
Cotton/Wheat Zone Ref. Ref.
Rain-Fed Zone -1.559 (0.230)*** -1.273 (0.219)***
Mix-Crop Zone 0.180 (0.217) 0.609 (0.222)***
FMachinery 0.005 (0.081) 0.018 (0.089)
CropShare 1.067 (0.260)*** 0.517 (0.238)**
Proximity 0.115 (0.070)* -0.052 (0.071)
ρ (S.E.) 0.979 (0.013)***
Wald χ2 (24) 134.04***
LR ρ 181.486***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; SE in paranthesis
5.5.2.2 Multinomial Logit Results
Compared to the bivariate probit model, the multinomial logit model is less restrictive on the
effects that exogenous control variables can have on different choices, allowing coefficients
to vary across exclusive combinations of different activities. Therefore, exclusive choices are
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not restricted to have same coefficients. In other words, multinomial logit model is also in-
terpretable if every alternate choice has different sets of observed characteristics. To be more
clear on this issue, we prefer to take characteristics, for an exclusive choice, that may affect
the particular choice and exclude one or more characteristics from any other alternate choice
if it may have no affect on that particular choice. Selection criteria of observed character-
istics for each strategic choice in terms of exclusion restriction is also a prerequisite to test
for complementarity based on adoption approach. But, first we are interested in contextual
variables affecting the stand alone activities.
In order to do so we apply the indirect structural test for complementarity that we described
in the previous section. Under the assumption that smallholder farmers make the best choice
in terms of farming or not we estimate a multinomial logit model for their actual choices:
cropping, livestock, both and Others.
Pr(Y = k) =
eXiβ
∑Ni=1 eXiβ
with k ∈ {Crpng,Livestk,CropLive,Others} and Xi a vector of smallholder farmers charac-
teristics. In search to understand the variables that affect smallholder farmer strategy choices,
we ameliorate our search for complementarity. We reveal variables that are relevant for spec-
ifying the structural cropping and livestock decisions and that are needed for testing the exis-
tence of complementarity. We have taken other than farming activities (Others) as reference.
The bivariate probit restricts the coefficients to be the same for all cropping (livestock) de-
cisions. Contrary to this, multinomial logit model reveals contextual variables as exclusive
combinations of the different farming adoption choices. That is, the alternatives are exclusive
now, i.e. each smallholder can only belong to one of the four groups.
Sharecropping is a pro poor approach widely used in less developed agricultural countries.
The literature on sharecropping contracts (Ayele and Mamo, 2004) provides us with a theo-
retical argument that smallholders having larger family size and larger number of livestock
require additional land. They acquire extra land through sharecropping contracts from those
who have excess land. This argument indirectly test for complementarity. Sharecropping up-
lifts the income on dual side. On one hand, the land owner paid off in the form of crops and on
the other hand, smallholders also benefit from this contract by engaging their family labour
and to handle bigger livestock. In addition to this, economies of scale are also one important
factor for smallholder farmers. Hence, sharecropping contracts may also have an indirect
effect of increasing marginal returns from livestock when cropping is already adopted. Apart
from sharecropping, crop farming is also associated positively with the ownership of land.
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Some studies show that smallholders who own their own agricultural land are likely to get
higher income than others who acquire agricultural land on contract or tenure basis (Chand
and Yala, 2009; Smith, 2004; Carter and Olinto, 2003). Land owners who invest on livestock
also have increasing effect on mixed farming strategy. Farm machinery is another driver to
test for complementarity indirectly. Although there are a least number of smallholder farm-
ers who use farm machinery for cropping and livestock, but its importance and utilisation
to improve the production level cannot be ignored. As in our case, farm machinery is posi-
tive significant to livestock and mixed farming acitivties that also explicate its importance in
performing these activities and to increase income by their joint adoption. Larger herd size
is likewise more prone to livestock and both activities as in the case of farm machinery. As
we stated that larger herd size is needed to be managed in the bigger agricultural land, these
two can be considered as substantial parts for each other. It also suggest increasing marginal
returns by adopting both activities at the same time and the adoption of livestock activity
in isolation, thus, indirectly superimpose cropping over livestock. In these circumstances,
we deduce that adequate number of herds and secured land ownership status reinforce the
complementary relation between cropping and livestock activities. These are the four main
characteristics that indirectly force the adoption of livestock and hence to be tested for com-
plementarity, indirectly.
There are some further comments that center around reducing the likelihood of adoption of
farming activities. Regional variations restrict the adoption of farming activities under the
agro-climatic conditions. That is, smallholders are not free at all to grow any crops or engage
in livestock activity without considering climatic conditions (Garcia et al., 2007). Mixed
farming activities in rain-fed zone are clearly not preferred due to climatic restrictions. High
diversity in agro-climatic zones do matter and affect the adoption choices of smallholders
(Olesen et al., 2011; Jagtap and Amissah-Arther, 1999).
Population growth can make the cost of land relative to labour increase. As this cost increases,
people often change the methods of managing cropping and livestock (Templeton, 1999;
Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). Increased family turns only increase in labour due to
lack of education in this sector. Halting population growth might not capable of improving
productivity in the farming activities, thus remain less likely towards these activities.
The estimation resutls show that a significant number of contextual variables for the indirect
test work. Sharecropping and land ownership status impacts the choice of cropping in iso-
lation as well as the joint adoption of mixed farming. On the other hand, increasing herd
size and increasing farm machinery affect positively on livestock adoption and mixed farm-
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ing as well. As a result, we can conclude that these contextual variables are the cause to
increase marginal returns as having positive impact on either activity in isolation as well as
affect positively the other activity, indirectly. Other variables in our empirical analysis are
either not significant or show decreasing marginal returns in case of adopting both activities
simultaneously as in rain-fed zone, family system and family size.
Like bivariate probit analysis results, multinomial logit resutls are also favourable for joint
activity adoption choices. It seems that the contextual variables for adoption of cropping and
livestock stand alone activities are feasible, which may result in both activities as comple-
mentary than substitute. We find indeed some contextual variables that show the increasing
marginal returns for either activity in isolation or for both, but not the other activity. In the
following section, we estimate a multinomial probit model that will provide coherent result
on the presence of complementarity effect between farming activities.
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Table 5.5: Multinomial logit estimation for 360 smallholder farmers
Variables Cropping Livestock Mixed
Constant 8.549 (11.049) -1.224 (1.674) -0.364 (1.001)
AGE 0.191 (0.268) -0.089 (0.338) 0.179 (0.150)
EDU -0.206 (0.217) -0.076 (0.260) -0.020 (0.111)
FmlySize 0.093 (0.201) -0.615 (0.244)** -0.245 (0.101)**
HerdSize -13.93 (10.938) 4.340 (0.833)*** 0.915 (0.541)*
FmlySys -1.421 (0.648)** -2.269 (0.775)*** -0.994 (0.329)***
LandSize 0.030 (0.116) 0.053 (0.109) 0.052 (0.055)
LandPos 2.425 (0.900)*** -1.922 (0.913)** 1.798 (0.475)***
Cotton/Wheat Zone Ref. Ref. Ref.
Rain-Fed Zone -3.066 (0.845)*** -0.248 (0.957) -3.233 (0.490)***
Mix-Crop Zone -2.896 (1.218)** -0.220 (1.013) 0.132 (0.432)
FMachinery 0.288 (0.383) 0.531 (0.285)* 0.118 (0.067)*
CropShare 2.002 (0.836)** -4.267 (5.219) 1.903 (0.532)***
Proximity -0.202 (0.290)*** -0.202 (0.290) 0.185 (0.147)
LR χ2 (36) 267.66***
Pseudo R2 0.3580
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; SE in paranthesis
5.5.2.3 Multinomial Probit Results
The Table 5.6 below presents the multinomial probit results estimated by Gibbs sampling
approach (Albert and Chib, 1993). Our primary interest of the study is to investigate whether
there is complementarity between cropping and livestock activities. For this, we are firm
with the believe that smallholder farmers make the best choice in terms of different strategies
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we estimate multinomial probit model for their actual choices: k = 0 if smallholder farmer
chooses other livelihood activities than cropping and livestock; k= 1 if the choice is cropping
only; k = 2 if the choice is livestock only; k = 3 if both farming activities adopted. Likewise
multinomial logit model and to ease the interpretation of estimates, smallholders with other
activities (Others) serves as benchmark.
We have estimated the coefficients for both stand alone farming activities as well as the
constant terms for all three adoption choices. These constant terms also include a pairwise
interaction term between cropping and livestock (δ) that test for complementarity. In addi-
tion to this, we have also estimated the coefficients of correlation (ρ) between error terms
that catches the unobserved heterogeneity among smallholder farmers. This unobserved het-
erogeneity measure allows the econometricians to test that how profit levels of smallholders
with same observable characteristics are different. The former estimate indicate that marginal
returns of cropping on livestock (or vice versa) are increasing since the payoff function is
supermodular (δ= 0.205) and ends up with the conclusion that cropping and livestock ac-
tivities have more of a complementary effect than of a substitution effect. The latter test
determines that the estimated residual correlation coefficient between cropping and livestock
(ρ= 0.641) provides the evidence of unobserved heterogeneity among smallholder farmers
choosing different strategies with the same apparent characteristics. Despite the fact that
unobserved factors affect the choice of adoption, we obtain the effect of complementarity
between cropping and livestock.
In our results, we observe that the motivation for smallholder farmers for cropping and live-
stock is the propritery rights of agricultural land than its size. It states that ownership status
is necessary to increase the productivity through joint adoption. The lesser the distance from
main city, the adoption of cropping is higher. Farm machinery in livestock is a source to
increase its adoption among smallholder farmers as these accessories are very helpful in
administering a comparatively bigger flock of animals. Obviously, increasing herd size is
showing more profitable characteristic that can add some economic fuel in terms of livestock
adoption. A bigger flock of animals that is being used for livestock activity will have lower
transaction cost. A number of studies pointed out the livestock utility in the integration of
crop-livestock activities in terms of agronomic and ecological vantage. Herd size also assures
draught power, the risk assurance and a source of immediate income generation.
Diversity in the agro-climatic zones affects the farming choice adoption because of the ge-
ographical, environmental and other factors. Rain-fed zone is less prone to cropping and
livestock mainly because of land physiography and its fertility issues. Looking at socio-
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demographic variables, the effect of joint family and family size stir up on adoption of crop-
ping and livestock due to different family issues and unequal family labour for each family.
Moreover, larger population is another hindrance to adopt these activities that do not fulfil
their economic needs as they do not own very bigger land sizes and larger number of ani-
mals. They are to search other sources of livelihoods for their larger families.
The nature of using bivariate models are distinct from the multinomial choice models in that
for the former, the focus is upon the modeling of two decisions, with each decision involving
two alternatives, whereas in the latter case there is a single decision among two or more
alternatives (Greene, 1993; p. 913). Bivariate probit model has been estimated by using
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method while we have estimated the multinomial
probit model using Gibbs sampling method under Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to
identify all parameters of our model. The main difference in the estimated results by MCMC
is that posterior mean and standard deviation are significantly smaller than the MLE, due to
the strong left skewness of the marginal posterior distribution (Albert and Chib, 1993).
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Table 5.6: Multinomial probit estimation for 360 smallholder farmers
Variables Cropping Livestock Mixed Farming
Constant -0.834 (0.912) -0.095 (0.456)* 0.205 (0.565)**
AGE -0.350 (0.424) -0.010 (0.089)
EDU -0.365 (0.400) 0.008 (0.060)
FmlySize -0.260 (0.352) -0.090 (0.074)**
HerdSize -1.061 (1.000) 0.946 (0.311)**
FmlySys -1.120 (0.630)** -0.347 (0.259)**
LandSize 0.052 (0.184) /////
LandPos 0.475 (0.713)*** 0.064 (0.240)*
Cotton/Wheat Zone Ref. Ref.
Rain-Fed Zone -1.250 (0.774)* -0.493 (0.395)*
Mix-Crop Zone -0.874 (0.831)** 0.287 (0.306)
FMachinery 0.011 (0.428) 0.110 (0.081)**
CropShare 0.749 (0.741)** 0.060 (0.339)
Proximity 0.685 (0.395)*** -0.011 (0.095)
Error Components
ρ(Crpng, Livestk) 0.641 (1.568)***
ρ(Crpng, Mixed) 0.789 (1.709)***
ρ(Livestk, Mixed) 0.656 (0.403)
σ(Crpng) 10.539 (21.587)
σ(Livestk) 0.819 (0.337)***
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; SD in paranthesis
5.6 Conclusion
In this study, we take a closer look at the relationship between farming activities, that is, crop-
ping and livestock. We distinguish two types of farming decisions of smallholder farmers.
Using the methodology developed by Athey and Stern (1998), we systematically examine
the complementarity vs substitute relationship between these two farming business activities.
Going beyond the mere identification of the relationship, the analysis also focuses on the
contextual variables affecting this perceived relationship. In addition to this, bivariate probit
analysis was also performed to see the relationship between farming activities on the basis of
unobserved factors. We use direct as well as indirect approach to test for the nature and the
drivers of the relationship between the two farming activities.
In direct approach, we deduce from OLS regression estimates that cropping and livestock
activities have supermodular relation and hence are complementary. On ther other hand,
multinomial probit model also suggest the supermodular relation between cropping and live-
stock through indirect approach.
This study provides a root to explore the multidisciplinary factors that affects the farming
activities. First, the results on our small sample nevertheless provide an interesting suggestion
for further research. Secondly, more empirical work using the same methodology needs to
be done to improve the predictive power, significance levels and check the robustness of
results on larger samples. It is suggested that adoption of scientific knowledge and technical
assistance can enhance the payoffs upto a maximum level. Besides, a panel dataset would
allow us to further control for unobserved heterogeneity effects.
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Chapter 6
General Conclusion
In this chapter we summarize the key conclusions from the thesis (6.1), their potential public
policy implications (6.2) and suggest avenues for future research (6.3).
6.1 Summary
The challenge set up at the beginning of this thesis was to develop and test empirical models
of complementarity. Following Athey and Stern (1998), we had recourse to the productivity
and adoption approaches. The models derived from these approaches have been tested using
two database: (i) a database on quality signal strategies of Small French cooperatives; and
(ii) a database on farming systems choices by smallholders in the Pakistan Punjab. Our main
contributions were: (a) estimating a multinomial probit that allows us to separate what is due
to complementarity and what is due to unobservable heterogeneity, and thus solving the inco-
herence problem of the first model of the adoption approach; (b) testing for complementarity
using both approaches on the same data in order to see if their results are convergent. In what
follows, we detail a little bit more the different results obtained in the chapters of the thesis.
In Chapter 2, we presented a survey on the methodology of complementarity. After a brief
review of the theory of supermodularity and the monotone comparative statics approach, we
show how this theory is able to provide empirical propositions to test for complementarity be-
tween different economic activities. Then, we discuss in detail the two approaches suggested
by Athey and Stern (1998) and mainly investigated in the literature. More precisely, we focus
on the incoherence problem encountered by the bivariate probit model used to test for com-
plementarity in the adoption approach. We show that estimating a multinomial probit is able
to solve this problem by estimating two parameters, one that catches the complementarity
163
effect (constant term) and the other that catches the unobserved heterogeneity (correlation
coefficient).
Chapter 3 aimed at determining those drivers of branding and labeling strategies that mainly
focus on coexistence of both strategies. To do this, multinomial logit estimation were carried
out on our database. The most striking result is the effect of marketing variables and mainly
the export markets. Exporting outside European Union borders impact branding strategy pos-
itively while exporting inside EU mainly affect labeling and mixed signal. This supports the
evidence that branding only strategy is more adequately observed outside EU. However, there
are some drivers in the marketing channels sector that returns higher probability of choosing
both strategies. These drivers are helpful in testing for complementarity/substitutability be-
tween branding and labeling strategies that can affect payoffs of the firms and that is the next
step in our agenda of research. At the second stage, we also analyzed the ordinal ranking
among different quality signaling strategies, i.e. starting from no signal strategy to a common
label, a mix signal (both labeling and branding) and then finally to a branding only strategy.
In addition to classic analysis of ordered choices, we further investigated to control for endo-
geneity problem of turnover variable on the choice of quality signals. We estimated a specific
simultaneous equations model where one of the (ordered) dependent variable (quality signal)
depends on the second dependent variable (turnover). The main result of this bivariate or-
dered probit model is that turnover variable is indeed endogeneous and significant and have
clearly positive effect on the probability of choosing a higher ranking quality signal. That is,
turnover which is based on the investment level can influence the choice of strategies as well.
In chapter 4, to reveal out the econometric impact of these drivers, we tested the model of
complementarity/substitutability between the joint adoption of branding and labeling strate-
gies emprically. Indirect test of complementarity was conducted on our database because
of lack of performance measure that exclusively explain the payoffs observed by adopting
branding and labeling strategies. Multinomial probit model was used to test for possible
complementarity because of its capability to separate of what is due to complementarity from
what is due to unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimation resutls show that there is a clear
interaction effect between branding and labeling strategies in the form of substitutability (be-
cause of inverse interaction effect). The positive correlation that can be observed between
both signals is only due to the unobserved heterogeneity among cooperatives.
To further probe into the complementarity theory empirically, we studied one more database
in which different strategies of farming activities were adopted by smallholder farmers in
Pakistan. In this chapter 5, we benfitted both approaches to test for complementarity, that
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is, direct and indirect approach. Cropping and livestock activities are confirmed as comple-
ment to each other. We identify that regional diversity in an imporatnt factor in determining
economic gains for smallholder farmers. Mix crop zone certainly show income growing
with the household activities whereas rain fed zone is a weaker area in terms of growing
income through agricultural resources. Apart from testing merely the complementarity, we
also figured out drivers or contextual variables through multinomial logit model, and which
are important to testing complementarity.
6.2 Policy Implications
The results exihibited in this thesis can have some policy implications. First, our substitua-
bility results on the quality signals suggest a strong limitation of the common label strategy
outside of the EU markets, and this mainly for the smallest cooperatives. This may question
the european commission in its strategy and negociation with WTO on the status of common
labels and GIs (Geographical Indications) in the international trade. These common quality
signals must be secured by a system of property rights, like the trademark system for brands.
Our empirical work is one stone in the burgeoning literature, mainly theoretical, that work on
the possible coexistence of brands and GIs (Moschini and Menapace, 2012). Second, our re-
sults on the mixed farming systems show that these systems are not only social efficient since
they can provide some systemic services in the agricultural production, but also because they
can increase the income of the smallholders. From our data in the Punjab Pakistan, we show
that jointly adopting crop and livestock systems allow to increase the famer income more than
the adoption of cropping activities only or livestock activities only. In our knowledge, this is
the first time that such a clear result on the economic efficiency of mixed farming is provided.
This work open the door to the analysis of mixed farming systems in developed countries in
order to this whether mixed systems in those countries also exhibit complementary effect. If
such results are obtained, this can give some credit to the new incentive program developed
by the Ministry of Agriculture for the adoption of such systems (Agroecology Plan).
6.3 Future research
This Ph.D. thesis has endeavored to advance on the empirical models of testing complemen-
tarity effects. Even if we get some very interesting results, our work has some shortcomings.
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First, we tried to solve with the problem of incoherence encountered by the bivariate probit
model with unobserved heterogeneity bias, by estimating a second parameter using a multino-
mial probit model. That is, in so doing we separate what is due to unobserved heterogeneity
(catched by the correlation coefficient) and what is due to a “real” complementarity effect
(the constant term). But the best method to control for unobserved heterogneity is to use
panel data. That is, what we aim to do by collecting additional data.
Second, we do not deal with the endogeneity issue in our empirical models of complemen-
tarity. If we try to take this into account sucessfully in our ordered model of quality signal
choices (see chapter 3) by using an ordered bivariate probit model, we ignored this problem
in the more specific models of complementarity in chapters 4 and 5. We have some hope
that it can be solved in the bivariate probit model, provided that we find relevant instruments.
But estimating a multinomial probit that can catch complementarity effect with endogenous
regressor, e.g. income, can be a little bit more difficult.
Third, in the future we would like to apply to other objects the different empirical models of
complementarity that we tested. For example, it would be interesting to analyze the efficiency
of the adoption of different combinations of innovative cropping practices, e.g. agroecolog-
ical practices. Indeed, Altieri (1995) show that agroecology is driven by the principle of
functional complementarity between different organisms (biological diversity). We would
like to know if this principle can also be applied for the different practices of the farming
systems. More precisely, we would like to know if some practices are jointly adopted by the
farmer because they generate some complementarity effect.
Fourth, we have not yet derived the conditions under which complementarities may also influ-
ence the buyer behavior. For example, a new business strategy not only impact the producers
capacity but consumer behavior also may vary with the change. To account for consumers
behavior, switching costs may play a significant role that can affect the payoffs of respective
business strategies. By controlling switching costs sizable complementarities can be existed
(Arora et al., 2010). Further, even under the assumption of existence of complementarity,
we have only partially addressed the issue of model identification under the umbrella of ex-
clusion restriction assumption. Our models for complementarity are in lack of panel data
structure adoption which states the issue of heterogeneity.
166
Bibliography
[1] Abernathy, F., Dunlop, J. T., Hammond, J. and Weil, D. (1995): “The Information
Integrated Channel: A Study of the US Apparel Industry in Transition”, Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity-Microeconomics, pp. 175-246.
[2] Agyemang, K. (2003): “Agriculture and Livestock Integration in the context of the
developing world with emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa”, International Trypanotoler-
ance Centre, Banjul. An invited Key Presentation at the Global Forum for Agricultural
Research (GFAR) Conference, Dakar, Senegal.
[3] Ahmed, S. (2011): “Does economic geography matter for Pak-
istan? a spatial exploratory analysis of income and education inequal-
ities”, MPRA Paper No. 35062, Available online at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/35062/2/MPRA\_paper\_35062.pdf.
[4] Akerlof G. (1970): “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500.
[5] Albert, J. A. and Chib, S. (1993): “Bayesian Analysis of Binary and Polychotomous
Response Data”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88(422): 669-679.
[6] Alfranca, O., Rama, R. and Tunzelmann, N. V. (2004): “Technological capabilities in
multinational agribusiness”, International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Gover-
nance and Ecology, 2(3-4): 383-398.
[7] Amjad, R., Arif, G. M. and Mustafa, U. (2008): “Does the Labor Market Structure
Explain Differences in Poverty in Rural Punjab?”, The Lahore Journal of Economics
Special Edition (September 2008): 139-162.
167
[8] Anastassopoulos, G. and Rama, R. (2003): “Industrial and geographical diversifica-
tion, and performance in food and beverages multinationals”, in: Rama, R. (Ed.),
Multinational Agribusinesses. Haworth Press Inc, N.Y., London, Oxford.
[9] Arora, A. (1996): “Testing for Complementarities in Reduced-Form Regressions”,
Economic Letters, 50: 51- 55.
[10] Arora, A. and Gambardella, A. (1990) “Complementarity and external linkages: the
strategies of the large firms in biotechnology”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 38:
361-379.
[11] Arora, A., Forman, C. and Yoon, J. W. (2010): “Complementarity and information
technology adoption: Local area networks and the internet”, Information Economics
and Policy, 22: 228-242.
[12] Athey, S. and Stern, S. (1998): “An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories about
Complementarity in Organizational Design”. NBER working paper #6600.
[13] Aubert, M. and Perrier-Cornet, P. (2009): “Is there a future for small farms in devel-
oped countries? Evidence from the French case”, Agricultural Economics, 40: 797-
806.
[14] Augereau A., Greenstein S. and Rysman, M. (2006): “Coordination vs. Differentiation
in a Standards War: 56K Modems”, RAND Journal of Economics, 37: 887-909.
[15] Auriol, E. and Schilizzi, G. (2003): “Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory
and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market”, IDEI Working Paper 165.
[16] Ayele, G. and Mamo, T. (2004): “Determinants of Land Contracts and Efficiency in
Ethiopia: The Case of Libokemkem District of Amhara Region”, Journal of Agricul-
tural and Rural Development in the Tropics and Subtropics, 105(2): 139-147.
[17] Barjolle, D. and Sylvander, B. (2002): “Some Factors of Sucess for “Origin Labelled
Products” in Agro-Food Supply chains in Europe: Market, Internal Ressources and
Institutions”, Economies et Societes, 25, 9-10: 1441.
[18] Belderbos R., Carree M., and Lokshin B. (2006): “Complementarity in R&D cooper-
ation strategies”, Review of Industrial Organization, 28: 401-426.
168
[19] Belleti, G. (1999): “Origin Labelled Products, Reputation and Heterogeneity of
Firms”, in the Socio-Economic of Origin Labelled Products in Agro-food Supply
Chains: Spatial, Institutional and Coordination Aspects. B. Sylvander, D. Barjolle and
F. Arfini (eds.), 2000, Series Actes et Communications, 17, INRA, Paris.
[20] Ben-Akiva, M. and S. Lerman (1985): “Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and appli-
cation to travel demand”, MIT press.
[21] Berges-Sennou, F., Bontems, P. and Requillart, V. (2004): “Economics of private la-
bels: a survey of literature”, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization
2: Article 3.
[22] Biesebroeck, J. V. (2007): “Complementarities in automobile production”, Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 22: 1315-1345.
[23] Binswanger, H. P. and Deininger, K. (1997): “Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian
Policies in Developing Countries”, Journal of Economic Literature, 35(4): 1958-2005.
[24] Birkhoff, G. (1984): “Lattice Theory”, American Mathematical Society.
[25] Black D. A. and Smith J. A. (2004): “How robust is the evidence on the effects of
college quality? Evidence from matching”, Journal of Econometrics, 121: 99-124.
[26] Bonnet, C. and Simioni, M. (2001): “Assessing Consumer Response to Protected Des-
ignation of Origin Labeling: A Mixed Multinomial Logit Approach”, European Re-
view of Agricultural Economics, 28(4): 433-439.
[27] Bottega L., P. Delacotte and Ibanez, L. (2009): “Labeling Policies and Market Be-
havior: Quality Standard and Voluntary Label Adoption”, Journal of Agricultural and
Food Industrial Organization 7(2): article 3.
[28] Bouamra-Mechemache Z. and Chaaban, J. (2010): “Protected designation of Origin
Revisited”, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, 8(1), article 5.
[29] Boz, I., Akbay, C., Jordan, G. and Kamalak, A. (2005): “Measuring
livestock farmers’ effect on sustainable agricultural and rural development”,
Livestock Research for Rural Development, 17: article 88. avaiable at:
http://www.lrrd.org/lrrd17/8/boz17088.htm
169
[30] Braham, E. (2003): “Translating terroir: the global challenge of French AOC label-
ing”, Journal of Rural Studies, 19: 127-138.
[31] Brandenburger, A. M. and Nalebuff, B. (1996): “Co-opetition: A Revolution Mindset
That Combines Competition and Cooperation... The Game Theory Strategy That’s
Changing the Game of Business. Currency.
[32] Breschi, S., Malerba, F. and Orsenigo, L. (2000): “Empirical patterns of firm growth
and R&D investment: a quality ladder model interpretation”, The Economic Journal,
110: 388–410.
[33] Bresnahan T., Brynjolfsson E., and Hit L. M. (2002): “Information technology, work-
place organization, and the demand for skilled labor: firm-level evidence”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117: 339-375.
[34] Brown, J. S. and Duguid, P. (2000): “The Social Life of Information”, Harvard Busi-
ness School Press.
[35] Burton, M., Rigby, D., Young, T., and James, S. (2001): “Consumer attitudes to ge-
netically modified organisms in food in the UK”, European Review of Agricultural
Economics, 28: 479-498.
[36] Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2010): “Microeconometrics Using Stata”, Revised
Edition, Stata press.
[37] Cappelli, P. and Neumark, D. (2001): “Do high performance work systems improve
establishment level outcomes?”, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 54(4): 737-
775.
[38] Caroli E., and Van Reenen, J. (2001): “Skill-biased organizational change ? Evidence
from a panel of British and French establishments”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
116: 1449-1492.
[39] Carree M., Lokshin B., and Belderbos R. (2011): “A note on testing for complemen-
tarity and substitutability in the case of multiple practices”, Journal of Productivity
Analysis, 35: 263-269.
[40] Carter, M. R. and Olinto, P. (2003): “Getting institutions right for whom? Credit
constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of in-
vestment”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(1): 173–186.
170
[41] Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R. (2006): “In Search of Complementarity in the Inno-
vation Strategy: Internal R & D, Cooperation in R & D, and External Technology
Acquisition”, Management Science, 52: 68-82.
[42] Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R. (2007): “Are external technology sourcing strategies
substittutes or complements? The case of embodied versus disembodied technology
acquisition”, Working paper no. 672, IESE Business school, University of Navarra.
[43] Chambolle C. and Giraud-Héraud, E. (2005): “Certification de la Qualité par une
AOC: Un Modèle d’Analyse” Review of International Economics 13:461- 471.
[44] Chand, S. and Yala, C. (2009): “Land Tenure and Productivity: Farm-Level Evidence
from Papua New Guinea”, Land Economics, 85(3): 442-453.
[45] Cheng, M. J. and Simmons, J. E. L. (1994): “Traceability in manufacturing systems”,
International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 14(10): 4-16.
[46] Cheng, S. and Long, S. (2006) “Testing for IIA in the Multinomial Logit Model”,
Sociological Methods & Research 35: 583-600.
[47] Christensen, C. M. (1997): “The Innovator’s Dilemma - When New Technologies
Cause Great Firms to Fail”, Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
[48] Clogg, C. and Shihadeeh, E. (1994): “Statistical Models for Ordinary Variables”,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
[49] Colombo, M. G. and Mosconi, R. (1995): “Complementarity and Cumulative Learning
Effects in the Early Diffusion of Multiple Technologies”, The Journal of Industrial
Economics, 43(1): 13-48.
[50] Cosanigro, M., Bond, C. A., and McCluskey, J. J. (2012): “Reputation Leaders, Qual-
ity Laggards: Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and Collective Reputa-
tions”, Journal of Agricultural Ecnomics, 63(2): 245-264.
[51] Crespi, J. (2007): “Generic Advertising and Product Differentiation Revisited”, Jour-
nal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 5(1): 691-701.
[52] Crespi, J. and Marette, S. (2002): “Generic Advertising and Product Differentiation”,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(3): 691-701.
171
[53] Crespi, J. and Marette, S. (2003): “Some Economic implications of Public Labeling”,
Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3): 83-94.
[54] Csorba, G. (2006): “Screening contracts in the presence of positive network effects”,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26: 213-226.
[55] Darby, K., Batte, M. T., Ernst, S., and Roe, R. (2008): “Decomposing local: a conjoint
analysis of locally produced foods”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90:
476-486.
[56] Dasgupta, B. (1978): “Village Studies in the Third World”, Hindustan Publishing Cor-
poration, Delhi.
[57] Delgado C., Rosegrant, M., Steinfeld, H., Ehui, S., and Courbois, C. (1999): “Live-
stock to 2020: The Next Food Revolution”, Food Agriculture, and Environment Dis-
cussion Paper 28, International Food Policy Research Institute.
[58] Delve, R. J., Cadisch, G., Tanner, J. C., Thorpe, W., Thorne, P. J. and Giller, K. E.
(2001): “Implications of livestock feeding management on soil fertility in the small-
holder farming systems of sub-Saharan Africa”, Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environ-
ment, 84(3): 227-243.
[59] Devendra, C. and Thomas, D. (2002): “Crop–animal interactions in mixed farming
systems in Asia”, Agricultural Systems, 71: 27–40.
[60] Dinar, A., Hassan, R., Mendelsohn, R. and Benhin, J. (2008): “Climate Change and
Agriculture in Africa: Impact Assessement and Adaptation Strategies”, EarthScan,
London.
[61] Dorsey, S. and Boland, M. A. (2009): “Vertical Integration in the U.S. Food Economy.”
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 41(3): 585–598.
[62] Edwards, P., Pullin, R. S. V. and Gartner, J. A., (1988): “Research and Education for
the Development of Crop- Livestock-Fish Farming Systems in the Tropics”, ICLARM
Studies and Reviews, No. 16 ICLARM, Manila, Philippines.
[63] Erdum, T., Imai, S. and Keane, M.P. (2003): “Brand and Quantity Choice Dynamics
under Price Uncertainty”, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 1(1): 5-64.
172
[64] Erenstein, O. and Thorpe, W. (2011): “Livelihoods and agro-ecological gradients: A
meso-level analysis in the Indo-Gangetic Plains”, India Agricultural Systems, 104:
42-53.
[65] Fabien, S., Régis, A., Christiane, D., Gisèle, A., Louis, D. J. and Harry, A. (2010):
“A participatory approach in agricultural development: A case study of a Research-
Education-Development project to optimize mixed farming systems in Guadeloupe
(FWI)”, Advances in Animal Biosciences, 1(2): 507-508.
[66] Fahrmeir, L. and Tutz, G. (1994): “Multivariate Statistical Modelling based on Gen-
ralized Linear Models”, New York: Springer.
[67] Feder, G., Just, R. E. and Zilberman, D. (1985): “Adoption of agricultural innovations
in Developing Countries: a survey”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 33:
255-298.
[68] Filippi, M. and Triboulet, P. (2010): “Alliance and Partnerships in the development
of competences in agricultural cooperatives”, Canadian Review of Regional Science,
33(1), 115-132 (in french).
[69] Gallouj, F. and Weinstein, O. (1997): “Innovation in services”, Research Policy, 26(4-
5): 537-556.
[70] Garcia, M., Raes, D., Jacobsen, S. E. and Michel, T. (2007): “Agroclimatic constraints
for rainfed agriculture in the Bolivian Altiplano”, Journal of Arid Environments, 71(1):
109-121.
[71] Garcia, O., Mahmood, K. and Hemme, T. (2003): “A review of Milk Production in
Pakistan with Particular Emphasis on Small-Scale Producers”, Pro-Poor Livestock
Policy Initiative. PPLPI Working Paper No. 3, International Farm Comparison Net-
work IFCN, FAL, Bundesallee 50, 38116 Braunschweig, Germany.
[72] Gavetti, G. and Levinthal, D. E. (2000): “Looking Forward and Looking Backward:
Cognitive and Experiential Search”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 113-137.
[73] Gawer, A. and Henderson, R. (2006) “Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Com-
plementary Markets: Evidence from Intel”, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 16: 1-34.
173
[74] Gellnyk, X., Verbeke, W. and Vermiere, B. (2006): “Pathways to increase consumer
trust in meat as a safe and wholesome food”, Meat Science, 74(1): 161-171.
[75] Gentzkow, M. (2007): “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online
Newspapers”, American Economic Review, 97: 714-744.
[76] Ghemawat, P. and Levinthal, D. (2000): “Choice Structures, Business Strategy and
Performance: A Generalized NK-Simulation Approach”, Working Paper 00-05, Whar-
ton School.
[77] Giovannucci, D., Joslin, T., Kerr, W., O’Connor, B. and Yeung, M. (2009): Guide
to Geographical Indications. Linking Products to their Origins. Geneva: International
Trade Centre.
[78] Gonzàlez-Garcia, E., Gourdine, J. L., Fanchone, A., Alexandre, G. and Archimède, H.
(2010): “A mixed farming system for the reconversion process in the Caribbean: How
to do the necessary research? Which strategies?”, Advances in Animal Biosciences,
1(2): 483-484.
[79] Grant, J. H. (2007): “Advances and Challenges in Strategic Management”, Interna-
tional Journal of Business, 12(1): 11-31.
[80] Greene, W. (2003): “Econometric Analysis”, Fifth Edition, New Jersey.
[81] Greene, W. H. (2011): “Econometric Analysis”, Seventh Edition, Prentice Hall.
[82] Hassan, D., and Monier-Dilhan, S. (2006): “National brands and store brands: com-
petition through public quality labels”, Agribusiness, 22(1), 21-30.
[83] Hausman, J. A. (1978): “Specification Tests in Econometrics”, Econometrica, 46(6):
1251-1271.
[84] Haussman, J. and D. McFadden (1984): “A specification Test for the Multinomial
Logit Model”, Econometrica, 52, 1219-1240.
[85] Hayes, D. J., Lence, S. H. and Stoppa, A. (2004): “Farmer-owned brands”, Agribusi-
ness, 20: 269 – 285.
[86] Heckman, J. J. (1978): “Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation
System”, Econometrica, 46: 931-959.
174
[87] Hendriksen, G. and Bijman J. (2002): “Ownership structure in agrifood chains: the
marketing cooperative”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84(1): 104-19.
[88] Herrero, M., González-Estrada, E., Thornton, P. K., Quirós, C., Waithaka, M. M.,
Ruiz, R. and Hoogenboom, G. (2007): “IMPACT: Generic household-level databases
and diagnostics tool for integrated crop-livestock system analysis”, Agricultural Sys-
tems, 92: 240-265.
[89] Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, R. (1994): “The Firm as an Incentive Systems”, The
American Economic Review, 84: 972-991.
[90] Hou, J. and Mohnen, P. (2013): “Complementarity between internal knowledge cre-
ation and external knowledge sourcing in developing countries”, UNU-MERIT Work-
ing Paper Series 010, United Nations University, Maastricht Economic and social Re-
search and training center on Innovation and Technology.
[91] Hu, W., Batte, M. T., Woods, T. and Ernst, S. (2011): “Consumer preferences for
local production and other value-added label claims for a processed food product”,
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1-22.
[92] Ichniowski C., Shaw K. and Prennushi G. (1997): “The Effects of Human Resource
Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines”, American
Economic Review, 87: 291-213.
[93] Ichniowski, C. and Shaw, K. (1999): “The effects of human resource management
systems on economic performance: An international comparison of US and Japanese
plants”, Management Science, 45: 704-721.
[94] Innes, B. G., Kerr, W. A. and Hobbs, J. E. (2007): “International Product Differ-
entiation Through a Country Brand: An Economic Analysis of National Branding
as a Marketing Strategy for Agricultural Products”. CATPRN Commissioned Paper
CP 2007-05, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network, University of
Guelph. Available at:http://www.uoguelph.ca/ catprn/PDF/CommissionedPaper2007-
05Kerr.pdf.
[95] Jagtap, S. and Amissah-Arther, A. (1999): “Stratification and synthesis of crop-
livestock production system using GIS”, Geo Journal, Kluwer academic publishers,
printed in the Netherlands, 47: 573-582.
175
[96] Jaleta, M. and Gebremedhin, B. (2010): “Crop-Livestock Interactions in Smallhold-
ers’ Market Participation: Evidence from Crop-Livestock Mixed Systems in Ethiopia”,
Contributed paper presented at the joint 3rd African Association of Agricultural
Economists (AAAE) and 48th Agricultural Economists Association of South Africa
(AEASA) Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, September 19-23, 2010.
[97] Jamal, H., Khan, A. J., Toor, I. A. and Amir, N. (2003): “Mapping the Spatial Depri-
vation of Pakistan”, The Pakistan Development Review, 42(2): 91-111.
[98] Just, R. E. and Pope, R. D. (1979): “Production Function Estimation and Related Risk
Considerations”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 61(2): 276-284.
[99] Kaminski, J. and Thomas, A. (2011): “Land Use, Production Growth, and the Insti-
tutional Environment of Smallholders: Evidence from Burkinabe Cotton Farmers”,
Land Economics, 87(1): 161-182.
[100] Keane, M. (1992): “A Note on Identification in the Multinomial Probit Model”, Jour-
nal of Business and Economic Statisics, 10:193-200.
[101] Khanna, T. and Rivkin, J. W. (2001): “Estimating the performance effects of business
groups in emerging markets”, Strategic Management Journal, 22(1): 45-74.
[102] Klein, B. and Leffler, K. (1981): “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performacne”, Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 615-634.
[103] Kristjanson, P. M. and Thornton, P. K. (2004): “Methodological challenges in evaluat-
ing impact of crop-livestock interventions”, In Sustainable Crop-Livestock Production
for Improved Livelihoods and Natural Resource Management in West Africa (Eds.
Williams), pp.160-172. International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi.
[104] Kurosaki, T (1995): “Risk and Insurance in a Household Economy: Role of Livestock
in Mixed Farming in Pakistan”, Developing Economies, 33(4): 464-485.
[105] Kurosaki, T. (1997): “Production Risk and Advantages of Mixed Farming in the Pak-
istan Punjab” Developing Economies, 35(1): 28-47.
[106] Landon, S and Smith, C. (1997): “The Use of quality and Reputation indicators by
Consumers: the Case of Bordeaux Wine”, Journal of Consumer Policy, 20(3): 289-
302.
176
[107] Landon, S and Smith, C. (1998): “Quality Expectations, Reputation and Price”, South-
ern Economic Journal, 64(3): 628-634.
[108] Lapan, H. and G. Moschini (2007): “Grading, Minimum Quality Standards, and the
Labeling of Gentically Modified Products”, American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 89: 769-783.
[109] Lapar, M. L., Holloway, G. and Ehui, S. (2003): “Policy options promoting market
participation among smallholder livestock producers: a case study from the Phillip-
ines”, Food Policy, 28: 187-211.
[110] Laursen, K. and Mahnke, V. (2001): “Knowledge strategies, firm types, and com-
plementarity in human-resource practices”, Journal of Management and Governance,
5(1): 1-27.
[111] Lemaire, G., Franzluebbers, A., Carvalho, P. C de F. and Dedieu, B. (2013) : “In-
tegrated crop-livestock systems: Strategies to achieve synergy between agricultural
production and environmental quality”, Agriculture, Ecosystem and Environment, In-
press.
[112] Lence, S., Marette S., Hayes, D. and Foster, W. (2007): “Collective Marketing Ar-
rangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts
and Policy Implications”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89: 947-963.
[113] Lenné, J. M. and Thomas, D. (2006): “Integrating crop livestock research and devel-
opment in sub-Saharan Africa. Option, imperative or impossible?” Outlook on Agri-
culture, 35: 167–175.
[114] Levinthal, D. A. (1997): “Adaption on Rugged Landscapes”, Management Science,
43: 934-950.
[115] Levinthal, D. A. and Warglien, M. (1999): “Landscape Design: Designing for Local
Action in Complex Worlds”, Organization Science, 10: 342-357.
[116] Liesbeth D., Reardon, T. and Swinnen, J. (2004): “The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in
Central and Eastern Europe: Implications for the Agrifood Sector and Rural Develop-
ment”, Development Policy Review, 22(09): 525-556.
[117] Lipton, M. and Moore, M. (1972): “The Methodology of Village Studies in Less De-
veloped Countries”, Discussion Paper 10, IDS, University of Sussex, Brighton.
177
[118] Liyama, M., Kaitibie, S., Kariuki, P. and Morimoto, Y. (2007): “The Status of Crop-
Livestock Systems and Evolution toward Integration”, Annals of Arid Zone, 46(3-4):
1-23.
[119] Locksin, B., Belderbose, R. and Carree, M. (2008a): “The productivity effects of inter-
nal and external R&D: Evidence from a dynamic panel data model”, Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 70(3): 399-413.
[120] Lockwood, B. (1982): “Livestock in the Farm and Non-Farm Household’s Economy:
A Case Study of a Village in Sheikhupura”, Economics of Village Livestock, ed. M. J.
Khan and H. Rehman PERI Publication No. 198 (Lahore: Punjab Economic Research
Institute).
[121] Long, J. (1997): “Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Vari-
ables”, Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences. Sage Publications:
Thousand Oaks, CA.
[122] Long, J. and Freese J. (2006): “Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Vari-
ables Using Stata”, Second Edition. STATA Press.
[123] Loureiro, M and Umberger, W. (2003): “Estimating Consumer Willingness to Pay for
Country-of-Origin Labeling”, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 28(2):
287-301.
[124] Loureiro, M. L. and McCluskey, J. J. (2000): “Assessing Consumers Response to
Protected Geographical Identification Labeling”, Agirbusiness, 16(3): 309-320.
[125] MacDuffie, J. P. and Krafcik, J. F. (1992): “Integrating technology and human re-
sources for high-performance manufacturing: Evidence from the international auto
industry”, In: Kochan, Thomas A. and Useem, Michael, (Eds.), 1992. Transforming
organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[126] Maddala, G. (1985): “Limited and Dependent Variables in Econometrics”, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[127] Mahenc, P. (2004): “Influence of Informed Buyers in Markets Susceptible to the
Lemons Problem”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(3): 649-659.
178
[128] Malerba, F., Orsenigo, L. and Peretto, P. (1997): “Persistence of innovative activities,
sectoral patterns of innovation and international technological specialization”, Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 15: 801–826.
[129] Marette S., Crespi J. M. and Schiavina, A. (1999): “Can Quality Certification Lead to
Stable Cartels ?” Review of Industrial Organization 23: 43-64.
[130] Marette, S., Crespi, J. M. and Schiavina, A. (1999): “The role of common labeling in
a context of asymmetric information”, European Review of Agricultural Economics,
26: 167-178.
[131] Massini, S. and Pettigrew, A. M. (2003): “Complementarities in Organisational Inno-
vation and Performance: empirical evidence from the INNFORM survey”, London:
Sage.
[132] Mayer, K. J., Nickerson, J. A. and Owan, H. (2004): “Are Supply and Plant Inspections
Complements or Substitutes? A Strategic and Operational Assessment of Inspection
Practices in Biotechnology”, Management Science, 50: 1064-1081.
[133] McFadden, D. (1974): “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Analysis”,
In Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka. New York: Academic Press, 105-142.
[134] McIntire, J., Bourzat, D. and Pingali, P. (1992): “Crop-Livestock Interaction in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC.
[135] Menapace, L. and Moschini, G. (2012): “Quality Certification by Geographical In-
dications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation”, European Review of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 39(4): 539-566.
[136] Mérel, P. (2009): “On the Deadweight Cost of Production Requirements for Geo-
graphically Differentiated Agricultural Products”, American Journal of agricultural
Economics, 91: 642-655.
[137] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990): “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Tech-
nology, Strategy, and Organization”, American Economic Review, 80: 511-528.
[138] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1995): “Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure
and Organizational Change in Manufacturing”, Journal of Accounting and Economics,
19: 179-208.
179
[139] Miravete, E. J. and Pernias, J. C. (2006): “Innovation Complementarity and Scale of
Production”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(1): 1-29.
[140] Miravete, E. J. and Pernias, J. C. (2010): “Testing for Complementarity when Strate-
gies are Dichotomous”, Economics Letters, 106: 28-31.
[141] Mishra, R. K. (2007): “Livestock-Crop Production Systems and Livelihood Develop-
ment”, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors (P) Limited, Delhi.
[142] Mohnen, P. and Röller L. H. (2005): “Complementarities in innovation policy”, Euro-
pean Economic Review, 49: 1431-1450.
[143] Monteiro, D and M Lucas (2001): “Conjoint Measurement of Preferences for Tradi-
tional Cheeses in Lisbon”, British Food Journal, 103(6): 414-430.
[144] Moretti, A. and Tamma, M. (2010): “Networks of Complementarities: Complements
and Conflicts in Networks Configuration and Evolution”, presented at: 14th Annual
Meeting, European Business History Association 2010, Glasgow, August 26th-28th,
2010.
[145] Mortimore, M. (1991): “A Review of Mixed Farming Systems in the Semi-Arid Zone
of Sub-Saharan Africa”, Working Document No. 17. International Livestock Centre
for Africa, Addis Ababa.
[146] Moschini, G., Menapace, L. and Pick, D. (2008): “Geographical Indications and the
Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets”, American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, 90: 794-812.
[147] Mothe, C., Nguyen-Thi, U. T. and Nguyen-Van, P. (2011): “Synergistic effects of
organizational innovation practices and firm performance”, Working paper No. 2011-
32, CEPS INSTEAD.
[148] Nagassa, A. and Jabbar, M. (2008): “Livestock Ownership, Commercial Off-take Rate
and their Determinants in Ethiopia”, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)
Research Report 9, Addis Ababa.
[149] Ngambeki, D. D., Deuson, R. R. and Preckel, P. V. (1992): “Integrating livestock into
farming systems in Northern Cameroon”, Agricultural Systems, 38(3): 319-338.
180
[150] Nosheen, F., Ali, T., Anwar, H. N. and Ahmad, M. (2011): “An Assessment of Par-
ticipation of Rural Women in Livestock Management and Their Training Needs in
Potohar Region”, Pakistan Veterinary Journal, 31(1): 40-44.
[151] Okike, I., (2000): “Socio-economic implications of emerging urban food production
systems”, In: Advances in crop-livestock integratin in West African cities.
[152] Olesen, J. E., Trnka, M., Kersebaum, K. C., Skjelvag, A. O., Seguin, B., Peltonen-
Sainio, P., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J. and Micale, F. (2011): “Impacts and adaptation of
European crop production systems to climate change”, European Journal of Agron-
omy, 34(2): 96-112.
[153] Parthasarathy, R. P. and Birthal, P. S. (2008): “Livestock in mixed farming systems
in South Asia”, National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research,
New Delhi, India; International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics,
Patancheru, 502324, Andhra Pradesh, India. 156 pp.
[154] Parthasarthy, R. and Sethi, P. S. (1993): “Relating strategy and structure to flexible au-
tomation: A test of fit and performance implications”, Strategic Management Journal,
14: 529-549.
[155] Pell, A.N. (1999): “Integrated Crop-livestock management systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa”, Environment, Development and Sustainability, 1: 337-248.
[156] Perry, D. H. (1982): “Public Policy and Role of Dairying in the Pakistani Punjab”,
Ph.D. diss., Stanford University.
[157] Porter, M. and Siggelkow, N. (2001): “Contextuality within Activity Systems”, Work-
ing paper, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.
[158] Powell, J. M. and Williams, T. O. (1995): “Livestock, Nutrient Cycling and Sustain-
able Agriculture in the West African Sahel”, Gatekeeper Series No.37. International
Institute for Environment and Development, London.
[159] Randall, G. W. (2003): “Present-day agriculture in southern Minneso-
tav— is it sustainable? Available at http://sroc.coafes.umn.edu/Soils/
Recent%20Publications%20and%20Abstracts/Present-Day% 20Agriculture.pdf
(accessed Mar. 2005, 20 Jan. 2006; verified 21 Nov. 2006). Univ. of Minnesota,
Southern Res. and Outreach Center, Waseca.
181
[160] Rivkin, J. W. (2000): “Imitation of Complex Strategies”, Management Science, 46:
824-844.
[161] Rivkin, J. W. and Siggelkow, N. (2003): “Balancing Search and Stability: Interdepen-
dencies among Elements of Organizational Design”, Management Science, 49: 290-
311.
[162] Samuelson, P. A. (1947): “Foundations of economic analysis”, Harvard Economic
Studies, Volume 80, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[163] Samuelson, P. A. (1974): “Complementarity”, Journal of Economic Literature, 12:
1255–1289.
[164] Schaefer, S. (1999): “Product Design Partitions with Complementary Components”,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38: 311-330.
[165] Schumpeter, J. A. (1934): “The Theory of Economic Development”, Transaction Pub-
lishers.
[166] Scoones, I. (2009): “Livelihoods perspectives and rural development”, Journal of Peas-
ant Studies, 36(1): 171–196.
[167] Seo, S. N. (2010): “Is an integrated farm more resilient against climate change? A
micro-econometric analysis of portfolio diversification in African agriculture”, Food
Policy, 35: 32-40.
[168] Shapiro, S (1983): “Premium for high quality products as returns of reputation”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98: 660-679.
[169] Siggelkow, N. (2001): “Change in the Presence of Fit: the Rise, the Fall, and the
Renaissance of Liz Caliborne”, Academy of Management Journal, 44: 838-857.
[170] Siggelkow, N. (2002): “Evolution toward Fit”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 47:
125-159.
[171] Siggelkow, N. and Levinthal, D. A. (2002): “Adapting to Adapt: Sequencing Organi-
zational Structures to Satisfy Conflicting Demands”, Working Paper.
[172] Small, K. and Hsiao, C. (1985) “Multinomial Logit Specification Tests” International
Economic Review 26: 619-27.
182
[173] Smith, R. E. (2004): “Land Tenure, Fixed Investment, and Farm Productivity: Evi-
dence from Zambias Southern Province”, World Development, 32(10): 1641-1661.
[174] Steinfeld, H., Wassenaar, T. and Jutzi, S. (2006): “Livestock production systems in
developing countries: Status, drivers, trends”, REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECH-
NIQUE DE L‘OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES EPIZOOTIES, 25(2): 505-156.
[175] Sykuta M., and Cook M. (2001): “A New Institutional Economics Approach to Con-
tracts and Cooperatives”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83 (5): 1273-
1279.
[176] Tamer, E. (2003): “Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple
Equilibria”, The Review of Economic Studies, 70: 147-165.
[177] Tarawali, S., Herrero, M., Descheemaeker, K., Grings, E. and Blümmel, M. (2011):
“Pathways for sustainable development of mixed crop livestock systems: Taking a
livestock and pro-poor approach” Livestock Science, 139:11–21.
[178] Teece, D. J. (1986): “Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for inte-
gration, collaboration, licensing and public policy”, Research Policy, 15: 285-305.
[179] Teece, D. J. (2010): “Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation”, Long
Range Planning, 43: 172-194.
[180] Templeto, S. R. (1999): “Effects of Demographic and Related Microeconomic Change
on Land Quality in Hills and Mountains of Developing Countries”, World Develop-
ment, 27(6): 903-918.
[181] Tether, B. S. and Tajar, A. (2008): “The organisational-cooperation mode of innovation
and its prominence amongst European service firms”, Research Policy, 37(4): 720-
739.
[182] Thornton, P. K. and Herrero, M. (2001): “Integrated crop-livestock simulation models
for scenario analysis and impact assessment”, Agricultural Systems, 70: 581-602.
[183] Thornton, P. K., Kruska, R. L., Henninger, N., Krisjanson, P. M., Reid, R. S., Atieno,
F., Odero, A. N. and Ndegwa, T. (2002): “Mapping Poverty and Livestock in the
Developing World”, ILRI (International Livestock Research Institute), Nairobi, Kenya.
183
[184] Tidd, J., Bessant, J. and Pavitt, K. (2005): “Managing Innovation-Integrating Techno-
logical, Market and Organizational Change”, 3rd edition, John wiley.
[185] Tirole, J. (1996): “A theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Per-
sistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)”, Review of Economic Studies 63: 1-22.
[186] Topkis, D. (1978): “Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice”, Operations
Research, 16(2): 305-321.
[187] Topkis, D. M. (1978): “Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice”, Operations
Research, 26(2): 305-321.
[188] Topkis, D. M. (1998): “Supermodularity and Complementarity”, Princeton, New Jer-
sey: Princeton University Press.
[189] Torre A. and Traversac J. B. (2011): “Territorial Governance: Local Development,
Rural Areas and Agrofood Systems”, Physica-Verlag. Springer.
[190] Train, K. E. (2009): “Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation”, Second edition.
Cambridge university press.
[191] Udo, H. M. J., Aklilu, H. A., Phong, L. T., Bosma, R. H., Budisatria, I. G. S., Patil,
B. R., Samdup, T. and Bebe, B. O. (2011): “Impact of intensification of different
types of livestock production in smallholder crop-livestock systems”, Livestock Sci-
ence, 139(1-2): 22-29.
[192] Vanhonacker, F., Verbeke, W., Guerrero, L., Claret, A., Contel, M., Scalvedi, L.,
Zakowska-Biemans, S., Gutkowska, K., Sulmont-Rosse, C., Raude, J., Granli, B.S.,
and Hersleth, M. (2010): “How European consumers define the concept of traditional
food: evidence from a survey in six countries”, Agribusiness, 26: 453-476.
[193] Vilrla, L., Macedo, M. C. M., Júnior, G. B. M., Kluthcouski, J.
(2003): “Crop-livestock integration benefits”, In: Kluthcouski J; Stone
LF; Aidar H, eds. Integração lavoura-pecuária. Embrapa Arroz e Fei-
jão, Santo Antônio de Goiás, Goiás, Brazil. Translation. available at:
www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/integration/papers/integration_benefits.htm
[194] Vives, X. (1990): “Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities”, Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 19: 305-321.
184
[195] Walker, T. S. and Ryan, J. G. (1990): “Village and Household Economies in India’s
Semi-arid Tropics”, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[196] Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., Peck, S., Fenton, E. and Canyon, M. (1999): “Change
and Complementarities in the New Competitive Landscape: A European Panel Study”,
Organization Science, 10: 583-600.
[197] Williams, T. O., Hiernaux P. and Fernández-Rivera, S. (1999): “Crop-livestock sys-
tems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Determinants and intensification pathways”, In Property
Rights, Risk and Livestock Development in Africa (Eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow,
M. Kirk and P. Hazell), pp. 132-151. Washington D.C.:IFPRI, Nairobi: ILRI.
[198] Williams, T. O., Tarawali, S. A., Hiernaux, P. and Fernandez-Rivera, S. (Eds.),
(2004): “Sustainable crop livestock production for improved livelihoods and natural
resource management in west Africa”, ILRI (International Livestock Research Insti-
tute), Nairobi, Kenya and CTA (Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Coopera-
tion, ACP-EC), Wageningen, The Netherlands.
[199] Winfree, J. and McCluskey, J. (2005): “Collective Reputation and Quality”, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 87: 206-213.
[200] Wozniak, G. (1983): “The Adoption of Interrelated Innovations: A Human Capital
Approach”, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXVI: 70–79.
[201] Wu, D-M. (1973): “Alternative Tests of Independece between Stochastic Regressors
and Disturbances”, Econometrica, 41(4): 733-750.
[202] Zago, A.M. and D. Pick (2004): “Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incen-
tives, Public Intervention and Welfare Effects”, Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, 29: 150-165.
185
Essais sur la Complémentarité:
changements organisationels et de marché en agriculture
Cette thèse vise à tester pour l'existence d'eﬀet de complémentarités entre diﬀérentes activités
économiques dans le secteur agricole. Pour cela, nous mobilisons les deux approches que
propose la littérature, à savoir l'approche par la productivité et l'approche par l'adoption.
Nous commençons par une revue de la littérature sur l'économie de la complémentarité, en
nous focalisant sur ces deux approches de la complémentarité et ses modèles empiriques.
Nous proposons ensuite trois analyses empiriques permettant de tester ces modèles. La
première explore les déterminants du choix de marque et/ou de signes des qualité par les
petites coopératives agricoles françaises, avec un focus particulier sur la coexistence de ces
deux signes. La seconde fournit un test direct de complémentarité entre labels et marques
en recourant à l'approche par l'adoption. En estimant un probit multinomial, il est en eﬀet
possible de séparer l'eﬀet de complémentarité de celui de l'hétérogénéité inobservable. La
troisième introduit l'approche par la productivité, en sus de l'approche par l'adoption, pour
tester de cet eﬀet de complémentarité dans les systèmes de polyculture élevage adoptés par
les petits exploitants de la province du Pendjab au Pakistan.
Mots-clés: complémentarité, signes de qualité, polyculture élevage, modèles de choix discrets.
Essays on Complementarity:
organizational and market changes in agriculture
The main objective of this thesis is to test for complementarity between diﬀerent economic
activities in agriculture. To do this, we have recourse to the two approaches proposed by
the literature, i.e. the productivité approach and the adoption approach. First, we review
the economics of complementarity and analyze the diﬀerent empirical models to test for
complementarity. Then, we propose three empirical analyses testing these models. The
ﬁrst examine closely the drivers of the branding and labeling strategies from French small
agricultural co-operatives, with a focus on the coexistence of both quality signals. The
second directly test for complementarity between branding and labeling using the adoption
approach, by estimating a multinomal probit. This allow us to separate what is really due
to complementarity and what is caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Third, in addition to
adoption approach, we test for complementarity using a productivity approach in the mixed
farming systems adopted by smallholder farmers in Punjab, Pakistan.
Keywords: Complementarity; quality signals; mixed farming systems; discrete choice models.
